# Daily Report

# Central Eurasia

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8 November 1994

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## Central Eurasia

*FBIS-SOV-94-216* *8 November 1994*

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## Leaders Extend Mandate of Tajik Peacekeeping Forces

*LD0811120494 Dushanbe Radio Tajikistan Network in Tajik 1100 GMT 8 Nov 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] The council of the heads of state of the Commonwealth of Independent States has decided to extend the mandate of the CIS joint peacekeeping forces in Tajikistan until 30 June 1995 and to broaden the powers of the commander of these forces. This is mentioned in a letter by Sergey Lavrov, the Russian ambassador [permanent representative] to the United Nations, wh.ch was issued as a United Nations document on Monday.

The letter says that the council of the heads of state of the Commonwealth of Independent States have also agreed to extend the validity of the decision on measures to stabilize the situation on the state borders of the Republic of Tajikistan and Afghanistan, until the end of 1995.

It is reported in the document that the council of the heads of state of the Commonwealth of Independent States has appointed Major General Yakushev as the commander of the CIS joint peacekeeping forces in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict zone.

## Yakushev Named To Lead Forces

*LD0711210994 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2039 GMT 7 Nov 94*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Boris Sitnikov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] United Nations November 8 TASS—The CIS heads of state have decided to extend the mandate of CIS peace- keeping troops in Tajikistan until June 30, 1995 and to broaden the powers of their commander, Russian Ambassador to the U.N. Sergey Lavrov said in a letter issued as a U.N. document on Monday [7 November].

The CIS leaders have also agreed to extend the decision "on measures to stabilise the situation in the state border of the republic of Tajikistan with Afghanistan" until the end of 1995.

The CIS heads of state have appointed Major-General V. Yakushev commander of CIS peace-keeping troops in Tajikistan.

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### Kozyrev To Receive Iraqi Deputy Premier for Talks

*LD0811093694 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0824 GMT 8 Nov 94*

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow November 8 TASS—Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and Iraqi Deputy Premier Tariq 'Aziz will hold negotiations this morning in Moscow, it became known to ITAR-TASS.

The Russian foreign minister and the Iraqi deputy premier last met in October in New York. They had a coversation after Andrey Kozyrev made a statement in the United Nations headquarters to sum up his trip to Baghdad and Persian Gulf countries aimed at normalising the situation in the region.

### Media Barred From Meeting

*LD0811105994 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1036 GMT 8 Nov 94*

[By unidentified ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 8 Nov—No journalists will be allowed to attend a meeting between Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister Tariq 'Aziz, which is planned for this afternoon. ITAR-TASS has learned this at the Department of Press and Information of the Russian Foreign Ministry. A press release will be circulated after the meeting, the department said.

Diplomatic sources said that the talks are expected to discuss the easing of tension in the Gulf region, including Baghdad's recognition, as soon as possible, of Kuwait's sovereignty, and their common border. The talks will also discuss bilateral relations in the political and economic sphere during the so-called post-sanction period.

"The change of heart" on the admission of the mass media to the meeting was explained by the Russian Foreign Ministry as purely technical reasons. During the last visit of the high-ranking Iraqi envoy to St. Petersburg and his talks there with the Russian foreign minister, journalists were also not allowed to cover it. This resulted in numerous speculations about the content of the meeting among the Russian and foreign media.

### Shumeyko Delivers Yeltsin Message to ROK President

*LD0811070694 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0355 GMT 8 Nov 94*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lyudmila Yermakova and Ivan Zakharchenko]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Seoul, 8 Nov—South Korean President Kim Yong-sam has today received Vladimir Shumeyko, speaker of the Russian Federation Council who arrived here on a three-day official visit at the head of the Russian parliamentary delegation.

In the (Chkhonvade) reception hall, furnished in Korean traditional style, Shumeyko delivered President Yeltsin's verbal message to Kim Yong-sam, in which the Russian leadership's view on possible ways of solving problems arising in relations between the two countries was outlined. [passage omitted: Shumeyko is said to have complained to Russian journalists about the lack of a legislative base for developing economic ties with Korea]

In the course of today's meeting, the question of Russia furnishing its debts to South Korea was also dealt with. President Kim Yong-sam noted that it "appreciates Russia's problems."

The president of Korea confirmed his invitation to Russian President Boris Yeltsin to visit the Republic of Korea. OFFicial Seoul believes this could be arranged in the first half of 1995.

### Shumeyko Discusses Debt

*LD0711202194 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1234 GMT 7 Nov 94*

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondents Lyudmila Yermakova and Ivan Zakharchenko]

[FBIS Translated Text] Seoul, 7 Nov— Vladimir Shumeyko, Chairman of the Russian Federation Council, who is on a visit here, suggested that a document on cooperation between both parliaments should in due course be signed, following appropriate debates by both houses.

"Vladimir Shumeyko focused attention on a broad range of options deputies have in resolving state problems. He recalled the Russian Government's proposal to pay with military equipment for some of the debts which have accrued within the context of South Korean credits and are now owed by Russia as the former USSR's legal successor. Some estimates put the overdue credit debts at 400 million dollars. It would seem as though it were not a parliamentary problem, but when next year's budget is adopted, deputies will have to take the military and industrial complex' requirements into account, noted the speaker," ITAR-TASS reported.

### Russo-Japanese Governors' Meeting Opens in Niigata

*LD0811075194 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0726 GMT 8 Nov 94*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Yevgeniy Lents]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vladivostok November 8 TASS—Representatives from five regions of the Russian Far East and from sixteen major Japanese prefectures will attend the meeting of governors, scheduled to open in Niigata on Wednesday.

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Governor of the Russian Maritime Territory Yevgeniy Nasdratenko, who left for Japan today at the head of the Russian delegation, told ITAR-TASS that "the meeting's main purpose is to draw up concrete bilateral cooperation proposals for Russian First Vice-Premier Oleg Soskovets' upcoming visit to Japan".

At the invitation of the meeting sponsors—the Japanese Foreign Ministry and the Japanese-Russian committee for cooperation—the meeting will be attended by the heads of many well known Japanese firms. Together with the Russian representatives, they will draw up a package of business ideas, which will be submitted to the Russian and Japanese governments. The Japanese firms hope to get from them not only legal, but also financial support to several major projects.

"The priority areas of cooperation between the Russian Maritime Territory and the Japanese prefectures include energetics, coal and ore-mining, fishing and fish-processing, development of ports and agriculture," Andrey Zagumennov, chairman of the Maritime committee for external relations, told ITAR-TASS. "Agreement has already been reached between the Maritime territorial leadership and the Japanese 'Sumitomo' firm on the latter's participation in the project to modernise the water and electricity supply systems of Vladivostok and Nakhodka."

### Yeltsin Sends Message to Governors

*LD0811072194 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0700 GMT 8 Nov 94*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow November 8 TASS—Russian President Boris Yeltsin sent a message to the second meeting between the administration heads of Russian Far Eastern territories and regions and Japanese governors, which will open in Niigata on Wednesday.

Noting that he sends this message with great satisfaction, the president said that the first meeting between Japanese and Russian governors, held two years ago, made an impressive contribution to qualitatively new relations between the neighbouring countries in the Sea of Japan basin.

Stepped-up bilateral relations promoted the development of mutual understanding between the two nations, he stressed.

The Russian leader expressed firm conviction that such fora would largely facilitate and stimulate the work of central governments in developing inter-state relations.

Yeltsin underlined that broader economic and cultural ties and technical interaction at the level of Russian Far Eastern territories and regions and Japanese prefectures promote further advance of mutually advantageous cooperation as well as stronger peace and friendship between nations in the entire Asia-Pacific area.

In conclusion, the president wished all the participants in the forum successes and fruitful work.

### Mikhaylov Leaves for PRC Nuclear Cooperation Talks

*LD0711162394 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1055 GMT 7 Nov 94*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Mikhail Karlov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 7 Nov—Russian and Chinese experts will discuss future cooperation in the sphere of the peaceful use of nuclear power. A delegation of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy headed by Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhaylov, has left for the People's Republic of China. An ITAR- TASS correspondent was informed of this today at the directorate for information and public relations of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy.

### Joint Mig-AT Project Developing Successfully

*MM0711185794 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Nov 94 p 3*

["Own Information" report: "MiG-AT: Work Going According to Schedule"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The MiG-AT trainer program, on which the "MiG" Aviation Science and Production Complex [ASPC], the Moscow Aviation Production Association, and GosNIAS [expansion unknown] are working in cooperation with the well-known French firms SNECMA and Sextant Avionique, is arousing keen interest not only in the Russian but also the French military department. In late October the Moscow Aviation Production Association and the "MiG" ASTC were visited by representatives of the French Defense Ministry's Main Directorate for International Relations and the French Embassy in Russia, who studied the organization of the work and the implementation of the schedule for the construction of the first MiG-AT prototypes. The participants in the working meeting were shown the production areas where the series production of the new aircraft will be carried out, as well as certain components of the airframe, the main gear, and a set of "Larzak" engine exhaust components ready for shipment to France.

It was pointed out that Russian and French specialists are successfully integrating the on-board equipment, testing the complex's software programs, and developing spare equipment and aircraft systems. All this inspires confidence that the MiG-AT will take to the skies next April. There are already plans to show it at the Le Bourget Airshow in June.

### Paper Says Walesa Sees Quarrel as Vote-Winner

*MM0711151594 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Nov 94 p 8*

[Commentary by Anatoliy Shapovalov: "Do Not Confuse Pride With Arrogance. It Was Not 'Shuttle Traders' Who Were Beaten Up at Warsaw Station, But Citizens of Another State"]

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[FBIS Translated Text] As we have already reported, an extremely ugly incident occurred at Warsaw East Station: Passengers from Russia were robbed and beaten up by Polish police officers, who, instead of helping, hounded the victims with tear gas, calling them "Russian swine."

This is not the first time that something like this has occurred, it must be said. Simply such incidents were previously not made public.

Now the situation has changed. This event has shaken both the Russian Federation Government and ordinary Russian citizens to the depths of their soul. In view of the absence of an appropriate and detailed answer, satisfactory to the Russian side, as to the details and culprits of the event, not to mention public apologies in connection with the act of violence against Russian citizens at Warsaw station, Russian Federation Government Chairman Viktor Chernomyrdin has postponed his visit to Poland.

Warsaw failed to understand this. The newspaper SZTANDAR MLODYCH actually accused the Russian mass media of whipping up hysteria. Unfortunately, this newspaper started looking for the cause of visit's cancellation not in the regrettable incident at the station, but in higher considerations of international politics. Not everything was going smoothly, it said, first as regards the zero-option agreement (providing for the effective annulment of debts), which it was assumed would be signed during V. Chernomyrdin's official visit. Second, the protocol on the funding of the Polish section of the Yamal-West Europe gas pipeline is evidently not ready. Third, GAZETA WYBORCZA writes, "since the United States gave a clearly expressed signal about its readiness to speed up the acceptance of Poland into NATO, government circles in Warsaw have been sure that a Russian counteroffensive would ensue."

Everyone is free to think whatever he likes. But here is a curious fact. Not a single paper could be found in Poland today—apart from the church newspaper SLOWO-DZIENNIK KATOLICKI—giving an appropriate assessment to the incident at Warsaw station. The aggressive actions of the Polish police, the latter wrote, are probably an action worthy of regret.

The reaction of civilized Europe is also not without interest. Obviously, the German newspaper DIE WELT stressed, Moscow could not and did not wish to pass over this incident in silence. And not only because it allegedly wanted to steal a trump card from nationalists in Russia, but rather because of the wide public feedback.

Many things are being said in Warsaw about what happened. So far only President Lech Walesa is keeping silent—the same Lech Walesa who in 1981, as leader of "Solidarity," took a bucket and dishcloth and washed the defiled monuments to Soviet soldiers who laid down their lives for the liberation of Poland. Acts of defilement, he stated at the time, are neither humane nor Christian. Today Walesa is making out that nothing special happened, that this does not concern him, the head of state. Actually, there is quite a simple explanation. The president is wholly engrossed by the elections, which take place in less than a year. His situation is difficult. Perhaps this is the crux of the matter: There could be votes in a quarrel with Russia.

## Foreign Ministry Information Chief Visits Romania

*LD0711215994 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1745 GMT 7 Nov 94*

[by ITAR-TASS correspondent Nikolay Morozov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bucharest, 7 Nov—The main aim of the trip to Romania by Grigoriy Karasin, director of the information and press department of the Russian Foreign Ministry, which started today, is to establish direct contacts between information services of the two countries' foreign political departments.

With the Romanian side we have been planning to hold consultations on the information field for a long time, G. Karasin told ITAR-TASS. Our purpose is to map out specific measures for information exchange and to establish operational mutual understanding between information services which, to a great degree, determines the atmosphere itself of bilateral relations. The talks are proceeding in a positive mood and both sides agree that far from all potentials have been exhausted for ensuring mutually advantageous Russo-Romanian relations.

During his five-day stay in Romania, the director of the Russian Foreign Ministry's information and press department will meet chiefs of the information services of the presidential apparatus, government and parliament, and media heads—ROMPRES agency, radio and television, and major newspapers—and will hold a news conference at the Romanian Foreign Ministry's press center.

## UN Representative on Return of Georgian Refugees

*LD0711231094 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 2052 GMT 7 Nov 94*

[by ITAR-TASS correspondent Boris Sitnikov]

[FBIS Translated Text] United Nations, 7 Nov—Approximately 1,000 people should return from Georgia to Gali rayon in Abkhazia by 6 December, Sergey Lavrov, the Russian Federation's permanent representative to the United Nations, reported at a Security Council consultative meeting today.

He noted that the 10th sitting of the quadripartite commission, which took place in Sochi on 27 October, confirmed the schedule for the return of Georgian refugees until 6 December. It is planned that approximately 1,000 people will return to Abkhazia's Gali rayon during

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this period. According to the schedule, the direct return of refugees will take place weekly on Wednesdays and Fridays. The sides have agreed in principle that the next, 11th, sitting of the quadripartite commission on the problem of the return of refugees, which will be held in Sochi on 23 November, will examine in practical terms the question of increasing the number of returnees.

It was noted that continuing terrorist actions which frighten people are one of the basic obstacles to the planned mass return of refugees. Both the Georgian and the Abkhaz sides have blamed each another for this. As a result, as of 2 November 34 families (73 people) in all have returned to Gali rayon, although agreement had been given for 150 people.

## Border Service Denies Withdrawal From Southern CIS

*LD0811110994 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0948 GMT 8 Nov 94*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Anatoliy Yurkin]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 8 Nov—The Russian Federal Border Service is denying reports by some sections of the media about the withdrawal of border troops from the southern borders of the CIS. The ITAR-TASS correspondent was told at this department's press office that no changes in guarding the borders of the Commonwealth are expected in the near future. Russian posts and detachments, brought up to strength by soldiers and noncommissioned officers from the call-up in Russia and the Central Asian states, will continue in the future to fulfill assigned duties, specified by international agreements within the CIS framework.

Specialists from the main headquarters of the Russian border troops believe that the Russian border troops not only guard the borders but also stabilize the situation by their presence. In particular, in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan [as heard] they cut off supply channels to CIS countries for weapons and drugs and hold back floods of illegal immigrants. As a rule the inhabitants of the border zone have good relations with the border guards and give them every assistance.

## 'Realists' Urge CIS Integration, Army Reform

*MM0711120194 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 4 Nov 94 pp 1, 4*

["Analysis Report" prepared by the management of the "Realists" Club Information and Analysis Group: "Russia on the Threshold of Its Second Millennium. United? Indivisible? In a Eurasian Community? Or...."—first five paragraphs are introduction by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA Chief Editor Anatoliy Yurkov; last paragraph is editorial conclusion]

[FBIS Translated Text] Every day the editorial office receives invitations to press conferences, presentations, congresses, and "roundtables." We come along and often see another leader wanting to draw great Russia's attention to himself. Or the general secretary of a new party that can fit around a single table. Or yesterday's men wanting to turn back time.

And they all aspire to the role of the Fatherland's saviors.

The document that RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA is publishing today on page four is not quite a document. It is more like the construction material with which scientists, specialists, public figures, and politicians from the "Realists" Club are shaping Russia's future, without pomp or rostrums carrying official coats of arms. In a realistic way for intelligent statesmen, for the cause.

During a recent "Realists" plenary session chaired by Club President Yuriy Petrov, this concept of Russia's future was discussed in a trenchant and principled manner and met with both supporters and opponents.

They agreed that the concept—before it lands on presidents' and governments' desks—is open to modification and improvement. Particularly by competent specialists from the CIS countries, parliaments, and other state structures. We agreed with Yu. Petrov that RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA would publish the text of the concept—as yet "raw," but undoubtedly interesting—in the form in which it was submitted to the "Realists," and would ask all comers to discuss it.

The end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union herald a new phase in the development of the world community. In these conditions an in-depth scientific analysis of the new realities that have emerged and the revelation of Russia's role and place in the geopolitical area acquire particular significance. This work attempts to look at the main problems in the above sphere, draw the requisite conclusions, and make the necessary recommendations.

### I. The Special Features of the Russian Federation's Geopolitical Position

The emergence of the Russian Federation as a sovereign autonomous state on the geographical map has not improved its geopolitical position. On the contrary, owing to the breakup of the USSR Russia's territory has been cut by 5.3 million square km and its western borders have shifted eastward. Today the Russian Federation borders 10 new states showing a persistent tendency for new sovereigns to emerge.

As a result of the changes Russia has lost the first and second echelons of its defense on the front lines in Europe and its most powerful group of forces. The strategic defense area has been dramatically reduced. This situation creates conditions for various countries to actively apply political pressure in order to secure their own vital interests on Russian Federation territory.

Southern Russia's gravitation toward the Black Sea region, the Sinification of the Far East, the orientation of Maritime Kray and Sakhalin on the Japanese maritime

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economic area, and the impossibility of exhausted central Russia's fulfilling its role as the supporting structure for the Siberian and Far East regions are developing into regional economic isolationism and parochialism and bringing about the deformation of the optimum economic ties from which all Russia benefits.

The Russian Federation's geopolitical position is aggravated by the restriction and potential loss of access to extremely important ports in the Baltic, the Black Sea, and the Caspian. As early as 1990 the Russian Federation's ports were unable to meet 37 percent of its requirements for the shipment of foreign trade and coastal freight. Combined with the problem of a shortage of ports on the Baltic, Russia's foreign trade freight turnover in 1989-1991 dropped by 41 million tonnes, i.e. by 24.5 percent. The foreign trade shipment problem arises as a result of reduced access to ports, and this problem will make itself felt particularly acutely once Russia finds its niche in the international division of labor and dramatically increases exports.

Russia's potential for railroad traffic with both foreign countries and between regions has been considerably reduced. The Russian Federation's isolation in terms of communications and transport poses a potential danger for it if you take into consideration the emergence of new rivals as a result of the geopolitical transformation of the USSR in the shape of alliances involving the Baltic countries and the Turkic states in post-Soviet Central Asia and the Black Sea-Baltic Union, which are endeavoring to channel their flow of raw materials, mainly oil and gas, circumventing Russia, down the "Central Asia-Iran-Turkey-Europe" and "Central Asia-Indian Ocean littoral" routes.

The unified space communications system has to all intents and purposes been destroyed. Russia has to a considerable extent found itself in a confined area.

Considerable adverse changes have also occurred in the military-geopolitical sphere. The Baltic Fleet, cornered and virtually deprived of an opportunity to maneuver and preserve its combat readiness, has lost its main bases. The definitive partition of the Black Sea Fleet will deprive Russia of stability in the Black Sea. The possible loss of even some of the Kuril islands will disrupt the military infrastructure and integrated strategic defense in the Far East. And it will dramatically reduce the security of naval forces operating in the Sea of Okhotsk. At the same time Pacific Fleet forces will be disjointed and isolated from one another. Some will be cut off in the Sea of Japan, others in the Kamchatka region.

The Russian Federation's geopolitical potential is losing its root system in connection with the loss of its short- and intermediate-range missiles and also owing to the dramatic reduction in national military potential (by a factor of 4.0-6.5 in terms of ground-based categories of arms limited by the Paris Treaty and by a factor of two in terms of air-launched arms) compared with the NATO bloc, which is becoming the dominant military force in Europe.

Defense potential is also reduced by the restriction on Russia's right to the deployment of no more than two regular mechanized infantry brigades in flank zones under the Tashkent Treaty.

Owing to the economic crisis a threat is looming over the military-industrial complex and state-of-the-art military technologies. The country is cutting back mobilization resources, and there is evidence of mental and physical enfeeblement in the draft generation.

To sum up, it must be acknowledged that, **first,** as a result of the breakup of the USSR Russia has lost more factors of strength than it has gained; **second,** geopolitically Russia has returned to pre-Petrine times, finding itself pushed deep into the Eurasian continent. That will create the conditions for an increase in the threats to the Russian Federation's economic, military, ecological, and information security; **third,** a considerable decline can be discerned in Russia's sociopolitical and military status within the system of interstate relations. The Russian Federation has come up against a fundamentally new geopolitical reality, which necessitates a radical change in both its foreign and domestic policies.

### II. The Multipolar World and Russia

The late 20th century will most likely be a period that sees the fundamental destruction of the existing structure of established international relations. With the end of the Cold War and of the confrontation between two diametrically opposed social formations the bipolar world has collapsed, to be replaced by a multipolar world with such main centers of strength as the United States, Japan, Europe, China, and the Islamic world. At the same time the United States holds the lead among the above states. Over the next few years, according to many experts, there could most probably be a clash between two main trends. The first is linked with the further increase in the U.S. role linked to the building of a so-called new world order, an increase in military-political diktat via the subordination to U.S. interests primarily of states producing and supplying raw materials. In this connection U.S. diplomacy, with the backing of the political and economic establishment, could impose on Russia an "equitable" alliance based on a "facade" of military-strategic parity. Russia will receive help in achieving rapid European and North Atlantic integration to promote the development of its own democratic institutions and a market economy within the country.

On the other hand there could quite possibly be a move away from the pan-American idea, a renunciation of the role of leader of the world community, a shift of emphasis to resolving domestic problems, the protracted development of isolationist concepts, and a strengthening of the North American core (the United States, Canada, and Mexico) in the geopolitical area. As a result of this trend we can expect a weakening of U.S. positions within NATO and cooler relations with Russia.

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At the same time, although it has a preponderance of military power, the United States by no means dominates the system of international relations. Analysis shows that the United States bases its activity on greatly eroded national priorities rather than on a fully formalized foreign policy strategy. It is clear that in the longer term the United States could aspire to be the first country among equals. All this must be taken into consideration when formulating Russia's foreign policy course.

In Europe the process of "super-European" rapprochement and unification within CSCE structures which go beyond Europe and America and of strengthening the European Union as a force integrating the West European countries will most likely gain momentum. NATO, a rigid and at the same time flexible economic and defensive-political alliance, despite the emerging contradictions caused by the elimination of military confrontation, will tend to grow stronger, even if it does lose the active U.S. influence in the North-Atlantic alliance.

The prevailing geopolitical situation presupposes a broadening of cooperation with West Europe (particularly with Germany, as a main subject of mutual relations), which is taking the path of economic, political, and military integration. This will help not only to boost Russia as a state but also to prevent any European power from dominating the continent.

Russia's interest in ties with Western countries is determined primarily by its desire to obtain advanced technology and financial resources. However, things are complicated by the fact that all these advantages and resources cannot be activated on a broad scale within a short time frame. Hopes are slim that exports of raw materials may provide funds sufficient to pay for mass imports of advanced technology. They are limited not only by the amount of raw materials for export but also by the capacity of Western markets themselves to absorb the kind of influx of commodities from Russia and other former Soviet republics needed to ensure that the export-oriented strategy has some real effect.

In the current initial phase of exploring Western markets we have seen active reluctance on the part of producers ensconced there to tolerate the destabilizing effect exerted by the new suppliers of cheap output. Presumably, with the increase in the flow of commodities from Russia and the other post-Soviet states Western countries will not balk at introducing protectionist measures and using antidumping procedures to this end.

The prospects for Russia to export finished goods to the West are even less favorable. In the markets for relatively low-technology consumer output Russian exporters will have to compete with cheap goods from the developing countries, which are actively ousting Western manufacturers from their own national markets. Today the export of high-technology Russian goods to Western markets is complicated by the industrially developed countries' high standards when it comes to the parameters which determine the environmental and ergonomic specifications of both industrial and consumer machinery and equipment. In developing states' markets Russian exports will encounter equally tough competition from the very same Western manufacturers or manufacturers from the new industrial countries. Moreover, developing states' purchasing power is considerably inferior to that of Western countries. So Third World markets cannot be seen as a means of supporting externally-oriented Russian economic growth.

In the Asia-Pacific region it is important for Russia to secure steady good-neighborly relations with China, which in the conditions of a multipolar world is acquiring tremendous influence on the whole system of international relations.

Relations with Japan are also very important. One cannot help seeing the difficulties associated with the transfer of the well-known territories in the course of rapprochement with that country. However, concessions there could cause a chain reaction among other states regarding the revision of borders.

In the Muslim world Russia is confronted with the task of squeezing out the Western elites which control the Islamic agenda [proyekt], replacing them with Eastern (Russian) elites, and thus gaining control of a highly important spiritual and ideological area and keeping Eurasia for itself.

As for Russia's place in the multipolar world, it is important to see the contradictions between the existence of Russian vital interests in all the main zones of the geopolitical area and the lack of real allies. While noting this, we cannot discount the fact that a number of states have territorial claims on Russia.

Owing to these circumstances it is becoming necessary to formulate a series of priorities in Russian foreign policy. The maximum to which it can aspire is the status of a regional power which will play a key role in Northern Asia. There is clearly no other realistic prospect. The main danger that lies in store for Russia during this complex period of transition, with its uncertain future, is an inability to articulate and uphold statewide interests under the centrifugal influence of external force fields. Russia's mixture of civilizations renders it a frail and vulnerable organism in the Eurasian melting pot of the future. On this premise we can declare the following priorities in Russian Federation foreign policy.

**First,** the stabilization of the post-Soviet area (an increase in ties with primarily Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belorussia [Belarus] as the Russian Federation's main allies). At the same time it is important to establish Russia in the eyes of foreign countries near and far as a guarantor of free, democratic development and to pursue the policy of gentle, unforced integration of the central Eurasian cultural complex.

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**Second,** the organization of mutually beneficial cooperation with the leading Asian and European powers (the first priority being East Europe, the Near and Far East; the second being relations with the Far West). However, this cannot constitute a policy in which the subjects of mutual relations are equally remote. Russia must have privileged partners.

**Third,** the supertask of Russian geopolitics is to ensure favorable conditions for the accelerated modernization of the country, naturally developing the most viable national traditions.

It is important to include three components in the system of foreign policy coordinates: national interests, national strength, and the national spiritual factor. At the same time it is important to take account of the fact that the Russian internal geopolitical area is still filled with criminal mafia structures and is experiencing vigorous infiltration by foreign special services, which are not only pursuing information and reconnaissance objectives but also political ends.

The destructive processes are gaining momentum. Along with the main economic threat there remains the threat to Russia's integrity (the external threat posed by territorial claims and an internal threat in the disintegration of the Russian Federation, in the emergence of ephemeral states in the form of the Siberian, Yenisey, Ural, Yamal-Nenetsk, Kuban, and other republics); the conditions still exist for the emergence of interethnic and interstate conflicts, which may flare up both right on the borders of the Russian Federation and in adjacent regions; the uncontrolled wave of migration that has swamped Russia has not stopped (at present there are 640,000 migrants from the near abroad and 500,000 foreign citizens in the country).

Thus, one of the most important conditions for the stabilization of the Russian geopolitical area is for the center of gravity of political activity to be transferred direct to the regions in order to really help create a new infrastructure to replace the one that has disappeared. The idea of guarding the Russian Federation border in two echelons (along the borders of the CIS and the borders of Russia respectively) is being voiced among the practical recommendations linked with shaping an embryonic geopolitical concept; proposals are also being put forward for the creation of a single defense area (the CIS Council of Defense Ministers) and for Russian military bases to be sited in the states of the near abroad.

On the whole Russia has a very acute need of an integrated state geopolitical concept, which should be formulated forthwith and submitted to the supreme legislative organ of the Russian Federation.

The idea of the integration (reintegration) of the former USSR republics within a single federative (confederative) state or a Eurasian Union is becoming increasingly widespread in the public consciousness. Implementing this objective is a complex and lengthy process. In order to render it effective, it is necessary to step up the quest for an integrationist, unifying ideology, combining it with a geopolitical concept and a real process of sociopolitical, economic, cultural, spiritual, and ethical unification.

At the same time it is important to exploit the integration potential of the CIS itself. The following efforts are needed to achieve this: implementation of the Treaty on Economic Union; provision for collective security; and unification efforts in the sphere of humanitarian questions and human rights and freedoms.

Today Russia's main national economic interest or, in other words, the main problem of national economic security resides in preserving the integrity of the country's economy while transferring it from administrative to economic principles of management and integrating it into the world market. To this end we must temporarily forgo any ideas of any rapid gains in effectiveness from more rapid integration in the world economy.

The threat to Russia's economic security stems primarily from the abrupt, sudden, and wide-ranging rupture of the habitual foreign economic ties. **Enterprises need time to adapt to the new situation, to the new prices, to the new requirements of new customers, and to the new potential of their new suppliers, but it is precisely this time that they are lacking. Hence our task is to give enterprises with the time they need. In order to perform this task it is primarily necessary to facilitate their commercial ties with partners in the former union republics.** The most important obstacle here is the failure to resolve the problem of money and financial relations, which is thus becoming the main task as far as Russia's economic security is concerned in the transitional period.

The general crisis state of the economy of the states formed on the territory of the USSR constitutes the major disintegrating factor hampering the creation of a regional system of economic security. Special efforts must be made at interstate level in order to stop the former USSR's economic area from breaking up once and for all during the crisis period. Purposeful efforts to counter the centrifugal tendencies are determined directly by the national economic security interests of Russia and its former Union partners. The CIS countries' potential is objectively integrated, and the restoration and strengthening of that integrity are the most important factor governing the international competitiveness of Russia and its immediate neighbors.

### III. Ensuring Russia's External Security

The end of the Cold War eliminated over 70 years of harsh confrontation between two opposing social systems. However, notwithstanding the emerging trend toward some easing of military confrontation, the world is no more secure than it was before. If we are not indeed threatened with a new world cataclysm, considering the well-known technological realities, we are right to fear the gravest consequences in the event of "small" and

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"medium" wars developing. This is due: **first,** to the emergence of new centers of power and the uncertainty and unpredictability of their aims and actions; **second,** to the change in the vital interests of various countries in the zone of such a powerful state as Soviet Union, now broken up into separate, poorly defended states; **third,** a shift in the threat vectors, with a latent increase in tension on the "North-South" axis; **fourth,** the lack of effective regional security systems oriented on the needs of a multipolar world; **fifth,** the uncontrolled development of events on the territory of the former USSR.

In these conditions military strength retains its function as the ultimate guarantor in matters of defense against aggression, subversive actions, and terrorism, in maintaining the territorial status quo, and in ensuring the state's national sovereignty and integrity.

Taking cognizance of the new realities developing in the geopolitical area, it must be pointed out that it is not in Russia's interests to cut back nuclear arms any further. In a situation where conventional armed forces are continuing to be rapidly degraded [degradirovat] and the Russian Federation will be unable for a long time to come to create the extremely costly potential for effective conventional deterrence of the full multiplicity of threats around its borders, nuclear weapons and a realistic doctrine for their use cannot fail to remain the main means of ensuring the country's security. Russia's transition to "minimal nuclear deterrence" is only possible in the extremely unlikely prospect of its integrating more closely into the general system of NATO countries' conventional deterrence, which would make it possible for the Russian Federation to refrain from making provision in its defense calculations for forces and weapons for nuclear deterrence in the European and North American sectors. So there is no need for a SALT III Treaty.

Relations between the Russian Federation and NATO are becoming a major geopolitical problem. For all the declarations to the contrary, the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic alliance are still potential military adversaries at the moment. It is the sense of a threat from NATO that makes Russia object so resolutely to the bloc's zone of responsibility coming closer to Russia's borders. In order to resolve the problem a security treaty must be concluded, envisaging on the one hand mutual nonaggression pledges and on the other steps to further (compared with the CFE Treaty) cut back armed forces and arms in the European theater, which would be the basis of a new and more stable military balance of forces in Europe.

The creation of a system of collective security could be one of the main steps in ensuring Russia's security. A defensive union of the CIS countries could form the basis of this system. At least eight states and Azerbaijan with reservations are ready to do this. This system must be structured on a regional basis with consideration for the geographic position of groups of forces and the nature of potential threats.

The following could be a possible version of this structure:

the East Europe region, comprising the territories of the Republic of Belorussia, the western, European region of the Russian Federation, and Kaliningrad Oblast;

the Caucasus region, comprising the territories of the Republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia and the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation;

the Central Asia region, territorially divided into a western and an eastern zone: the western zone consisting of the territories of the Republics of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and the eastern zone consisting of the territories of the Republics of Kazakhstan, Kirghizia [Kyrgyzstan], and the Ural-Siberian region of the Russian Federation;

the East-Asia region: the territories of the eastern part of the Russian Federation and the eastern area of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

With a view to ensuring security and organizing defense in each of the above regions a political-economic organ (a Defense Council) and a coalition group of forces command would be set up. Thus, the Defense Council in the East Europe Region, for instance, could have the following approximate composition:

the president of the Republic of Belorussia as chairman of the council;

as members of the council: the vice premier in charge of military economic questions, the defense minister, the foreign minister, the Russian Federation ambassador to the Republic of Belorussia, a representative of the Russian military-industrial complex, the heads of the administrations of Russia's oblasts in the region, and the commanders of the Russian groups of forces in this operational sector.

In peacetime this Council focuses its efforts on maintaining peace and stability in the region and settling contentious problems and crises by political conciliation alone, while at the same time maintaining defense potential at the requisite level.

In the event of aggression the above Council's responsibility is to organize the task of repelling aggression and attacking the enemy.

The armed forces and other troops of the Republic of Belorussia, the Moscow Military District, and the Kaliningrad Group of Russian Federation Forces transferred to the operational jurisdiction of a coalition military command and control organ form the basis of the coalition defense forces in the East Europe Region. In addition to operational groups of forces, reserves may be formed in the regions comprising national formations, command and control, and rear services organs from the armed forces of the member states, transferred to

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regional command jurisdiction at the start of combat operations or used as the Collective Security Council's strategic reserves.

All other troop formations, command and control and rear services organs, and military training establishments remain under the jurisdiction of the national military-political leadership and are used in accordance with its plans. The concrete structure, combat and numerical composition of the regions' coalition defense forces may be determined by decision of the Collective Security Council on the submission of regional organs and the Council of Defense Ministers.

The central coordinating organs in the CIS collective security system should be: the Collective Security Council; the Councils of Defense and Foreign Ministers; the general secretary of the Collective Security Council; the CIS military-economic commission; the Chiefs of Staff Committee, and the Headquarters for the Coordination of Military Cooperation.

In wartime (or a period of threat) it seems advisable to create a Supreme High Command of the defense union and its working organs, granting them supranational powers to take charge of repulsing aggression.

One of the most important conditions for ensuring the Russian Federation's security is the active implementation of military reform and the elevation of that reform to a state level of priority equivalent to the radical economic transformations. Russia really needs a well thought-out concept for defense policy. This policy must be based on the sum total of priorities, of which the main ones could be:

—**priority** for collective security over the superpowers' military strength

—**priority** for the formula of stage-by-stage elimination of nuclear weapons and other mass-destruction weapons over the formula of nuclear deterrence and intimidation;

—**priority** for trust over confrontation in the military sphere;

—**priority** for military cooperation over military confrontation;

—**priority** for civil society control over power structures;

—**priority** for law over political expediency when formulating a decision to use power structures.

Military organizational development is an inalienable part of defense policy. It presupposes defining the aims and tasks of the armed forces, their numerical strength, and their structure; means of manning units and formations, command and control organs, and categories of arms and combat hardware; methods and means of providing troops with combat training while ensuring personnel's moral and psychological stability during operations in the extraordinary conditions presented by an armed conflict; and a system of material and legal support for troops' vital activity, and social and legal defense for servicemen, while creating conditions for their spiritual development and maintaining high military discipline and law and order. All these elements must be linked together to form a unified whole and submitted in a special state program formulated with the participation of experts and representatives of Russia's political elite and public.

This analysis report was prepared by the information and analysis group of the management of the "Realists" Club, based on "roundtable" material as well as a number of scientific works by A. Glivakovskiy, V. Kuvaldin, S. Rogov, V. Frolov, L. Shershnev, and others.

## Russia's Security, NATO Relations Viewed

*954E0142A Moscow NOVOYE VREMYA in Russian No 43, Oct 94 pp 18-20*

[Article by Dmitriy Trenin: "Will NATO Expand Eastward?—And What Should Russia's Policy Be in This Regard?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Despite the fact that the proposal pushed through by Germany—that the process of accepting Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary into NATO begin immediately—did not receive official approval at the recent session of defense ministers of the North Atlantic alliance in Seville, chiefly because of the United States' position, the "process" has in fact "begun." It began long ago. Appearing last year in a RAND Corporation report, the idea of expanding NATO eastward coincides with envious aspirations of the new elite in countries of the former Warsaw Pact.

Therefore, the rejection of a new—"soft"—partitioning of Europe was originally perceived as a blow to the hopes of the Central European capitals and an acknowledgment of Moscow's role. The former socialist countries were soon able to recover from the failure, however, correct their strategy, and enlist support within NATO. A course was charted towards joining NATO through active partnership. While Russia, on the other hand, spent the first half of the year in indecision and uncertainty, focusing on secondary, derivative things (the notorious special status, for example), instead of taking the initiative in developing a Russia-NATO partnership. As the year draws to an end, it is evident that the Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, and Hungarians have moved noticeably closer to the membership they so desire in the military-political organization of Western countries. In 1995, apparently, the question of their phased entry may be officially included in the agenda. Is another crisis in relations between Russia and the West brewing?

### The Worst Alternative

The fact that the question of expanding the circle of NATO membership might be put on the agenda does not mean, of course, that it will be resolved quickly. Serious

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problems exist, including those related to the financial and material aspects of military integration. According to several assessments, getting Poland started on the transition to NATO standards would require a one-and-a-half-fold increase in the defense budget. Even if we presume that the West will provide gifts to the new members in the form of abundant supplies of arms, the acceptance of such gifts may turn out too costly for them. Replacement of arms and military equipment will require full replacement of the existing infrastructure and the retraining of the entire armed forces. There exists a great likelihood, however, that by the year 2000 the former USSR allies will become full-fledged NATO members.

Fairly influential forces, including forces in the United States, are insisting on pushing the process of accepting the new members into NATO, which would lead to a substantial geographic expansion of the "West" (in fact—right up to the external CIS borders). This prospect would change a great deal in the military-political landscape of Europe and directly affects Russia's security. Virtually all factions of Russia's ruling elite relate extremely negatively to the expansion of NATO. In summarizing the arguments presented in this regard, we can see that entry of the Central European countries into the North Atlantic alliance:

—would lead to disappearance of the 1,500-kilometer "security buffer" which has materially guaranteed military-political security on the continent following the end of the Cold War like nothing else;

—would in fact return to NATO its status as the potential enemy of Russia (and vice versa) by virtue of the fact that collective defense guarantees would be viewed as primarily anti-Russian;

—would force the Russian military-political leadership to alter its assessment of the external military threat to the country by virtue of the new capabilities NATO would have for inflicting a blow upon Russia;

—would strengthen the influence of forces within NATO that have traditionally perceived Russia's international role with distrust and even suspicion;

—would tend to change the internal political climate in Russia in the direction of rejecting an orientation on interaction with the West and moving toward the need to organize "the rebuff of expansion."

The likely result of NATO expansion would be the intensified isolation of Russia from Western Europe and its further alienation from the countries of Central Europe. Under such conditions, the Russian leadership could well resort to "responsive measures" which, in its view, would reliably prevent any further spread of NATO influence—which might now be exerted on the former Soviet republics. We may logically presume that energetic efforts might be undertaken to establish a new alliance in the form of the Warsaw Pact, the backbone of which would this time be Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. The eastward march of NATO would therefore result in a strategic movement westward on the part of Russia, which would certainly meet internal resistance and would even be capable of provoking a dissident movement, in Ukraine for example. Under these conditions, both flanks—the Baltic and Moldova—are destined to become fields of confrontation, with serious consequences looming for their internal stability. In fact this scenario begins a new Cold War, in which environment we might predict the establishment of a rigidly authoritarian, militaristic, and imperial-isolationist regime in Russia. Isolation from the outside world will be supplemented and reliably secured through self-isolation.

**Is Defeat Inevitable?**

This is, of course, a scenario of one of the worst alternatives. An "in-between" decision could also be implemented—the extension to Central Europe of NATO guarantees only, without affording membership in the alliance to the countries in question and without integrating their armed forces. All the same, we must admit that the overall situation is taking shape quite unfavorably for Russia. If it is the aim of Russia's policy to prohibit entry of the Visegrad group into NATO, Russia is in reality threatened with destruction. The Russian Federation has inadequate levers for influencing the adoption of decisions in the club of Western nations. Additionally, the impression is sometimes created that people in Russia do not have a very good knowledge of what is in Russia's best interests. The formula "without veto or surprises" is hardly of any help in this instance—Russia has not had and does not now have the right of veto, while the NATO-ization of Central Europe is a process, of course, not a surprise. Economically Russia is weak and continuing to grow weaker at present, this under conditions in which relations with the West have become more rigid, ties with former allies are severed as before, and relations with the CIS countries are unstable. At the same time, intensified—as natural compensation—official, great-power rhetoric may delude Russians themselves as far as the country's real capabilities are concerned.

Despite all this, Russia does in fact have certain opportunities for avoiding defeat and standing up for its interests fairly effectively. In order to effect their realization, it is necessary first of all to repudiate negativism and passivity. The more and the louder we object to NATO's expansion, the more arguments our opponents cite. The more we await conciliatory steps on the part of others, the more we lose the initiative. Russia must learn that our country's true objective lies not in suppressing NATO membership for Central Europe, but rather in the stable demilitarization of our own relations with the West. It is not a question of keeping the Hungarians and Slovaks from going to Europe, but of ensuring that we in fact do not find ourselves cut off from it.

It is entirely evident that a new, even if significantly softer, military-political confrontation with the West

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would be disastrous for Russia not just in the economic and political sense, but in the military aspect as well. It must be acknowledged that Russia is in no position to oppose NATO on the field of battle, even if it wanted to, and if for this reason alone it should try to close this field off. Then too it must not be forgotten that Russia is today confronting a serious challenge in the South. And in the relatively near future, a difficult strategic scenario faces us in the Far East. In order to successfully cope with the problems of today and tomorrow, we must free ourselves of the remembrance of yesterday's problems no longer urgent. Of course Russia needs "eternal peace," and not only in the West. But it is only in the West that Russia can realistically count on this at present.

One other thing is clear: Even in view of all its uniqueness, Russia is an integral part of Greater Europe (and not Greater Asia). Our most promising geopolitical partner is, of course, the European Union, not the Far Eastern countries, not the Islamic countries. As far as integration of Russia with the post-Soviet states is concerned, the parameters and course of this process appear more advantageous and effective under conditions of "eternal peace" with the West than under conditions of confrontation with it.

A positive approach means replacing political symbols while remaining faithful to unchanging interests. It is obvious that Russia will not acquire any veto in Europe. Consequently, there is no use spending all our energy opposing NATO expansion. Instead of this we should chart a course towards convergence and close interaction between NATO and the Russian Federation. In this regard, Moscow could realistically take the initiative in developing bilateral partnership relations. There is no lack of ideas on this account in Brussels—and this affords the Kremlin an opportunity. After all, the formation of new relations with Russia has been proclaimed the general policy line of the alliance.

**From Confrontation—To Cooperation**

There are influential circles in the NATO countries whose position proceeds from the absence of fundamental contradictions between North-North (the former East-West "axis") interests. They see a need for friendly, even alliance-type relations with Russia. Most do not want a renewal of confrontation. It is extremely important that we consolidate and develop these trends.

To this end, moving creatively in the very near future, Russia should place a program of practical cooperation on the table for discussion with its partners, a program that would envision procedures and institutions for continuous political consultations, military-diplomatic interaction, and military and military-technical cooperation, enabling us to move beyond the talking stage and construct—even without calling a spade a spade—an informal but genuine NATO follow-on.

The impression is sometimes created that Russia imparts too much significance, generally speaking, to the form relations take (readiness for immediate entry into NATO, proposal to transform the North Atlantic Cooperation Council into a "new type" of military-political organization, CSCE reform, etc.). In fact, any "monumental" form that turns out to be inconvenient to a partner can become an obstacle in the development of cooperation—which is essentially the goal of policy. The outcome is obvious: We should strive for practical cooperation with the West on the solid basis of coinciding national interests—which do exist, beyond any doubt, implementing this cooperation in forms that are realizable in practical terms.

An extremely important orientation of positive strategy would be the building of constructive relations with the countries of Central Europe. Without any doubt, this region is important for Russian security policy, but new relations could be built chiefly on the commonality of economic interests. Political initiative is clearly required in order to develop ties in this sphere—initiative from the Russian side. A logical beginning, taking economic, geopolitical, and historical factors into account, would consist of steps towards a new cooperation with Poland.

It might be advisable to first create—with the support of private capital on both sides—an independent public commission on bilateral relations, tasking it to draw up a report on the opportunities for the development of ties between the two countries and problems that might arise. We are not talking about "snatching" a country from a united front—which, incidentally, does not exist. Similar solid, friendly relations with the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia would provide a real guarantee against a new "cordon sanitaire." It is not the prospect of our former allies leaving for NATO that should alarm us (which in and of itself would hardly augment the military threat to Russia), as much as the revival in Central Europe of anti-Russian sentiment, growth of which the Kremlin is encouraging through its apathy mixed with negativism.

As far as the main topic of dispute—whether or not Central Europe should be in NATO—is concerned, the motives of Central Europeans (to stop being a "gray zone" and return forever to the bosom of the West) are understandable. Also understandable are the motives of the Bonn "sponsorship"—Germany, in the words of one German representative, no longer desires that the West be to its west, and the East—to its east. The FRG wants the West to be all around it. In principle, internal stability in Central Europe, like the inclusion of Germany in international security institutions, is in the interests of the Russian Federation. The problem lies in trying to prevent attainment of the one and the other from bringing about renewed confrontation in Europe and Russia's isolation.

Is a policy of trying to suppress what Russia has no power to suppress capable of averting such an outcome? Hardly. Our country will be able to protect its interests only by conducting an active foreign policy oriented on

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the achievement of concrete positive results—the attainment of close partnership with NATO, the building of new, constructive relations with Central Europe, and the establishment, together with Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, of the foundations of a new economic community.

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## Political Issues

### Yeltsin To Visit Udmurtia 10 November

*LD0811094294 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0858 GMT 8 Nov 94*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Taranov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 8 Nov (ITAR-TASS)—Russian President Boris Yeltsin will make a working visit to Udmurtia 10 November. He will meet the republic's leadership and visit one of the military factories.

The Russian Federation president will also take part in ceremonies to mark the 75th anniversary of outstanding Russian small arms designer Mikhail Kalashnikov.

### Chernomyrdin To Visit Kirov Oblast Enterprises

*LD0811094094 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0836 GMT 8 Nov 94*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Gennadiy Yezhov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 8 Nov—Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin will make a one-day working visit to Kirov Oblast on 9 November to brief himself on the situation at major enterprises in Kirov and Kirovo-Chepetsk, and on how the problems facing industrial and scientific installations of the military-industrial complex are being tackled. The prime minister plans to visit the Kirovo-Chepetsk chemical combine, the Defense Ministry scientific research instriute and a number of defense complex enterprises in Kirov.

Viktor Chernomyrdin will hold a conference with oblast leaders and enterprise directors at the end of his trip.

### Internal Minister on Martemyanov Assassination

*LD0711181694 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1700 GMT 7 Nov 94*

[From the "Vesti" newscast; passages within quotation marks recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Internal Affairs Minister Viktor Yerin regrets that time has been lost investigating the tragic death of deputy Martemyanov.

[Yerin] "Relatives originally failed to get in touch either with the militia or with the medical people and it is only 24 hours later that we were, regretfully, informed, by the medical people."

[Unidentified reporter] Yerin said that the president's meeting with the ministers in charge of the power-wielding ministries was also devoted to politicaly motivated crimes—first and foremost the assassinations of Min and Kholodov.

[Yerin] "We had a very hard talking to. We are not up a blind alley as far as these cases are concerned."

[Reporter] The crime wave is engulfing us all, but even in this situation, Yerin is in favor of following the law, to the letter and for resisting the line of least resistance under pressure. Yerin certainly does not believe that the ministry he has been entrusted with is in control of the situation, but the work is proceeding in the right direction. Personnel are working for peanuts, risking their lives. This year alone 150 Internal Affairs Ministry operatives lost their lives. The minister is not eager to retain his position.

[Yerin] "As long as you are of use both to society and to your own system, you need to keep on working in your post, no matter how hard things become, no matter how complicated things become—but to leave this post to suit political ambitions of some or other figures and to suit the demands of some or other factions is something I regard as faint hearted behavior and, as such, unacceptable."

### 'Governmment of Popular Credibility' Formed

*LD0711182894 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1726 GMT 7 Nov 94*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] A total of two million votes have been collected in favor of an early presidential election, leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation Gennadiy Zyuganov said at an opposition rally in Moscow on Monday timed to coincide with 77 years since Russia's October Revolution of 1917.

He said the State Duma (the lower house of parliament) would come up with a law on early elections in the next four weeks and that the opposition had formed "a government of popular credibility" including people such as Petr Romanov, Svetlana Goryacheva and Vasiliy Starodubtsev.

For his part, leader of the Russian Communist Workers' Party Viktor Tyulkin said "Russia has not run out of its limit of revolutions yet". He said the main task now "is to overthrow the present anti-popular regime". "We still face the task of carrying out a great socialist revolution", he thinks.

Other speakers at the rally, among them editor-in-chief of the opposition ZAVTRA Aleksandr Prokhanov, former commander of a police crack unit in Riga Cheslav Mlynnik and former Soviet deputy Sazhiy Umalatova, said that an immediate priority was to call a national political strike aimed at "overthrowing the Yeltsin regime".

Zyuganov put the number of people taking in a demonstration and rally on Monday at 200,000. However, police counts say that only 25,000 to 30,000 people took part.

### Rutskoy Justifies Actions, States Plans

*954Q0069A Moscow ROSSIYA in Russian No 41, 1 Nov 94 p 3*

[Interview with Aleksandr Rutskoy by Rodion Morozov; place and date not given: "Those That Have Reduced the Country to Crisis Are Afraid of Me"]

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[FBIS Translated Text] **It so happened that an employee of ROSSIYA once took part in an assessment of the actual potential of Aleksandr Rutskoy. This was in 1991, when the question of the introduction in Russia of the institution of the presidency had essentially been decided. It was clear also that Boris Yeltsin would run for this office. It was at that time that a request came from his election campaign headquarters—that he speak on the subject on the possibility of the nomination on B. Yeltsin's ticket as vice presidential candidate of A. Rutskoy, who was at that time chairman of a parliamentary committee. The conclusion (a copy of which is extant) was laconic: Colonel Rutskoy is a person who is far removed from democracy. Arguments were adduced. The atmosphere on the committee that he headed at that time was reminiscent of an army subunit. Not to mention the conflict that had arisen over the unwillingness of some Afghan veterans to join a unified structure. The degree of democratism of the two candidates for the highest offices of state proved similar, for that matter.**

Hardly anyone doubted that the return to big politics was for Aleksandr Rutskoy merely a matter of time. Although neither the bulk of Russian politicians nor the press wish, by all accounts, to recognize this as yet.

[Morozov] Aleksandr Vladimirovich, you began the resumption of your political activity with trips around the country, the heartland, essentially. Why?

[Rutskoy] I was in a difficult position: While I was in prison, the left and right "filled," if I may put it this way, my political niche, allocating me a place on the very edge of the right flank, with which I simply cannot agree. In addition, those that had done the "distributing" were, for the most part, those who in the tragic days of October had engaged, in the main, in demagogy or who had fled from the besieged House of Soviets completely....

I had to begin my political activity, however, practically from scratch. More, I had, in addition, to earn some means of subsistence: Despite the decision of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of 12 August 1994, the Ministry of Defense is still paying no pension for my 27 years of uninterrupted service in the army. But sitting with arms folded, weeping, and waiting for everything to change of its own accord is not my style. In my short time in politics—less than four years—I have learned a great deal and have produced a mass of program ideas and projects. And for me to be understood and for these ideas to "take hold of the masses," especially under the conditions of active opposition on the part of the "democratic" news media and the regime itself, which considered it the done thing even to order books discrediting me from a variety of Bunichs, Gulbinskiys, and Shakins, I had to go around the country, meet with people, and explain to them not only the essence of all that had happened but also the actual prospects that need to be fought for.

[Morozov] And are you traveling a lot?

[Rutskoy] In the past two months I have toured 12 oblasts, spending nine to 12 hours a day meeting people.

[Morozov] As far as I know, in your political activity, and at the upcoming presidential elections also, you plan to rely on the Derzhava social-patriotic movement that you have formed. But, going by what is written in the press, things are not all that brilliant as regards its construction?

[Rutskoy] The result of the first two months of our work in the regions is 568,000 applications for membership of the movement. We are specifying only fixed membership of both individuals and legal entities. Then, why do you think that I should lay claim to the roles of leader, president? I do not exclude such for myself but it is necessary first to win mass public support....

[Morozov] Very well. What does Derzhava represent in this case? Whom does it unite?

[Rutskoy] First, it is an organization in the full sense of the word, having a precise structure and discipline and subordinate to the overall leadership. It is such an organization, I most profoundly believe, that is needed in these difficult, chaos-filled times. Anyone to whom the following ideas are not alien may be a member: a revival of great-power Russia within the borders of the USSR; unity of the peoples and national groups in a single nation; the building of a democratic society of social justice. Aksyuchits' Russian Christian Democratic Movement and the Russian Social Democratic People's Party have consented to join the movement and cooperate with it; as have the nonradical part of the National Salvation Front in the person of Konstantinov, Dmitriy Rogozin's Congress of Russian Communities, and part of the LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia] under Kobelev. A number of other movements are at the doorstep also.

[Morozov] Is it not too heterogeneous a composition?

[Rutskoy] Whoever we are, whatever beliefs we hold, we are all citizens of a great country, and we have one purpose—to live a decent life.

[Morozov] To return to the fall of 1993.... Do you believe that all that you did, you did right, or do you admit to having made mistakes?

[Rutskoy] I do, yes, of course. But a number of factors of considerable importance played a part at that time, in October: the complete absence of means of control both inside the besieged building and outside it; the total mass betrayal by the leaders of parties and movements and army generals, the militia, and the security authorities; the total lack of material and financial resources; the limited number of weapons; the inaction and cowardice of the regional soviets and, consequently, the absence of mass support on the scale of Russia; treachery within the Supreme Soviet both among deputies bought off by handouts and offices by the Yeltsin regime and among the parliamentary leadership (it is sufficient to see where

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the various Ryabovs, Abdulatipovs, Pochinoks, and others are currently "working" and for whom); the well-planned, carefully considered system of provocations; the total absence of the possibility of getting on the air in terms of both television and radio; the absence of a really controlled opposition and forces capable of fighting; the physical and moral exhaustion of both the leadership and the defenders of the House of Soviets—two weeks without food, water, or light and in a state of constant tension. Let anyone else under these conditions not make mistakes.

[Morozov] Once, long ago, you and Yeltsin gave the impression of being fellow thinkers, if not friends. Was this true? And, generally, was there a time when you were one team: Yeltsin, Khasbulatov, Rutskoy? Or not?

[Rutskoy] As far as like-mindedness is concerned, at the first stage, yes. As far as friendship, we were never friends, and thank God, as they say. Nor was there one team, not counting the first four months of work. Can there be a team when those that helped someone become president are relegated to the role of extras? I personally in November 1991, Ruslan Imranovich, somewhat later, realized who under the general title of "president of Russia" had assumed office and why. The reasons became clear—why I had been harnessed to the cart in which I was to pull Yeltsin to the charted goal. After the victory, first hints, then words of the "chief" outlined the role that had been assigned me. Information (which I did not believe) that a conspiracy against the Soviet Union would be prepared filtered through to me also. After the "Belovezha compact" of 8 December 1991 and the active formation of a government of "amateur economists," I finally realized that a political rabble had come to power. After which I adopted a position to which I adhered and to which I now adhere to this day. Of course, I attempted repeatedly to persuade Yeltsin that we had not chosen this course, that he had surrounded himself with the wrong people, and that this riff-raff would disgrace not only him but the whole country also. Then I abandoned this, realizing that the mind of the "popularly elected" could no longer be changed.

[Morozov] In the period of the critical exacerbation of relations with the president one of the main allegations against you was acquaintanceship with such people as Miroshnik, the Sokolov brothers, and Akop Yuzbashev, "king" of the Moscow region. How could it have happened that these people were by your side?

[Rutskoy] Something had to be written to discredit the inconvenient "vice," particularly after his work on the exposure and disclosure of corruption in the highest echelons of power. So whatever came to mind was pinned on Rutskoy. I gave these hacks an opportunity to show the people via the investigation and trial what sort of person the vice president was. But, as is the case in a "democratic" state, the prosecutors cover the scribblers of this dirt, and the newspapers repudiate the authors of lampoons; these are not their journalists, they say, and how this article or the other ended up in the newspaper is not known. Prove any way that you like that you are not a rogue. You think that if I had really derived anything from the "acquaintanceship" with these people, I would now be at liberty? And would I, having "grabbed" while I was in office, now be forced to go around begging and to seek sources of financing for the creation of a movement and my trips around the country?

I shall tell you, for that matter, how Yuzbashev appeared. A person came to me proposing the creation in Pushkinskiy Rayon of an interfarm association for the processing of agricultural products. I invited the chairman of the soviet of people's deputies and the head of the administration of Pushkinskiy Rayon, and we went together to the location, studied the proposal, and made the decision to offer assistance—this was the entire contact. What was unlawful about these actions, if in that period, in accordance with the instructions of the president, I was developing new forms of agricultural production? What is reprehensible in the response to the proposal of an entrepreneur for help in the creation of the same agro-industrial complex as we had created near Istra? But fear that someone would finance Rutskoy and his opposition party did its work. It was here that, in accordance with instructions from the top, a "case" against Rutskoy and his "gangster" circle was concocted. And stories about bribes in the presence of Vinokur and about Rolex watches, sabers, and other rubbish began. This was nothing other than a preemptive stab in the back that had been planned in advance. The powers that be sensed where the work of my commission to fight crime and corruption would lead. Of the 55 cases of corruption in the highest echelons of power that had been instituted by the investigation group headed by the deputy prosecutor general, 46 were, following investigation, confirmed.

Under what kind of conditions were we working—it is sufficient to recall the public statement of Yu. Boldyrev, former chief of the Main Control Administration of the Office of the President of the Russian Federation: "I was ordered by the president under no circumstances to give Rutskoy the papers on verification of the instances of looting against the Western Group of Forces." And now M. Burlakov, former commander of the Western Group of Forces, who should be held responsible for the looting not only of the Western Group of Forces but of the Southern Group of Forces also, has for "outstanding" services, under Grachev's protection, been appointed first deputy minister of defense....

How do you think the president reacted at that time to my announcement on the results of the commission's work? He summoned these people and said: "See what Rutskoy has dug up on you." Yet the embezzlements were of a minimum of R5 million and up (in old prices). Never mind about anything else if nine months after the shooting up of parliament Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin handed out privileges to "close" commercial structures

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of R6.5 trillion! I do not know why the Duma does not remember and is pretending that nothing has happened and nothing is happening. But I know why the Federation Council is silent, why its chairman, Shumeyko, is silent—because his assistant, one Romanyukh, has run off with stolen millions of dollars to Canada and is wanted. He has fled to where another friend of Shumeyko's—the not-unknown Dima Yakubovskiy, of whose services the president himself even avails himself—dwells.

[Morozov] A reason for your break with Yeltsin was, it is now customary to believe, your disagreement with the reform policy that he is pursuing. What do you wish to bring to office? After all, the main thing that drives you, in the opinion of the majority of your adversaries, is revenge.

[Rutskoy] Coming to power to exact vengeance—where, generally, does this idea come from? It is simply that the ones that have reduced the country's economy to crisis, and the people, to humiliating poverty, and that have stolen public property should for the first time in the 77 years of our history appear before the law and answer for their crimes. And this is possible only if I become head of state. And they are afraid.

## Procurator 'Pessimistic' on Kholodov Case

*954F0258A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 28 Oct 94 pp 1-2*

[Interview with Moscow Procurator Gennadiy Ponomarev by Lidiya Timofeyeva; place and date not given; under the rubric "Firsthand": "Gennadiy Ponomarev: 'Contract Murders Are Rarely Solved'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **As Moscow Procurator Gennadiy Ponomarev told us, the first to qualify Dmitriy Kholodov's murder as a terrorist act was the capital city's Krasnopresnenskiy Rayon procuracy. The second was the president of Russia, who ordered that the case be transferred to the General Procuracy of the Russian Federation. In Gennadiy Ponomarev's opinion, however, contract murders are rarely solved.**

[Timofeyeva] You are a professional jurist; you have spent more than 20 years in the investigative and oversight service. Have you ever encountered crimes committed for political motives?

[Ponomarev] First, there is no such article in the law. There is criminal culpability with political overtones. Second, no one case is like another. A year ago we investigated the kidnapping and beating of Viktor Anpilov, leader of the Working Moscow movement. We found some evidence that would enable us to identify one of the perpetrators. But at that point the general procuracy took over the case, and it died there. We did manage to see to the end the investigation of materials on Russian Federation Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoy (the Seabeco case). The case was closed because of the absence of criminal misdoing. We are still investigating the murder of entrepreneur and public figure Otari Kvantrishvili, as well as the attack on Moscow City Soviet Deputy Nikolay Moskovchenko... By the way, contract murders are the most difficult crimes to solve. They are conducted on an exceptionally professional level. As a rule the weapon is disposed of. The culprit leaves the country for a long time—sometimes for good.

[Timofeyeva] I think the independent journalistic investigation that is being conducted by MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS and other newspapers in the matter of tragic death of our colleague Dima Kholodov should help the procuracy. We finally have our own "muckrackers," just like in the West...

[Ponomarev] We always look attentively through what is published in the press. A year ago we initiated a case on the material published in VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA regarding militia officers seizing and beating up a journalist. We made an unsuccessful attempt to join forces with ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, which published its own version of Kvantrishvili's death. The journalist refused to work with us, and the editor in chief even upbraided the investigator when he attempted to obtain more precise information from the newspaper.

There also have been instances when procuracy personnel, having read an article in a newspaper and wishing to find out the details, discovered that the whole thing was the author's fantasy prompted by the desire to stir up interest in his periodical. That is, I want to say that our domestic "muckrackers" so far lack the true skill of investigation based on real documents and facts.

Dmitriy Kholodov apparently was one of the few true professionals. In any case, we see Dima's death as a loss to our ranks...

[Timofeyeva] What do consider unprofessional?

[Ponomarev] When journalists accuse someone without proof and indiscriminately, exploiting only emotions and their own hypotheses. Until an investigation is completed, it is premature, to put it mildly, to accuse, for instance, Pavel Grachev or Matvey Burlakov, or anyone else, of committing a crime.

[Timofeyeva] Then what do we do with the facts of corruption quoted in the MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS materials?

[Ponomarev] There is no such legal category as corruption; there is abuse of official position for mercenary gain. Culpability—again, if proven—is determined under this article.

[Timofeyeva] All right, but are politicians that different from journalists—take the president, who publicly gives glowing praise to Pavel Grachev and says that "there has never been such a minister of defense before"? Is this not influencing the investigation?

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[Ponomarev] I also consider such actions improper. Corporate or political interests should not supersede the law.

[Timofeyeva] Were there no instances in your practice of pressure from politicians or your superiors during an investigation?

[Ponomarev] There were before October 1993, and more than once. In August 1991 we received telephone calls demanding that we qualify actions of one of the sides as criminal. The general procuracy kept sending us to opposition rallies, tasking us to report what slogans were promoted there, what arguments were used. In short, there were attempts to drag us into politics, into something alien to us. And it sometimes happens now that some or other official suddenly displays "routine" interest in some or other case, indirectly attempting to influence the process. But since I am already "somewhat" known, they understand that this is not going to get them anywhere.

[Timofeyeva] Not everyone is aware that in September-October 1993 you behaved like a true procurator, which, translated from Latin, means "I care, ensure, defend" the law. Seeing Decree No. 1400 to be unconstitutional, you appealed to deputies to find a conciliatory option in this conflict...

[Ponomarev] Yes, I advised the deputies to surrender the weapons kept in the White House and personally participated in their transfer and inventorying until Rutskoy ordered a halt. I did what I could to have the blockade removed from the White House...

[Timofeyeva] But you contend that politics and justice are incompatible...

[Ponomarev] Of course. While a political decision depends more than 50 percent on a particular person, justice should be least dependent on subjective factors. When this rule is applied, and on top of that there are law-abiding citizens, we have the example of Great Britain, where there is simply no corruption among bureaucrats...

[Timofeyeva] In this case, we have exciting prospects for the next hundred years...

[Ponomarev] There is no other way.

## Opposition Rallies Held in Moscow, St. Petersburg

*LD0711153294 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1130 GMT 7 Nov 94*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Tamara Ivanova and Igor Belskiy]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow November 7 TASS—One of Moscow's central squares—just opposite the former KGB headquarters—buzzed like a beehive on Monday as the Russian opposition marked the 77th anniversary of the 1917 Bolshevik revolution.

Waving red calico flags and posters praising socialism and the October revolution, demonstrators carried the portraits of Vladimir Lenin, the founder of the Soviet state, and Soviet dictator Josef Stalin, some of them chanting "Stalin is our glory."

The rally was opened to the music of the International, followed by a minute of silence observed in memory of State Duma Valentin Martemyanov, who had been attacked and died in hospital of severe bodily injuries last week, and all those who had given their lives for the socialist fatherland.

One of the opposition leaders, Sazhi Umalatova, who calls herself chairwoman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, lashed out at ex-Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev for destroying socialism in the country. She also scathed President Boris Yeltsin for continuing his line. Umalatova called on the demonstrators to join in an action of protest by "not going to work, not paying the rent, gas and transportation fees until they leave."

Viktor Tyulkin, first secretary of the Russian Communist Workers' Party, said the major challenge facing Russian communists is the elimination of the anti-popular regime. He believes that "the potential of revolutions in Russia is not exhausted yet" and that "a great socialist revolution has yet to come."

Tyulkin said that communists had won in eight out of 24 constituencies in St. Petersburg in the first round of local elections, emphasizing the need to "continue the fight for Soviet power on all fronts and in all directions."

Russian Communist Party leader Gennadiy Zyuganov called on the demonstrators to support the people who were trusted by the Communist Party and who could govern the country.

Of the original list of 20 people announced on Sunday, Zyuganov named only three—Petr Romanov, Svetlana Goryacheva and Vasiliy Starodubtsev. Zyuganov's statements also indicate the Russian Communist Party's willingness to take an active part in the preparations for the upcoming celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the end of world war two. Their essence boils down to one clear message—"we won because we were united and led by the Communist Party." Therefore the Soviet Union and its Communist Party should be restored.

Zyuganov stressed that this issue would be the main theme at a congress of Soviet peoples to be held on December 12. In the run up to the congress the leaders of 20 communist parties have held a meeting in Gorkiy Leninskiye, the place where Lenin died in 1924, outside Moscow.

Zyuganov told the participants that two million signatures had already been collected in support of the call for

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early presidential elections in Russia. He urged the State Duma to adopt a law on early elections as soon as possible.

The Russian communist leader criticised the organisers of a trade union rally in Moscow for confining themselves only to economic demands. He said that the calls for President Yeltsin's resignation had been supported throughout the country during the campaign of protests, except Moscow.

Zyuganov said the campaign had involved millions of Russians. He put the number of participants in today's demonstration at 200,000 people, but the police said that the rally was attended by not more than 10,000 people.

He also threatened to bar television from communist rallies and meetings if "they continue to tell lies."

[Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian at 1250 GMT on 7 November carries the following report: "Thirty thousand 'Leningrad communists' marched through St. Petersburg today to mark the 77th anniversary of the October Revolution. The march ended with a rally on Palace Square.

"Speakers at the rally called for the dismissal of the president and government and described the murder of the Communist State Duma deputy Valentin Martemyanov as 'democratic terror.'"]

## ITAR-TASS Rounds Up Regional Ceremonies

*LD0711133194 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0714 GMT 7 Nov 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy [No date as received]—People taking part in a meeting on Lenin Square in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy today marked the 77th anniversary of the October Revolution with the hymn of the USSR, red flags, and slogans. Several thousand townsfolk decided to support the "Tovarishch" public political movement today and mark the revolution anniversary. In addition to making many critical remarks about the Federal and local authorities, the meeting also collected signatures in support of calls for preterm presidential elections.

Vladivostok—A biting icy wind was no obstacle to the several hundred people of Vladivostok who assembled today on the city's central square, which is named after the "Fighters for the Power of the Soviets." There was a meeting devoted to the 77th anniversary of the October revolution. The organizers were local committees of the Russian Federation's Communist Party, the Russian Workers' Communist Party, and the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). The meeting passed a resolution calling for the abolition of the post of president in Russia, the restoration of Soviet power, the formation of a government of national trust, and the implementation of measures to revive the Soviet Union.

Representatives of the "Working Russia" movement collected signatures at the meeting in support of opposition candidates for president of Russia. At the end of the meeting those taking part went to the train station square in the city, where they laid wreaths at the memorial to V.I. Lenin.

Ulan-Ude—An October Revolution meeting in the capital of Buryatiya today ended with an impromptu demonstration. A column of veterans' and communist organizations in the republic did a symbolic march around the Lenin monument on Ulan-Ude's central square. During the meeting, which was attended by around 500 people, wreaths were also laid to the memory of the "leader of the world proletariat." The speakers offered a traditional selection of the slogans of the irreconcilable opposition.

Chita—A few people of Chita were drawn to a meeting organized by the local communist and veterans' movements to mark this year's anniversary of the October revolution. Approximately around 300 citizens, mostly the older generation, went to the Lenin monument on the central square in Chita today. Standing under red flags, the veterans condemned government and presidential policy, then quickly went back home.

The residents of the Baykal area also demonstrated a tangible decline in interest in any political action during Sunday's repeat elections of deputies to the city and oblast dumas. According to estimates, only in nine of the 15 electoral districts was the turnout high enough for the elections to be deemed valid.

Kurgan—The city administration allowed the central square in Kurgan to be used, at the request of the communists, to hold a meeting to mark the 77th anniversary of the October Revolution. Fewer than 1,000 people, mainly the elderly, assembled by the Lenin memorial.

Kostroma—Communists and their sympathisers are today laying flowers at the Lenin memorial in the center of Kostroma to mark the 77th anniversary of the October Revolution. Only members of the oblast committee came to this statue prior to this demonstration until recently. Nothing would have kept them away. In fact, the Kostroma Lenin memorial is an unusual structure. The statue is different in that it has an unusually long, outstretched arm. And the pedestal on which Lenin stands is more interesting still.

It has never been a secret in Kostroma that the "golden brick" laid in the foundations when the pedestal was being built was laid by Russia's last sovereign, Nicholas II. The structure was erected by public subscription and was initially dedicated to the 300th anniversary of the House of Romanov.

After the revolution, instead of statues of tsarist personages it was the founder of the Soviet state and organizer of the October revolution who ended up on the pedestal.

In Yaroslavl, about three thousand people came today to a rally organised by the local branch of the Communist

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Party. Leaders of the opposition called on their supporters to take an active part in preparations for a regional congress of working people scheduled for december.

In Tambov, the crowd of protesters consisted mainly of workers from two major defence plants, "Revtrud" and "Oktyabr," which are currently on strike demanding their wages delayed for several months.

In Novgorod, hardline rally and manifestation took place in spite of a bomb threat. About 11:00, local time, an anonym [as received] called a police station and warned that "the participants in the manifestation would be blown up unless they disperse." the police informed organisers of the rally about the threat and conducted the search operation but no explosives were detected in the area.

In Kazan, about two thousand demonstrators marched through the city to lay wreaths to the monument of Vladimir Lenin.

In murmansk, ITAR-TASS has conducted a mini-poll asking several dozens of city residents whether they were going to celebrate the revolution date. Hundred per cent of the polled said they would do it at home.

In Kursk, about five thousand people came to a communist rally to mark the anniversary of the 1917 Bolshevik revolution, whereas last year that figure did not exceed two thousand.

### 7 Nov Rallies Assail Yeltsin, Government

*LD0711185594 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1231 GMT 7 Nov 94*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [no dateline as received]

Omsk. A rally and a demonstration by the opposition in Omsk, organized by communists, were held in the square at the Oblast's legislative assembly. Participants called on the opposition to muster all their forces in order to fight the existing regime, restore the Union and start court proceedings against the current government.

Penza. Today's rally in Penza turned into a demonstration of protest against the irrepressible growth of prices and rising unemployment. About 3,000 people gathered in Sovetskaya square. The speakers voiced criticism of the Russian government and local administration for the falling industrial production, collapsing agriculture and falling living standards.

Voronezh. The central square in Voronezh was again full of red flags today. The Russian Communist Party's oblast committee and the "Working Voronezh" movement, the organizers of a demonstration in honor of the October anniversary, led columns of people through the town center and opened a rally at the monument to Lenin. The speakers, who included Ruslan Gostev, State Duma deputy, first secretary of the Communist Party's oblast committee, and Ivan Shabanov, chairman of the Oblast Duma, mainly criticized the government and the president and called for restoring the power of workers and peasants in the country.

Tver. Participants in a rally devoted to the 77th anniversary of the October revolution observed a minute's silence in memory of Valentin Martemyanov, communist and State Duma deputy who had been murdered. Before the rally a demonstration passed along the town's main street carrying red flags and banners reading "All power to the Soviets", "Let us celebrate Victory Day without President Yeltsin," and the like. On the eve of the anniversary, in Upper Volga region the Communist Party oblast committee held a solemn soiree and a reception for war, labor, and armed forces veterans. Today participants in the rally laid flowers at the monument to Lenin. [passage omitted]

### Zyuganov Addresses October Revolution Rally

*LD0711214094 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1306 GMT 7 Nov 94*

[by ITAR-TASS correspondents Tamara Ivanova and Igor Belskiy]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 7 Nov—At today's rally devoted to the 77th anniversary of the October Revolution, Gennadiy Zyuganov, leader of the Russian Communist Party [RCP], tackled a number of new topics, among them a call to make known "in all towns and villages" the names of people capable, in the Communist Party's view, of running the country.

The list itself comprising 20 candidates was made public by the chairman of the RCP Central Executive Committee at the solemn soiree devoted to the anniversary, which was held earlier. Today only three names were announced at the rally—Petr Romanov, Svetlana Goryacheva, and Vasiliy Starodubtsev.

Gennadiy Zyuganov's speeches yesterday and today show the RCP's intention to start active preparations to celebrate the forthcoming 50th anniversary of Great Victory. His main slogan is: "We won because the people were united and led by the Communist Party." From this it follows that the CPSU and the USSR should be restored.

According to Zyuganov, this subject will be the main one at the congress of the peoples of the USSR scheduled for 12 December. The congress is preceded by a meeting of heads of 20 Communist parties held in the Lenin Hills near Moscow.

The RCP leader told the rally that 2 million signatures have already been collected for the demand for early presidential elections and that now the State Duma should adopt a law "on early elections." He reproached the Moscow rally of trade unions for limiting itself only to economic demands. According to him, during the all-Russian action by the Federation of Independent

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Trade Unions, calls for the Russian president's resignation were made everywhere except Moscow.

Speaking about the rallies held by the opposition and trade unions, Gennadiy Zyuganov assessed their attendance in millions. In his view, today, too, 200,000 people marched from Oktyabrskaya Square. At the same time, according to militia estimates, over 10,000 people came to today's rally, which had the best attendance in recent times.

The leader of communists was unhappy about the biased television coverage, in his view, of the events organized by the opposition. "If they continue to lie we will not allow them in our marching columns," he announced.

### Federation Directive Unites 'Mass Information'

*MM0711161494 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Nov 94 p 1*

[Untitled directive No. 1718-r of the Russian Federation Government signed by V. Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Russian Federation Government; dated 1 November 1994]

[FBIS Translated Text] 1. In accordance with the Russian Federation President's Edict No. 2255 of 22 December 1993 "On Improving State Administration in the Sphere of Mass Information" (SOBRANIYE AKTOV PREZIDENTA I PRAVITELSTVA ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII, 1993, No. 52, p. 5067) the Russian FSTR [precise expansion unknown; possibly Federal Service for Television and Radio Broadcasting] shall assume the functions associated with the implementation of state administration and coordinating the activity of Russia-wide and regional state television and radio broadcasting organizations.

It shall be established that Russia-wide and regional state television and radio broadcasting organizations come within the jurisdiction of the Russian FSTR.

The Russian Ministry of Finance, as of 15 November 1994, shall provide, in accordance with prescribed procedure, budget funding and subsidies for Russia-wide and regional state television and radio broadcasting organizations via the Russian FSTR.

2. In order to complete the liquidation procedures linked with the abolition of the former Administration for Television and Radio Broadcasting under the liquidated Russian Ministry of Press and Information, the Russian FSTR and the Russian Committee for the Press shall form a liquidation commission and within two months, in accordance with current legislation, complete the process of liquidating this administration.

[Signed] V. Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Russian Federation Government

[Dated] Moscow, 1 November 1994

## Economic Issues

### Security Council Blames Shokhin for Fall of Ruble

*LD0711130294 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1147 GMT 7 Nov 94*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 7 Nov (ITAR-TASS)—Former deputy prime minister Aleksandr Shokhin, whose resignation was accepted by the Russian Federation president Sunday, was among those named as the people mainly responsible for the 11 October slide of the ruble.

A report by the state commission headed by Oleg Lobov, secretary of the Russian Federation Security Council, and a resolution of the Security Council which ITAR-TASS received today, state that a number of officials failed to use their powers to prevent speculation on the currency market. Among them, former chairman of the Central Bank Viktor Gerashchenko, his deputy Dmitriy Tulin, director of the department for international operations Aleksandr Potemkin, former acting finance minister Sergey Dubinin, his deputy Andrey Vavilov, and a number of others.

The documents name the banks which profited the most from the provoked slide of the ruble rate. These were Most-Bank, Neftekhimbank, Alfa-Bank, the International Moscow Bank, and the Mezhkombank.

### Further on Security Council Report on Ruble

*LD0711141694 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1249 GMT 7 Nov 94*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 7 Nov—The state commission investigating the causes of the sudden destabilization of the financial market, which is chaired by Russian Federation Security Council Secretary Oleg Lobov, has concluded that the causes of the slide in the ruble exchange rate on "Black Tuesday"—11 October—were generated both by economic factors and by factors connected with increased speculative demand for foreign currency.

This is stated in the 11-page report by the commission which ITAR-TASS received today, together with a Russian Federation Security Council decision adopted on the "Lobov commission" report, as journalists refer to it for short.

The general economic factors cited include an acceleration of inflationary processes, inflation exceeding the rate at which the ruble exchange rate was falling, a fall in refinancing rates, and so on.

The report also points to breaches of the regulations for exchange trading, in particular applications for trading

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being accepted without any check being made on the clients' real financial situation.

The commission came to the conclusion that a number of commercial banks took advantage of the situation. "The unprecedented activity on the part of banks trading on 11 October (86 banks took part), and the way they behaved in trading leads us to conclude that some banks acted in concert, speculating to lower the ruble exchange rate," the report points out. The Slavyanskiy bank, Menatep, Inkombank, the Mezhdunarodnyy Moskovskiy Bank, Rosmestbank, and Imperial bank were particularly active, accounting for almost 50 percent of the entire initial demand, the document says.

The report points out that the sharp fall in the ruble exchange rate could have been avoided if the economic bodies of the federal executive authority had taken timely measures. The investigation brought to light irresponsibility on the part of officials who could have prevented the collapse of the ruble.

The four-page Russian Federation Security Council decision lays accusations of a lack of professionalism and lack of responsibility against Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Shokhin, who resigned yesterday; against his deputy, Dmitriy Tulin; against the director of the International Operations Directorate Aleksandr Potemkin; acting Finance Minister Sergey Dubinin—who was recently dismissed from that post; and Deputy Minister Andrey Vavilov; as well as against Viktor Krunya, director of the Federal Currency and Export Control Service.

The decision also names the banks which made the greatest profit from the collapse of the ruble—Most-Bank, Neftekhimbank, Alfa-Bank, the Mezhdunarodnyy Moskovskiy Bank, and Mezhkombank.

The decision contains a number of instructions to the government, to the Central Bank, to the Federal Counterintelligence Service, to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and to other government departments, who are to put the situation on the currency market to rights.

## Commercial Banks Reject Blame for Ruble Crash

*LD0811110894 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1020 GMT 8 Nov 94*

[By BUSINESS-TASS correspondent]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 8 Nov—The Association of Russian Banks expressed "astonishment" today over the stance taken in the Russian Security Council decision which indicates that certain commercial banks, and the commercial banking system as a whole, were implicated in the colossal slide in the ruble exchange rate on so-called "Black Tuesday", 11 October.

A statement issued by the Association today points out that it is the management of the Central Bank and the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance that is responsible for controlling the dynamics of the currency exchange rate. The involvement of commercial banks in the trading thus cannot lead to an abrupt fall in the ruble exchange rate, the document says.

The Association of Russian Banks makes a resolute protest against attempts to shrug off responsibility for what happened onto the commercial banks. "We have always supported the reformist aspirations of the president and the government, and continue to do so, advocating the stability of the national economy and the national currency. All efforts to put us in opposition to the policy of reforms is of advantage only to those who have no concern for the future of Russia", the statement says.

## Ruble Collapse 'Nothing To Do' with Commercial Banks

*LD0711194594 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1835 GMT 7 Nov 94*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow November 7 TASS—Russian commercial banks have nothing to do with the rouble's collapse on October 11, a Russian State Duma deputy said.

In an interview with ITAR-TASS on Monday, Pavel Bunich, deputy chairman of the State Duma Committee for Ownership, Privatisation, and Economic Activities, said, commenting on the results of an official investigation into the rouble's dramatic fall announced today, that it could have been avoided if the government had promptly used available economic levers.

He recalled that the rouble's exchange value had been declining for two weeks in a row and that was a clear signal to the government to immediately raise interest rate in order to "bind" the capital kept by individuals in banks. But the government failed to do so.

Bunich believes that the central bank should not have saved hard currency—free roubles on the financial market were almost used up and the central bank could have made another currency intervention in order to "freeze" the dollar exchange rate quite safely.

## Economic Ministry Expects 'Turning Point'

*LD0811101294 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0818 GMT 8 Nov 94*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Taranov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow November 8 TASS—"Russia has reached the lowest point of the economic slump and next year may mark a turning point in its economy," experts of the Russian Ministry for Economics point out in their forecast concerning Russia's socio-economic development in 1995.

The recession is expected to slow down noticeably at enterprises of the machine-building complex—from 45

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to 12-14 per cent. The combined figures for machine-building and metal-working will equal to 40 and 14-20 per cent respectively. The gross output of agriculture is expected to decrease by only six per cent.

The output of petroleum and gas condensate is expected to amount to 295 million tonnes, a drop of six per cent as compared to 12 this year. Coal output will equal to about 265 million tonnes, a three per cent drop. Plans are afoot to stop coal extraction at 18 particularly loss-making pits in the course of restructuring. Electric power generation will decrease by two per cent.

The total volume of exports, in terms of value, is estimated at 50 billion U.S. dollars, and the figure for imports is approximately 30 billions. The influx of imported goods to the Russian market will grow in 1995, which may increase the straits of Russian producers, who will be unable to improve the quality of their goods.

### Property Gap 'Almost Trebled' in 12 Months

*LD0711193494 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1726 GMT 7 Nov 94*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] In the past 12 months the property gap between Russian citizens almost trebled. The incomes of the wealthiest Russians are 14 times higher than those of the neediest. However the real gap is at least twice as wide, the Labor Ministry told Interfax.

When economic reforms began in Russia in 1992, the difference in incomes did not exceed 500%.

## Military & Space Issues

### Defense Minister Views 'Smear Campaign'

*BR0711155894 Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 6 Nov 94 p 2*

[Report by Pilar Bonet: "If Nationalists and Fascists Attain Power, There Will Be Civil War and Massacres"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow—"President Boris Yeltsin is the only stabilizing force in Russian society that prevents the outbreak of civil war," Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev categorically asserted yesterday: He believes himself the victim of a campaign to undermine his good relationship with the country's top leader, in which, according to him, reformist politicians of the Democratic Russia movement are assisting. Grachev spoke yesterday with journalists from the U.S. radio station Radio Liberty, the Moscow newspaper SEGODNYA ("Today"), and EL PAIS. The interview, conducted for the program "Litso k Litsu" ("Face to Face") in Russian is being broadcast by the aforementioned radio station today.

In corridors and anterooms, the minister's aides, anxious about his public image, were expressing at the same time a feeling of being under siege and yet determination to start a counteroffensive in order to prove that Grachev, a 46-year-old Afghanistan veteran, decorated as a hero of the USSR, is not as villainous as he is portrayed in some Russian news media. Following an exhausting week full of visits, journeys, and unpleasant criticisms, Grachev devoted Saturday morning to public relations, and even postponed his game of tennis for that purpose.

The minister's office, dominated by a portrait of Yeltsin and decorated with the pictures of Russian military leaders and a globe, is the very place where on the night of 3-4 October 1993 the decision to shell parliament was taken. In his book "A President's Notes," Yeltsin asserts that Grachev hesitated before taking the decision and demanded a written order. The minister asserts that "it was not exactly like that." "On the night of 3-4 October, an important state decision had to be taken on the Armed Forces' intervention and their joint action with the Interior Ministry troops and the police in order to prevent civil war in Russia."

"Those chiefly responsible for taking decisions met here under Yeltsin's leadership, and each of them gave his opinion on the time of the intervention, the forces, and the start of joint actions in order to prevent the conflict from taking place," he added.

"The most delicate thing was the start of the actions. Some people were in favor of starting them by night, and I declared myself opposed because cooperation by night between the Army and the Interior Ministry troops was not well practiced, and the police could cause unnecessary casualties even among those who were taking part in the actions, and for that reason I proposed acting at dawn. The discussions centered on this, and there was no delay in undertaking the operation. Following a serious debate on the proposals, the president took the decision to act from the early hours of 4 October," said Grachev, who described the president's book as a "work of art."

There would have been nothing special about Grachev's demanding a written order from the president, in view of the occasions when the Kremlin leaders have washed their hands of military actions of which, because of their position, they could not have been unaware. Grachev explained that he is obliged to carry out a verbal order, "but, according to our rules, the verbal order must be confirmed by a written instruction." In October 1993, the defense minister demanded no order, because, according to him, Boris Yeltsin took the initiative and ordered it himself. Today, he disclosed, the order is kept "at general staff headquarters."

Following the killing of journalist Dmitriy Kholodov, who was investigating corruption in the Army, Grachev said that he has been the target for harsh criticisms, partly encouraged by unfortunate statements when he suggested that Kholodov was the victim of an explosive which he himself had brought from the Caucasus. Grachev believes that there is "a smear campaign against the government and the president in order to oust the government and allow the entry of other forces."

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The Moscow newspaper MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA yesterday published on interview with General Matvey Burlakov, former chief of the Western Group of Troops, recently withdrawn from Germany, who has just been suspended as deputy defense minister while undergoing a new investigation. The interview, in which Burlakov accused some of the politicians close to the president, was signed by journalists of the newspaper IZVESTYA, who apparently failed to publish it in their own newspaper. Grachev believes that Burlakov is being "sunk deliberately," since for several years many civilian and military commissions visited the Western Group, which concealed nothing and even helped reveal the abuses which had occurred, Grachev stated.

Yeltsin holds Grachev in high esteem, "but there are powerful forces which do not like the Army's relations with the president as they now stand, and Grachev is the obstacle which they run up against and who has said that he will honorably carry out commander in chief Boris Yeltsin's orders. This is not liked by those who aspire to power in an unthinking and blind way," asserted the minister, who does not rule out the possibility that the "mafia organizations," the "fascists," and the "nationalists" could attain power in Russia. "Anything could happen, and if they (nationalists and fascists) come to power, what will happen? Not only will there be civil war; there will be massacres." Urged to be more specific, he stated that "Unfortunately, those most active against me are some representatives of Democratic Russia."

The minister asserted that "Boris Yeltsin's democratic potential is not exhausted," and that the cutting of one-third of the presidential administration is "political." Grachev declared himself "opposed" to a civilian heading the Armed Forces in Russia today, because the latter "would not subordinate themselves to a civilian." Apart from the defense portfolio, of which he had never dreamed, Grachev sees for himself no prospect other than retirement, since he does not aim to run in a presidential election.

Contrary to what the surveys say, he believes that he has his subordinates' support , and explained the undisciplined conduct of General Aleksandr Lebed, his classmate and comrade in Afghanistan, who today heads the Russian 14th Army, stationed in Moldova. Lebed "felt like a hero, and he sometimes behaves incorrectly, and this must be corrected. In any event, it seems to me that there are those who are suggesting to him the idea that he has a chance of making a great political career, and if he carries on in this way, we will propose to him that he choose between the Army and politics." If Lebed became defense minister, he said, "they would heed him for two months, and in the third month they would begin to accuse him of breaking up the Army, blame him for the reforms which are not working, for the fact that he is not building homes, and neither his courage nor his loud voice would avail him at all... And he also needs to study. He ought to go through the General Staff Academy."

The minister has been criticized for the purchase of two Mercedes cars for his ministry. The use of foreign cars by the guardians of Russian patriotism may seem curious in view of the profound crisis in the Russian automobile industry. Grachev explained that an order issued by the Soviet Government in 1989, which forbade senior officials to use home-produced cars such as ZIL's and Chaykas, is in force. Its aim was "to prevent ordinary citizens from becoming angry on seeing their leaders going about in such long cars." Apparently, Mercedes do not provoke such anger, because "everybody here from young people aged 18 to old people drives a Mercedes today." "From within that car I can also direct the use of nuclear weapons, if necessary. I am revealing a little secret to you," he contended.

## Gen Lebed Calls for Grachev's Resignation

*BR0811101894 Paris LE FIGARO in French 5-6 Nov 94 p 2*

[Interview with General Aleksandr Lebed, chief of the Russian 14th Army, by Isabelle Lasserre; place and date not given: "Lebed: 'Grachev Should Resign'"—first paragraph is LE FIGARO introduction signed "L.M."]

[FBIS Translated Text] In Moscow, the name of the fiery General Aleksandr Lebed is on everybody's lips at a time when there are persistent rumors of the resignation of Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, and when Aleksandr Shokhin, first deputy premier and economics minister, has just resigned. Lebed, a paratrooper who commands the 14th Russian Army in Moldova in the style of a Roman proconsul, is rated as the Army's most popular officer in the opinion polls. Deputy chief of the airborne forces during the 1991 putsch, he gave his support to Boris Yeltsin at that time, together with Pavel Grachev. But since his appointment to the Dniester region, the troublesome general has spoken out increasingly against the Yeltsin leadership, condemning loud and clear the irresponsibility of his policies. This summer, he clashed with his minister, rejecting the objective of 1.5 million men accepted by Pavel Grachev for the Army. In view of the fact that we cannot ensure quality because of the crisis, let us maintain quantity, he said in substance. According to the Russian Interfax agency, Lebed was called to Moscow this weekend.

[Lasserre] Is the firing of the deputy defense minister by Boris Yeltsin a triumph for justice?

[Lebed] It is a triumph for justice. However, I do not rule out the fact that it is also a concession to public opinion. There is so much evidence against Burlakov, he has committed so many sins... The German court will prove it.

[Lasserre] Should the defense minister resign?

[Lebed] Yes, he should.

[Lasserre] Why?

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[Lebed] For the very good reason that almost everybody is now criticizing the Defense Ministry. The newspapers and even individuals no longer hesitate to attack it. Grachev must go, if only to safeguard the honor of the Army and its morale.

[Lasserre] You rejected the reorganization of the 14th Army, and then an inspection by General Burlakov. Does this subordination by a general not create a precedent?

[Lebed] What precedent? When have I disobeyed? Never. I simply warned the authorities what would happen if Burlakov came to inspect my Army, and I managed to convince the minister...

[Lasserre] Is the Russian Army really corrupt?

[Lebed] The majority of officers and soldiers are honest. But this is not true of some military circles, like Burlakov and others, at the head of the institution.

[Lasserre] How serious is the current political crisis?

[Lebed] There is an indicator: the dollar rate. Since the 20-percent increase in prices, the population is even poorer. It is continuing to plummet. The slightest thing could prove to be the last straw. In winter, the problems will start in the north of the country, which has no supplies.

[Lasserre] Do you have solutions?

[Lebed] I only have the power of my Army. But I have plans and solutions.

[Lasserre] Why are you the most popular general in the Russian Army?

[Lebed] Probably because I have always tried to respect the idea of honor. I was raised like that. The others seem to appreciate it. My Army is being spared by the scourge of corruption.

[Lasserre] Would you accept the post of defense minister?

[Lebed] No comment.

[Lasserre] And that of president?

[Lebed] No comment.

## Air Force Chief on Cuts, Reform, New Trainer

*MM0711140994 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Nov 94 p 3*

["Topical Interview" with Aviation Colonel General Petr Deynekin, commander in chief of Russian Federation Air Force, by Gennadiy Lisenkov; place and date not given: "Russia Will Not Remain Without Wings"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Lisenkov] Comrade commander in chief, the early nineties have been a kind of reference point in the development of the Russian Air Force. Which events do you consider most significant?

[Deynekin] Many events have occurred, but the chief one is, of course, connected with the reforming of the Armed Forces and the whole state system. Over the past two years alone over 40 air regiments have been transferred to Russia from countries in the far and near abroad and have been accommodated here and provided with facilities.

Much work has also been done to create air combat forces of the Air Force in the main strategic salients. The system of Air Force management is being improved. In accordance with a decision of the Russian Federation minister of defense, a frontal aviation command (Moscow) and a reserve and personnel training command (Samara) have been set up. At the same time the number of command and control organs of the Army echelon has been reduced. In our view this approach ensures the necessary reliability of the troop command and control system and a reduction in expenditure on its upkeep.

I believe that we have now succeeded in creating the state's Air Force capable of fulfilling to a high standard the tasks that it is meant to fulfill.

[Lisenkov] Today you have four separate commands under you. What necessitated forming them?

[Deynekin] Above all, the desire to turn the Air Force into the most important constituent of Russia's Armed Forces, as is happening in all the world's developed countries. The forces and means of military aviation must be ready, if necessary, for immediate operations in any salient. Possessing powerful and highly accurate weapons, the Air Force is regarded as the main means of making strikes against an enemy throughout the depth of the disposition of his forces and ensuring the high mobility of the combat force of its troops.

Proceeding from the concept of building Russia's Air Force, we must create air combat forces in strategic salients within a very short space of time. This will happen in conditions of a further reduction in the size of the Air Force. At the same time it is necessary to maintain a rational correlation between combat and support components.

The problem can only be resolved by systematic rearming of units and combined units with new aviation hardware and more thorough personnel training. We are obliged to think of people above all, and so the paramount task for the Air Force command is to improve social and domestic provision for airmen.

[Lisenkov] There is talk of combining or merging the Air Defense and Air Force commands. What advantages and disadvantages, in your opinion, does this idea have? It is known that a similar experiment was already being conducted in the late seventies, but its result did not have the expected effect....

[Deynekin] The program for reforming the Armed Forces provides for profound structural transformations

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to be carried out in the Army and Navy as the necessary conditions are created. This could require at a certain stage combining the forces and means of the Air Force and the Air Defense Forces in a single branch of the Armed Forces. A complex and, I would say, painful process. When implementing it, it is necessary to take both positive and negative aspects into consideration.

The former include the possibility of making more efficient use of the heterogeneous forces and means that operate in the interests of common tasks and cooperate closely with one another. A new quality can, I believe, be achieved through centralized leadership when repulsing enemy air raids and by more reliably ensuring mutual security and using a single airfield network, repair base, and rear support system. At the same time it is possible to reduce expenditure on maintaining and supporting a combined branch of the Armed Forces and on training flight and engineer-technician personnel. There are enhanced possibilities for implementing a single military-technical policy when developing and creating new models of hardware and armament.

At the same time certain complexities could arise when combining the Air Force and the Air Defense Forces. It must be remembered that the Air Force and the Air Defense Forces were created and developed as autonomous branches of the Armed Forces with their own structure, command and control systems, hardware, and armament. Therefore quite complex organizational, technical, and financial problems could arise in a possible merger. Today neither the state as a whole nor, still less, the Ministry of Defense, is ready, I believe, to implement "the idea of combining" the Air Force and the Air Defense Forces. Such a burden would be beyond our people, the taxpayers.

[Lisenkov] People want to know, however, how secure the skies over their head are. During his working tour of the Far East the minister of defense said that establishment-organizational measures [orgshtatnyye meropriyatiya—euphemism for downsizing] will continue in the Armed Forces and will primarily affect airmen's subunits.

[Deynekin] Air Force personnel are being reduced according to the plan for reforming the Army and Navy. The Russian Federation Air Force as a whole will have been reduced by 34 percent between May 1992 and the end of 1995. Given a system for training aviation cadres in accordance with modern demands and given that they are equipped with promising technical means, the security of Russia's skies will be ensured.

[Lisenkov] What is the Air Force High Command doing to enhance the military aviator's prestige, and is account taken here of the many years' experience of creating the Russian Air Force?

[Deynekin] You know, I am profoundly convinced that the skies will never cease to attract man. They are the abode of romantics and of courageous people who are avid to know the unknown and ready to test their mental and physical qualities against the highest standards.

I believe that Russia has not yet approached the danger point when it will have no one to send into the skies. Moreover, I am convinced that this will never happen! A good premise for this is the revival of special schools in the country with elementary flight training. They have already been created in Barnaul, Yeysk, and Akhtubinsk. There is no end of people wishing to study in them. More than 95 percent of their graduates become students of Air Force higher aviation schools. These are reliable cadres for replenishing the Air Force.

[Lisenkov] Comrade commander in chief, for more than 30 years the Czechoslovak L-29 (L-39) was the initial training aircraft in aviation flying schools. It is the aircraft of which Russian pilots say "in the country of the blind the one-eyed man is king." They are waiting impatiently for a Russian trainer aircraft to be brought on board.

[Deynekin] You have named another painful problem for the Air Force. Yes, today we are in dire need of our own, Russian trainer aircraft. For the adoption of the Czechoslovak aircraft was dictated by political interests more than the needs of aviators. Life has put everything in its proper place.

The Air Force announced a competition among design bureaus for the creation of a Russian trainer aircraft such as the MIG-15UTI, for example, was for a long time. Many set about creating it. But competition lets through only the most sophisticated aircraft. Two aircraft have now emerged onto the homestretch: the MIG-AT/UTS from the Mikoyan Experimental Design Bureau and the Yak-130 from the Yakovlev bureau. Both aircraft suit the Air Force in respect of many parameters. But the winner will be decided only by the skies, i.e. flight testing. Rest assured that the Air Force will find the money to buy the new aircraft from industry.

[Lisenkov] This is despite the fact that defense enterprises producing aviation hardware today do not have a state order, and the troops have been receiving a wretched number of aircraft in recent years. Incidentally, how do you rate the state of Russia's aircraft pool?

[Deynekin] The future of Russia as an aviation power will largely be predetermined by the state of the aircraft pool. The MIG-29 and Su-27 tactical fighters and the Tu-160 supersonic bombers in the arsenal today are to a certain extent legislators of world aircraft building. At international exhibitions professionals take off their hat to the skill of our pilots. Today in Germany an entire regiment is flying MIG-29's, and Bundeswehr pilots are in no hurry to switch to U.S. or other aircraft. Many countries wish to acquire our fighters. You understand, Russia was, still is, and, I am sure, will be a great aviation power. This is confirmed by the results of the end-of-training-period performance evaluation for 1994. The

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actions of our combat aircraft received a high rating from the Defense Ministry inspectorate.

[Lisenkov] The number of flight hours logged in a year by Russian bomber-pilots stands at just 80 hours, and 40 hours for fighter-pilots. Do these figures correspond to scientifically substantiated norms, and how is it possible to maintain the combat readiness of the Air Force in such a situation?

[Deynekin] Our pilots really do have now approximately such an average number of flight hours logged in a year. Yes, it is far lower than with their foreign colleagues. We are not satisfied with this, and it seriously complicates the resolution of the task of maintaining the combat readiness of aviation units and subunits at the proper level. The problem is being resolved to a certain extent by regulating the number of flight hours among pilots with an equal level of training, flexibly planning flight training, and also improving the quality and purposefulness of ground training of airmen, particularly involving the use of training equipment. The question of increasing the pilots' number of flight hours logged in a year to a level which will ensure not only the maintenance but also the constant enhancement of their combat training will hopefully be resolved in 1995.

[Lisenkov] One more question, comrade commander in chief, a strategic one.... What changes are foreseen in the Air Force in light of the new military doctrine?

[Deynekin] It is known that the changes in doctrine are conditioned by the changes in the views officially adopted in the state on the nature of war and on ways to prevent it and to repulse aggression and ways to wage armed struggle.

Proceeding from the premise that, for our state's part, war will be of a defensive nature, the Air Force must be a strong factor in curbing aggression and ensuring strategic stability. This means that it must be capable of effectively resolving, above all, the paramount task of repulsing a surprise air and missile attack and defending administrative-industrial, military, and other important state installations.

At the same time the resolution of these tasks is not confined just to combating an air enemy. It is no less important to inflict defeat on his ground and sea groupings and to neutralize them promptly. Here the role of the Air Force becomes decisive.

In deciding the areas for building and employing the Air Force, it is necessary to take account of such special features as the reduction of its effective combat strength, the restriction on moving air assets, the reduced potential of the missile forces, etc.

Consequently, the Air Force must possess new potential for the rapid creation of air combat forces and for their mobile and flexible use; it must have in its arsenal multirole aircraft systems with long range and accuracy of effect against enemy targets and continue improving the system of basing, support, and control.

The new military doctrine allocates an exceptionally important role to combat aviation. This means that we must do everything to ensure that Russia continues to have reliable wings.

### Tasks of Elektro Weather Satellite Profiled

*MM0711151994 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Nov 94 p 3*

[Report by Vasiliy Makashin under "Aero News" rubric: "'Elektro' Weather Scout"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Russian Federation Space Forces have launched the "Elektro" satellite. General Designer Yuriy Trifonov reported that it is an integral part of the currently operating world hydrometeorological system comprising four satellites: two American, one European, and one Japanese.

"Elektro" is Russia's first hydrometeorological geostationary satellite which can be used to obtain a "picture"—a depiction of the entire visible part of the Earth's disk. This will make it possible to promptly monitor changes in cloudiness and determine wind speed, which also means to substantially increase the effectiveness of short-term weather forecasts. In addition, it will be possible to use this system to measure the temperature of the surface of the sea and of the upper boundaries of clouds, and to predict with a high degree of accuracy possible natural cataclysms—hurricanes, floods, and typhoons.

The space equipment will also fulfill communications functions and send and relay information from operational data reception and processing centers located in Moscow, Novosibirsk, and Khabarovsk. The information "thrown out" by the satellite is used to compile weather maps, which are promptly conveyed to mass consumers. Simultaneously the equipment will make it possible to extract information from mobile and stationary autonomous automatic stations.

## Federal Assembly

### Duma Committee Officials Opposed to Downsizing

*MM0711160894 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Nov 94 p 2*

[Report by Alena Kozyreva and Yevgeniy Skukin: "Is the State Duma Apparatus To Be Reduced or Not?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] State Duma Chairman Ivan Rybkin has issued a directive whereby the apparatus of the lower chamber of parliament is to be reduced by 30 percent. Why is that?

There are two versions in existence: the official and the unofficial. According to the official version the deputies

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themselves put forward this initiative. It is said that they discussed the apparatus' work and put forward the proposal to reduce its size. As the popular saying has it: "It is not size that counts but ability!"

Version two is based on the assumption that since the president has decided to reduce his staff the Duma should support that initiative.

What is reliably known is that Ivan Rybkin has given all the leaders of the Duma factions, committees, and groups until 10 November to present their ideas on how to reduce the size of the apparatus and improve its work. As for suggestions on ways to improve work, they already exist.

Reductions are always a sensitive issue. We were told that many Duma committees do not have enough apparatus workers. First and foremost this applies to people with higher legal training and specialists on land law, ecological legal norms, health protection legislation, and so forth. The workload there varies tremendously. In some cases that variation is really considerable.

"Our committee's apparatus is working like an emergency service [kak sluzhba "01"]," Svetlana Umetskaya, leader of the health protection apparatus, told me.

"Law-making will be paralyzed," was how Viktor Ruslyakov, leader of the apparatus of the Committee for Agrarian Issues, described the consequence of the possible reduction of that committee's apparatus.

### Upper House Passes Judgment on Duma Bills

*MM0711161394 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Nov 94 p 1*

[Unattributed report: "It's Official"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Federal Assembly Federation Council has approved the previously adopted version of the federal law "On the Procedure for Examining and Ratifying the 1995 Federal Budget" and the federal law "On Ratifying the UN Framework Convention on Climatic Change," both of which were adopted by the Russian Federation Federal Assembly State Duma.

The federal law "On Combating Corruption" was rejected as a whole.

### Zyuganov Speech to Duma No-Confidence Session

*MM0711131594 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Nov 94 pp 1, 2*

[Speech by G. Zyuganov: "Compradors and the Nation State Are Incompatible"]

[FBIS Translated Text] During discussion of the report delivered by V. Chernomyrdin in the State Duma 27 October, the communist faction voted against the government in the no-confidence vote. In his speech, faction leader Gennadiy Zyuganov argued his position. Today, we publish his speech.

The unity of a state is composed of the people, the territory, and the way of life. It is from this stance that I will try to evaluate the situation which is emerging.

Territory. Our country used to be among the five safest countries in the world. Today, it is increasingly reminiscent of a delayed-action nuclear bomb which is breaking up and losing elementary control before our very eyes.

Allies. It has virtually no allies, but, on the contrary, the country is surrounded by an arc of instability from Tajikistan to the Baltic region. And we all see and sense this in our legislative activity.

Markets. Our Ministry of Foreign Affairs has robbed the country of all foreign markets, not only in the Near East and India but even in East Europe. Today, it is actively driving [the country] out of the markets of Belorussia [Belarus], Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, 75 percent of whose output used to make its way to the Russian Federation, and soon it will drive it out of its own Russian Federation.

We have discussed currency. The main currency is the dollar.

We have discussed language. Soon, English will become the main language.

As for the Army, the most important political institute of the state is gradually turning into a vagrant, whole garrisons will spend the cold Russian winter in open camps. I do not think this will please them.

Now we have asked: What type of system is being constructed? Developed capitalism has an interest in preserving science and the base sectors of industry and manufacture—they are being destroyed. Journalists have described this system as a field day for thieves and robbers. In my view, this is very close to what is actually going on.

The people. It was a property owner in the person of the state. This property has already been redistributed. Moreover, the incomes of the poorest 10 percent today are 23 times lower than the incomes of the richest 10 percent. Any sociologist will tell you that this is a highly charged situation, and it is impossible through democratic methods to sustain such a system of accountability.

Wages. Today, one person in two does not receive his wages on time.

Work. The government set itself the aim of creating mass unemployment. Name me another example in the history of any state where a task was resolved in this fashion.

Education: Article 43 of the Constitution deprives a whole generation of a full secondary education.

Health. Only 14 percent of the rising generation are in a normal state of health.

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Children. Two days ago at a station in St. Petersburg we saw a pack of homeless kids. We asked: "Where do you spend the night?" They replied: "Preferably in the toilets, as it is warmer there." And this no longer comes as a surprise to anybody.

Now, regarding the North. A family of four needs roughly a million rubles to buy winter footwear. At present, 80 percent of Russia's population does not have such means.

Lifestyle. Purely collectivist, convocational. In our country, the czar was elected at a general council. The czar and the general secretary were appointed to two posts. The former—governor general and commissioner of police; the latter—first secretary and chief of the KGB. Everything else was subject to election. The entire remaining representative structure has been pulled down, and they do not want to resurrect it.

As for morality. Lies have become the basic morality.

We have discussed security. There are people who have been murdered, and about whom the whole country knows: Talkov, Polyanichko, and now Kholodov.... Not a single major crime has been solved. The KamAZ plant burned down; apartment block No. 7 was blown up. Almost all major Defense Ministry depots have been blown up— and not even an investigation! Power supplies to Severodvinsk and the strategic control center were cut off—what next?

Religion will soon become a foreign religion. Judas is becoming the hero of the Fatherland.

Causes. The main reason is the lack of an elementary, national, meaningful state policy corresponding to the spirit and traditions of Russia. There is no elementary, normal control in the country. Indeed, there are not two governments in our country—there are at least four. The president's government, which fails to take account of a single one of our decisions. Recently, the Federation Council made a decision on Ilyushenko, and Filatov (who is he anyway?) immediately declares that Ilyushenko will work. At the same time, all competent prosecutors have been driven out of the system of law-enforcement organs. Can this really be possible? Then there is the government of Chernomyrdin, which basically runs the economic departments. And even here, these guys do not always carry out instructions conscientiously. Then there is Kozyrev's government, which carries out the instructions of the U.S. State Department in preference to those of its own president and its own premier. There is a media government. You have seen the kind of hysteria they whip up and how this is done. What is more, they focus primarily on the Army and the system of law-enforcement organs, both of which have one foot in the grave. As such, we consider a solution to reside in the following.

First. A change of course. Unless you do this, by the spring you will all be brought down regardless of how you voted. It is essential to invite the president to our session and to hear whether or not he is ready to propose anything new. In the event of his persisting with this course, we must appeal to the nation, because the security status is at its lowest ebb. We must, without delay, prepare a package of laws on elections. Unless we do this before 12 December, we will leave the country in the control of the very same team—and then it can do what it likes with it.

In order to restore control, it is necessary to redistribute the structure of power: It is essential to restrict the autocracy of the presidential team, and to strengthen the capacities of the government. We are ready to give it any powers under a specific program and on one condition: that every three months you report back, and if you are not coping, you go.

What is more. We are prepared to propose specific people. Why are you hanging on to those you have designated? There is no point in hanging on. In order to conduct reforms it is necessary to have a minimum of trust. There is none now! Even "their own people" have no confidence. We suggest examining the following candidacies who could enter a government of national salvation: Romanov, Tuleyev, Glazyev, Sokolov, Medvedev, Gusev, Filippov (leader of the tax service, he uncovered billions of rubles worth tax evasion—he was dismissed a year ago, and they cannot bring themselves to reinstate this competent individual), Kostin, Nazarchuk, Lapshin, Starodubtsev, Stroyev, Goryachev, Kondratenko, Kashin, Goryacheva, Kovalev, Ilyukhin, Isakov, Abdulatipov, Baburin, Spiridonov, Stepanov, Ivanova, Shapanov, Koptyug, Sadovnichiy, Gubenko. It is possible to list a dozen more people. Recognized leaders. Competent professionals. From various parties and movements. They know how to govern.

And finally. You can talk as much as you like about the budget, but unless there is revenue (and revenues are formed from the work of industry, the agricultural sector, science, the military-industrial complex, and from trade in precious metals) we will not be able to do anything. We have shared out R100, but in fact we have ended up with just R40. And no mention is made of how to top it up.

We have already made our decision: We cannot trust this policy. Any government which pursues Yeltsin's policy is a hostage—it is impossible to set matters right here. The government needs people who are nationally oriented and and who think at state level. For Russia and compradors are incompatible.

## Regional Affairs

### St Petersburg Election Results Noted

*954F0244A St. Petersburg SANKT PETERBURGSKIYE VEDOMOSTI in Russian 1 Nov 94 p 1*

[Unattributed report: "City Assembly Finally Complete"]

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[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday following a preliminary tally of the Sunday voting results, it became clear that the St. Petersburg City Assembly will now at last be fully manned. The elections, in which 28.6 percent of registered voters participated, were declared valid in 24 out of 25 districts where they were conducted. Only in District No. 45 of Primorskiy Rayon did fewer than 25 percent of the electorate take part, resulting in the election being considered invalid in accordance with the statute on elections to the City Assembly.

However, we will learn the names of the 24 new City Assembly deputies only after a runoff election, since there were no electoral districts in which one candidate was able to muster 50 percent (plus one) of the votes. The ballot for the runoff election will contain the names of the two candidates who received the greatest support from the electorate last Sunday. The candidate who receives the greatest number of votes during the runoff election, regardless of voter turnout, will become deputy.

According to preliminary unofficial data, most of the aspirants to the office of deputy from among the 48 candidates reaching the second round of the voting were nominated by electoral districts. There are 19 such candidates. As far as electoral associations are concerned, the greatest number of candidates—eight—who made it to the second round were nominated by Communists of Leningrad. Following this group is Favorite City, with seven candidates, the St. Petersburg Regional Organization—Democratic Choice of Russia, with four candidates, the people's social charitable fund in support of the populace—Peter the Great, with four candidates, Movement for People's Consolidation of St. Petersburg, with three candidates, Public Association of Veterans, with one candidate, All Petersburg, with one candidate, and the Christian-Democratic Union of St. Petersburg, with one candidate.

Here we present, as preliminary and unofficial information, the names of those candidates who received the greatest number of votes in their electoral districts, and who are trying to be included on the runoff election ballot. These data are subject to change, and we will inform voters immediately as necessary in this regard.

District No. 1. A.A. Kovalev (Favorite City); S.P. Alekseyev (nominated by the district electorate).

District No. 5. A.V. Dybovskiy (fund—Peter the Great, district electorate); S.A. Antonova (district electorate).

District No. 6. A.Yu. Molchanov (Democratic Choice of Russia); A.V. Prokhorenko (district electorate).

District No. 7. V.A. Sychev (Democratic Choice of Russia); L.P. Smirnov (Communists of Leningrad).

District No. 12. S.M. Mironov (All Petersburg); S.I. Vakulov (Communists of Leningrad).

District No. 13. Yu.G. Terentyev (Communists of Leningrad); V.P. Volodkin (Favorite City).

District No. 15. I.Yu. Artemyev (Favorite City); V.V. Kamsha (fund—Peter the Great).

District No. 18. G.I. Trubnikov (Christian-Democratic Union of St. Petersburg); B.P. Borneliner (Communists of Leningrad).

District No. 19. S.A. Zhitkov (Communists of Leningrad); K.V. Bugayev (district electorate).

District No. 24. V.N. Zhimirov (district electorate); G.A. Abelev (fund—Peter the Great, district electorate).

District No. 27. S.F. Zybin (fund—Peter the Great); V.G. Shcherbakov (district electorate).

District No. 29. A.G. Kramarev (Favorite City); S.P. Vymanets (district electorate).

District No. 30. A.Ye. Andreyev (Public Association of Veterans); Yu.M. Novolodskiy (district electorate).

District No. 35. A.Ye. Lovyagin (district electorate); N.V. Tikhonov (Movement for People's Consolidation).

District No. 36. M.N. Tolstoy (district electorate); V.A. Rumyantsev (Communists of Leningrad).

District No. 37. I.V. Vysotskiy (Movement for People's Consolidation); V.A. Serdyukov (Favorite City).

District No. 40. A.V. Vorontsov (district electorate); A.G. Achanov (district electorate).

District No. 41. V.P. Ostrovskiy (Democratic Choice of Russia); A.V. Shishlov (Favorite City).

District No. 46. N.G. Ananov (district electorate); V.D. Glukhov (Favorite City).

District No. 47. A.S. Zapesotskiy (district electorate); P.V. Nazarov (district electorate).

District No. 49. A.V. Levashov (Movement for People's Consolidation); C.M. Sokol (Communists of Leningrad).

District No. 50. O.Ye. Sergeyev (district electorate); V.S. Tokarev (Communists of Leningrad).

As far as Districts No. 34 and No. 38 are concerned, in which the elections were also declared valid, our editorial office has learned that complaints were immediately lodged in their regard. For this reason we have decided to refrain from publishing even preliminary data with respect to these districts. We will publish this information. as well as possible revisions to voting results in the other districts, at a later date.

## Tatarstan Edict on Foreign Investment

*954F0259A Kazan RESPUBLIKA TATARSTAN in Russian 3 Nov 94 p 1*

["Edict of the President of the Republic of Tatarstan: On Stimulation of the Attraction of Foreign Investments in the Republic of Tatarstan"]

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[FBIS Translated Text] For the realization of the Law of the Republic of Tatarstan "On Foreign Investments in the Republic of Tatarstan" and the creation of conditions conducive to the investment of foreign capital in the Republic of Tatarstan I resolve:

1. To exempt as of 1 January 1995 enterprises with foreign investments registered on the territory of the Republic of Tatarstan and involved in the production of commodities and the rendering of service in which the paid-up share of the foreign investors in their authorized capital constitutes no less than 30 percent, and in an equivalent amount, not less than $1 million, from the payment of the following taxes:

a) on profits, in respect to those paid to the republic treasury, for a term of three years;

b) on profits, in respect to those paid to the republic treasury, for a term of five years if the said enterprises are formed for the exercise of priority areas of activity determined by legislation of the Republic of Tatarstan;

c) on assets, for a term of three years.

The said privileges shall be accorded provided that the proceeds from the exercise of actual production activity are in excess of 70 percent of the sum total of proceeds from their realization of products (jobs, services).

Newly formed enterprises with foreign investments shall be accorded the said tax privileges from the time that they are officially registered.

2. To allocate foreign investors parcels of land, including those occupied by buildings, structures, and installations, for ownership or long-term lease on terms determined by land legislation of the Republic of Tatarstan.

3. To grant foreign investors state guarantees on the strength of state assets in accordance with current legislation. That the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Tatarstan shall draw up and confirm a register of state assets for use as security.

4. That if production activity is terminated prior to the expiration of five years since the tax privileges specified in clause one of this edict were obtained, an enterprise with foreign investments that has obtained such privileges shall be required to pay to the treasury in full the amount of the tax privileges accorded it.

5. That the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations of the Republic of Tatarstan and the Ministry of Information and the Press of the Republic of Tatarstan shall ensure that potential investors are notified as to the terms, privileges, and guarantees accorded enterprises with foreign investments on the territory of the Republic of Tatarstan.

6. That this edict shall take effect the day it is signed.

[Signed] M. Shaymiyev, president of the Republic of Tatarstan

The Kremlin, Kazan, 31 October 1994.

## Report on Local Response to Komi Oil Spill

*954F0249A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 44, Nov 94 pp 1, 5*

[Article by Igor Morzharetto and Igor Popov under the rubric "Disaster": "Bears and Bosses Unharmed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Natasha, a sales clerk in a rural cooperative store in the small Kolva settlement, lost in the forests of the Komi Republic, looked bewildered. And why not? She has never seen such an influx of customers to her store, and foreign-born at that. Actually, foreign guys carrying television cameras and photographic cameras were not buying anything—mainly browsing around the store and chuckling at the northern Russia exotics—felt boots (R20,000), high fur boots (R250,000), and red whortleberry (R18,000 a bucket). Taking turns, journalists stuck microphones in Natasha's face and plagued her with questions, while she could not understand all the commotion. So some oil got spilled. It gets spilled all the time, ever since the pipeline was built. And the Kolva river always had plenty of it in the water. Her father would go fishing in winter, cut a hole in the ice—and see, oil. Strictly speaking, they should have given up eating fish long ago, so much of it is permeated by oil, but the local people got used to it. Actually, they will soon have to give it up anyway—there is less and less fish. Instead, the northern backwoods are saturated with foreign goods—German vodka, Dutch Snickers, Syrian cookies... Except that man cannot live on Snickers alone—they are no substitute for the natural products the northern land used to produce in abundance... Today this land is literally crying out about the outrage inflicted on it by various oil-production AO's [joint-stock companies] and SP's [joint ventures]. Alas, the top brass does not hear these cries, and the ordinary folks, frightening as it may sound, have gotten used to them...

### So What Happened After All?

On 23 August, during the weekly monitoring helicopter flight over Usinskiy Rayon, an accident was detected at the Vozey—Headwork pipeline. Twenty-three ruptures were detected, of which the largest seven were in the bog area. It appears that they happened in the middle of August. Some were fixed right away, but the ruptures at the bog were only fixed in mid-September, when a bypass collector began to function.

Since the estimates were drawn from thin air (the bog is huge, impassable, and does not freeze even in winter), it is very difficult to determine the size of the contaminated area and how much oil spilled out. According to Komineft Association data, the difference between the oil extracted and the quantities received at the pipeline's final point amounted to 14,000 tonnes. The Ministry for Emergency Situations believes that about 20,000 tonnes spilled out. The U.S. Department of Energy estimates the quantity of oil spilled at 200,000 to 350,000 tonnes.

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("This is a lie!" said a Komineft representative. "For such a quantity to be spilled, the entire three-week oil output to the last drop would have to pour out.")

At the very beginning of the accident, the oil concentrated mainly in the bog. Gates were installed in the end of August at creeks flowing from the bog, which filtered the oil out of the water. In the second half of September, however, heavy rains began; the water level rose sharply, broke through the gates, and some oil got into the Kolva and Usa rivers. According to official information, no oil got into the Pechora river. Sevgidromet [Northern Hydrometeorological Center] monitoring stations take daily samples of water and report no increased content of petroleum products in Pechora. Not everyone agrees with this, however. At the Kolva settlement we got into a conversation with local farmer Leonid Fenerin, whose business was seriously hurt by the oil spill.

"So the big bosses tell you that there is no oil in Pechora? Amazing! I have been going sweep-net fishing in Pechora every day for the past week and I see oil moving everywhere. I pull the net out, and it is all black. There was oil there on occasion before, of course, but nothing like this! Below the mouth of the Usa there are kilometer-long oil slicks, whole fields of oil floating. I have never seen anything like this in my life. I have no reason to lie. Ask the men in the villages there, in Ust-Usa, for instance—they also go sweep-net fishing and saw the oil floating toward the sea. And when they say they will clean up the shores over the winter, this is nonsense too. There are places that are absolutely inaccessible for equipment. They have cleaned up maybe 2 km by now, no more than that."

By the way, when we asked Yevgeniy Khaylov, chairman of the Moscow commission working at the accident site, what he thought regarding the presence of oil in Pechora, he said that it appears that there is none, and if there is, it could have come from a number of sources. Perhaps a cutter or a steamship passed by. Or a drunken tractor driver spilled a barrel of kerosene on the shore, or something like that. Well, it must have been quite a barrel...

In short, local residents are quite unhappy, while officials report quite cheerfully: Oil has been collected from the water surface in the area of Kolva settlement; 7 km of the shore line has been cleaned up. "All that is left is to collect the oil from creeks and at the bog," said deputy department director V. Kozlov. "The work is currently being done by mechanical means: oil is collected by bulldozers and spades, and the oil-soaked soil layer is being removed." Unfortunately, biological preparations cannot be used—they only work at temperatures above 15 degrees Celsius. The Danes propose bringing in equipment on pontoons and collecting the oil with pumps. The commission decided that all the oil is to be collected before the beginning of the spring high water, and the AO Komineft has been told to replace 52 km of pipeline above the accident site by 1 December.

By the way, the "Vozey—Headworks" pipeline was put into operation in 1975, and the old pipes were scheduled to be replaced in 1990-1991. Accidents began to occur at the pipeline on a regular basis in 1989, and oil has spilled more than once into flood-lands on Kolva. Quick fixes were applied to the pipeline, and some segments were replaced, but this did not solve the problem. It took the current major disaster to push the problem to the forefront.

"If the rupture is indeed as great as is assumed, this is the third largest disaster of this kind," says P. Horseman, head of the Greenpeace oil group. "The Russian oil industry is sacrificing the Arctic ecology for the sake of profit..."

**Economic Side**

Therefore, on top of the lack of money to rebuild pipelines and our Russian chaos, this story has a "second layer." This is obvious, for instance, from the way the AO Komineft managers and the local administration tried to hide the extent of the disaster, and are now attempting to diminish its scale and consequences. "We will sort it out on our own without any help from the press," the deputy head of the AO Komineft said at a press conference. "They blew the scope of the accident out of all proportion and trumpeted it to the whole world, while all we have here is a run-of-the-mill situation, a rayon-scale accident."

A year ago the AO Komineft—by the way, not the poorest oil and gas association of the former Union—went through the first, voucher stage of privatization; as a result, rumor has it, a substantial share of stock went to the top management.

Now it is about to be decided who is going to be the owner of local oil. Naturally, it will not be the "people," just as it was not under the communists, despite it being proudly proclaimed. Today many transnational companies already have set foot in Komi in the form of SP's (mainly in processing), but would like to get the opportunity to develop large oil fields on their own. This means that there is a gain to be had from showing the world community that by itself Komineft can only foul up the Arctic (which, by the way, is not too far from the truth). That is why reports on the Komi disaster continuously fill television screens all over the world. The Komineft management, on the other hand, on the threshold of the second stage of privatization hopes to prove its competency and the ability to find a solution to any situation. Especially considering that according to Komineft's version, what they have is only "a rayon-scale accident..."

"Not a single reindeer, not a single bear was hurt by the accident," the deputy head of the Komi Republic, Vyacheslav Bibikov, assured journalists. Well, perhaps the bears got off lightly; as for the people... In spring the high water will definitely make its way to the meadows where farmer Leonid Fenerin mows hay for his livestock.

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As a result, nobody will buy milk from Fenerin, not to mention meat. Some customers have already abandoned Leonid after newspaper reports of the disaster. Well, he can understand them, but what is he going to do with his milk? The local fish is absolutely inedible, and the famous omul, which usually swims up the Usa river for spawning, this year changed its habit. How are they to live, make the ends meet? Perhaps the AO Komineft management knows the answer to these questions?..

*P.S. According to official estimates, the damage from the ecological catastrophe is R62 billion. In spring this figure will get considerably larger, because at this point it is impossible to determine the damage to reindeer pastures and fish stock. The hastily performed repairs on the pipeline do not guarantee that such accidents will not be repeated in the near future...*

### Officials Deny Report of Second Spill

*LD0711171894 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1500 GMT 7 Nov 94*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Roman Zadunayskiy]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 7 November—There has not been another major oil spill in the Republic of Komi, a report of which the Russian branch of the international ecological organization Greenpeace circulated on 6 November. An ITAR-TASS correspondent learned this today from information of the headquarters for civil defense and emergencies of the Republic of Komi and the "Usinsktermneft" directorate.

These organizations deny Greenpeace reports that there was a new major oil spill 60 kilometers to the north of Usinsk which, starting last Thursday, resulted in a further 13,000 tons of oil flowing from a worn-out pipeline. Greenpeace claims it discovered the new spill on Friday.

According to information from the headquarters for civil defense and emergencies and the "Usinsktermneft" directorate, on 4 November on the pipeline mentioned in the Greenpeace reports the need arose, in the process of planned repairs, to set alight oil spilt in August this year when a seal in the pipeline failed. Furthermore, at 1500 GMT on 3 November the pumping of oil from northern regions was halted. There was no other accident or oil spill here.

### Zyuganov Visit Attests To Communists Strength

*MM0711171394 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 5 Nov 94 p 2*

[Report by Vladimir Toporkov: "Meetings in Tambov Oblast"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The results of a two-day visit to Tambov Oblast by Gennadiy Zyuganov, chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and leader of the deputies' faction in the State Duma, attest to the strengthening of the Communist Party of Russia, its increasing authority, and the growing trust in it. This is expressed, above all, in the attention paid by ordinary voters. As a rule, the halls or shops where meetings were held were full to capacity. Over 4,000 people gathered in Tambov's "Yubileynyy" Palace of Culture alone. A PA system had to be set up not only in the palace foyer but also in the adjacent square.

On the first day of Zyuganov's stay in Tambov meetings were also held with servicemen of the local garrison, deputies of the oblast and city duma, and administration heads of the oblast's cities and rayons.

The second day began with a trip to the "Streletskiy" Sovkhoz. The farm workers indignantly informed the deputy about the very grave position of the peasantry.

Well-attended meetings were also held in the city of Michurinsk, where Gennadiy Zyuganov visited the vehicle repair plant, and he also addressed the students and teachers of the Agricultural Academy.

### Official Visits Northern Caucasus Conflict Zone

*LD0811111794 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1055 GMT 8 Nov 94*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Shanayev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vladikavkaz November 8 TASS—The purpose pursued by Russian Minister for Nationalities and Regional Policy Nikolay Yegorov, currently visiting the Northern Caucasus, is to study the situation in the zone of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict and to draw up conclusions on the fulfilment of presidential decrees and injunctions of the Russian Government pertaining to the return of refugees and displaced persons to four populated localities there.

He met here today morning North Ossetian President Akhsarbek Galazov, speaker of the North Ossetian Supreme Soviet Yuriy Biragov, members of the North Ossetian Government and parliament, and head of the provisional administration on a part of the territories of North Ossetia and Ingushetia Vladimir Lozovoy.

Yegorov noted during the meeting that a tendency towards stabilisation was lately observed in the region. The leaderships of North Ossetia and Ingushetia are making reciprocal steps towards peace and concord. "The problem of refugees, in light of the presidential decrees and injunctions of the Russian Government, must be resolved: People must be returned to their hearths. The Ossetians and Ingushs are destined to live side by side," he stated.

The minister stressed that work to build housing and the social infrastructure should be stepped up in the conflict zone. He also stated that there should be no revision of the borders or recarving of territories in the region, because this is apt to trigger a new tragedy in southern Russia.

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Yegorov also met today leaders of the Ingush Republic, visited some refugee camps and units of the Russian Army deployed in the conflict zone. The minister will leave Vladikavkaz today afternoon.

### 'Powerful' Mine Explodes Near Palace in Chechen

*LD0811092594 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0804 GMT 8 Nov 94*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sharip Asuyev]

[FBIS Translated Text] Groznyy, 8 Nov—A powerful mine was detonated at dawn today in Groznyy outside the Kavkaz Hotel opposite the presidential palace. Apart from window panes shattered in the blast the incident had no more serious consequences. Fortunately there were no casualties.

As in many other such cases, the perpetrator of this act of sabotage has not been identified. The Chechen law enforcement bodies are trying to blame the incident on certain forces attempting through any methods to destabilize the situation in the capital.

### Bryansk Airport Opens, Provides Access to West

*MM0711191194 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Nov 94 p 3*

[Report by Vyacheslav Mikhaylov: "Bryansk Gets New Airport"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bryansk's aviators have been waiting for this day since 1987. That was when construction began on the new air terminal 10 km from Bryansk (the old airport was virtually in the city center).

Now there is the joyous news that an An-24 RA-46511 aircraft from Moscow has landed on the new concrete runway (2,100 meters long, with the possibility of its being extended to 3,500 meters). Nikolay Vorobyev, chief of the Regional Air Transport Administration of the Central Regions Flight Safety Inspectorate, landed the aircraft on the new runway.

The new complex, which comprises, in addition to the terminal, many technical buildings for aviation engineering and auxiliary services as well as large storage premises, has great potential. It can handle 200-300 people an hour and accommodate Yak-42's, Caravelle-12's, Boeing-737's, and Il-76 transports.

What is more, the complex occupies an exceptionally advantageous position within European Russia and the CIS, virtually equidistant from such major cities as Moscow, Kiev, and Minsk. Bryansk is on the international airway linking West Europe and Moscow and is the first airport on Russian territory on this route. Considering the airport's geographical position, Bryansk Oblast Administration Head Vladimir Karpov, in conjunction with the Air Transport Department, has decided that Bryansk Airport will receive "international" status, which will make it possible to considerably relieve the Moscow air traffic center.

### Tatarstan Measures 'Unprecedented' Harvest

*MM0711173194 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 5 Nov 94 p 1*

[Article by Marsel Zaripov under "On the Imminent Great October Festival!" rubric: "It Turns Out According to Marx"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The results of the agricultural year are being summed up in Tatarstan on the eve of the Great October Socialist Revolution [as published]. True, this is being done only conjecturally in livestock units, but combine and tractor drivers, agronomists, and feed procurement workers are doing so finally. The harvest has repaid the tillers of the soil with interest. The year has been cold and rainy, as it has throughout Russia's middle zone, and the grain crops ripened one month later than usual—which is why reaping, feed procurement, fall plowing, and sowing of winter crops had to be carried out simultaneously. The success is all the more gratifying! A harvest unprecedented in the whole history of farming in Tatarstan has been obtained—26.4 quintals per hectare! Still more weighty are the results of leading workers—they are two or three times higher than the republic indicators. In Arskiy Rayon, for example, which is right on the border with the Non-Chernozem Zone in the Mari Republic, they obtained over 48 quintals of grain per hectare. The highest harvest was gathered by the farmers of the "Ashitbash" Kolkhoz and the "Akchishma" Sovkhoz—71 quintals. The farmers of the fertile Chernozem Zone could boast of such yields.

Animal specialists, milkmaids, and stockmen are calm about the coming winter period. They are making up rations not according to the potential of the meager feed base but according to the herd's need. Stocks of coarse and succulent feed stand at 26 quintals of feed units per standard head. Sufficient grain has also been left for forage.

The results of Tatarstan's farmers on grain and feed plots are almost twice the average Russian indicators.

What, you will ask, is the secret? This question is most frequently answered in the republic like this: Today's indicators were predicted 150 years ago in the economic postulate of Karl Marx, the founder of scientific communism: "...The land's productivity depends on the application of labor and capital." Despite the cataclysms of the reforms and the universal need for finance, agricultural production is considered the priority area in Tatarstan. **One-third of budget appropriations are channeled to the countryside.**

Another reason for the agrarian success is psychological and moral. At the start of perestroyka, in the heat of hasty, mass privatization, who was there who did not destroy the embryos of socialist management—the

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kolkhozes and sovkhozes—and urge rural working people to be free private farmers! What is the worth of the statement by Vice Premier A. Chubays, the chief piratizer, that there were nothing but thieves on kolkhozes and sovkhozes? This campaign of badgering breadwinners (there is no other word for it!) was launched by the first persons—Ivan Silayev, the premier for an hour, and President Boris Yeltsin, the authors of many directives and prescriptions for the rapid and immediate reforming of the agrarian sector. As a result, the private farmers, who were not supported by the state, failed to find their feet, and the kolkhozes and sovkhozes also went downhill and started abandoning arable land, slaughtering livestock, and placing artel wealth into private hands. As a bitter result of the "transformations," yields fell, and ordinary livestock farmsteads and stockraising complexes began producing less output.

In Tatarstan not one rebuke has been addressed to rural working people; wherever they work—on a private farm or in a united kolkhoz or sovkhoz family—all have identical opportunities and all are equally honored! Of course, life for them, like everywhere, is not all sweetness, there is no money for wages, and there is nothing with which to buy equipment. Rural working people know, however, that in the most difficult circumstances they will not be upbraided or cursed but will be thanked and greatly admired for their labors and endeavors.

Rural folk endeavor to repay a good attitude toward themselves with similar good. We thank them!

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## International Affairs

### Moroz, Haensch Discuss 'Partnership' Agreement

*LD0711185794 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1700 GMT 7 Nov 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] A Ukrainian parliamentary delegation led by Supreme Council Chairman Oleksandr Moroz continues its visit to Brussels. On 7 November, the Ukrainian parliament members met European Parliament President Mr. Klaus Haensch. During the meeting, the sides discussed opportunities for closer ties between the two parliaments. In an interview for UKRINFORM, President Haensch promised his help in attaining the European Parliament's ratification of the partnership and cooperation agreement between Ukraine and the European Community signed in Luxembourg in the summer. However, he added, whether Ukraine will or will not become a full member of the European family depends to a greater extent on Ukraine than on the European Union.

Members of the Ukrainian parliamentary delegation met European External Relations Commissioner Hans van den Broek. The Ukrainian side noted that its leadership is pleased with the ever more dynamic development of Ukraine's relations with the European Union and its members, which is taking on more specific and constructive forms. The recent leadership changes, said Chairman Oleksandr Moroz, did and will not cause any radical turns in Ukraine's foreign policy, which remains peaceful. Undoubtedly, adjustments are being made to some of the foreign policy aspects, said the Supreme Council chairman. This means more normal and active relations with Russia, closer cooperation within the CIS, and more active protection of Ukraine's national interests on the international scene. However, the Ukrainian parliament speaker stressed, our foreign policy principles remain unchanged. This fully concerns our desire to develop relations with the West and become closely involved with Europe's regional and general institutions. One of our constant and remaining priorities is the development of full-scale cooperation with the European Union.

## National Affairs

### Nationalists Call For Moroz Dismissal

*LD0711193994 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1726 GMT 7 Nov 94*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Ukrainian nationalists have called for the dismissal of Parliamentary Chairman Oleksandr Moroz.

Speaking on Monday at a rally held in Kiev by nationalist organizations, Prosvita Sociey leader Pavlo Movchan, a member of parliament, said the rally should become "the beginning of a new stage in the fight for the independence of Ukraine, the main goal of which is the remove the Communists from government."

In a resolution the rally also backed a demand for the dismissal of Kiev Mayor Leonid Kosakovskiy made by several members of the capital's municipal council.

### Defense Minister Speaks on Current Issues

*WS0811100094 Kiev KIYEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI in Russian 29 Oct 94 p 3*

[Interview with Valeriy Shmarov, Ukrainian defense minister, by Anatoliy Smetanin on 22 October; place not given: "Valeriy Shmarov: Military People Are Special. They Are Accustomed to Saying 'Yes, Sir,' but No One Knows What They Actually Think"—first two paragraphs are KIYEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] The appointment of a civilian as defense minister has been met with mixed reaction among society. But how did the military react to this fact, and what was their first impression of Valeriy Shmarov? Here is what one of the participants in the meeting held by the minister at the Central Military Hospital said: "He is well-built and tall. You can immediately see the military posture. There were not many such commanders even in the Soviet Army. He speaks quietly, but you feel that he does what he says. Put a uniform on him and let him smash his fist against the table, and the proper effect is guaranteed. Although, he does not even wear a uniform, you just feel like snapping to attention in front of him."

In one word, the new minister makes quite an impression. If he proves to be a man of action, his authority in the Army will be indisputable. While having his own opinions, Valeriy Shmarov makes compromises which sometimes seem inexplicable to many people and debasing to his image. Later, however, it always turns out that he is still in the saddle and his authority is even higher. How does he do that? So I decided to ask the minister myself.

[Smetanin] Some time ago, you and Valentyn Landyk [former deputy prime minister] refused to follow Leonid Kuchma and his team and let go of the government steering wheel. I think this must have provoked a negative reaction. Leonid Kuchma is back in power and you are on his team again. Is it because of your high professionalism, or should the reason be found somewhere else?

[Shmarov] First, I am not in a position to assess myself, all the more so in public. Speaking about the situation that you mentioned, which happened last fall, I thought then that it would be the right thing to continue to do my job. At that time, I probably did it worse, but later maybe better. In any case, things were moving forward. I believe that I was right in the long run.

As for my relations with the president, they are good, and there were no untoward actions either on my part or his.

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[Smetanin] Do you think that the appointment of a civilian as defense minister is a move toward international standards, or is it a result of military personnel shortages in the president's administration?

[Shmarov] I believe there are no military personnel shortages—we have a sufficient number of senior military officers. There is no straightforward answer to the first part of your question. Of course, we are seeking, to some extent, of building something close to international standards. One should understand, however, that this will not happen after some work is done to reconstruct the state and the Armed Forces, which might take quite a while. The main reason is economic. At present, the Army's condition depends entirely on the national economy. However, this is probably always the case, not only at present. I would say then, particularly at present, that the economy is not healthy, and it has its impact on the Army. The Armed Forces is a complex organism. So, it was the perception that the military should be headed by an individual with economic expertise who can balance the state's capabilities and the need to ensure protection of the country that prompted my appointment.

[Smetanin] As the defense minister, you are subordinated to the supreme commander plus, on a daily basis, to the deputy prime minister for national security. But you are the deputy prime minister, too. So, to whom are you subordinated and what are your professional relations with Evhen Marchuk [deputy prime minister and former Ukrainian Security Council chief]?

[Shmarov] Let me say right away: our professional relations are normal. Moreover, we have developed very close personal relations. Although there is a lot of work, we find ways to work well and to wisely divide our responsibilities. It is natural that being the Ukrainian defense minister (and at the same time the deputy prime minister), I handle the Ukrainian Armed Forces. This, however, in no way limits or rules out the coordinating role of Evhen Marchuk, because as deputy prime minister, he coordinates military matters. We have no conflicts on this issue.

[Smetanin] You returned yesterday from the CIS summit held in Moscow. Is the Black Sea Fleet issue still in a deadlock? Were there any compromises made on this issue?

[Shmarov] You know, we have always compromised, but there was a limit to this. Over the past two years, we have tried to build good relations and come up with some sort of model. However, the uncompromising and rigid position taken by the Moscow team which participated in the negotiations led us to nothing more than just marking time. No progress was made since last spring when we approached the issue of the division of the fleet's mobile part and the basic concept for dividing the infrastructure. This happened only because of the unyielding position of the Russian side. On the other hand, we were standing on a line that we could not overstep without violating our law and the country's sovereignty. So, we could no longer stick to the compromising stance which hurt the interests of our state.

By the way, there is nothing called the "Crimean issue" any more—it ceased to exist. It does not exist in the inflamed condition as it did in the past; and it should be remembered that these problems strongly affected the negotiations on the Black Sea Fleet, which was also noted by Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

[Smetanin] According to media leaks, Russia is ready to recognize the 1954 agreement, but in exchange, it demands recognition of the Russian status for Sevastopol. Is this correct? [Shmarov] No one is talking about this in official Moscow. Moreover, Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin expressed his full understanding of the issues concerning inviolability of the Ukrainian border.

[Smetanin] When you were a civilian and headed our delegation during nuclear disarmament negotiations, you agreed that the nuclear arms should be taken out of the Ukrainian territory. Now that you directly head the Ukrainian Armed Forces, do you still hold the same position?

[Shmarov] Just as in the past, my position reflects that of our state: our state has been consistently pursuing nonnuclear policies since 1991. I always put my executive policies in line with what was adopted by our parliament, the president, etc. At present, we are fulfilling our commitments on START I. The parliamentary commissions are now discussing the president's report on Ukraine's joining the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. This is, so to speak, a political response to your question.

As for the technical understanding of this process, I always make sure that we do not create a critical situation regarding the threat that our weapons can pose. You remember very well when this process came to a head (to sign or not to sign the START Treaty), we were denied maintenance of our nuclear ammunition. We found ourselves faced with the problem: the ammunition started to behave, as it were, abnormally, leaking and so on. These arms, if separated from production and technical servicing, can set a grave precedent for Ukraine. I consider efforts to prevent this precedent one of the major principles in my activities.

Now about the fulfillment of our commitments on the START I Treaty. We pay close attention to make sure that expired charges, "ill ammunition" in military terminology, are not left in Ukraine, because they can cause a tragedy much worse than that of Chernobyl. I do not want to spook anyone, but with the present huge stockpile of nuclear arms, one should very thoroughly store and maintain them—primarily, due to Ukraine's international commitments.

[Smetanin] Regarding this, here is my next question. Some high-ranking military officials are accused of trading weapons and ammunition. As the deputy prime

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minister for the military- industrial complex, what do you think about this "shady business"?

[Shmarov] Let me tell you right away: I have nothing to do with this "shady business." As deputy prime minister, I have tried—successfully, I hope—to set up a national system for overseeing sensitive exports and technologies. Speaking simply, this is what you can call the handling of issues concerning sales of weapons and ammunition and all other sensitive materials. The following has been done: relevant state institutions have been established, allowing me to declare that everything is being done legally. It is a common practice throughout the world for those who engage in arms trade. But this trade is regulated by international norms. We have a state commission granting licenses for these kinds of activities and for specific types of products that are subject to sales. The commission is a consolidated effort of many government institutions, including the Foreign Ministry, international law experts, the Science Academy, the Ukrainian Security Service, military officials, etc. In other words, a license is not issued until each particular case is assessed from various points of view. There are competent services—the committee of technical experts, the committee for sensitive technologies, and some other relevant organizations handling those special operations exclusively at the government's permission.

We believe that the system works. As for what you think and what was reported by the press, let me tell you this: Yes, there was a period of some disarray. However, I think that the press should behave itself more properly. All those engaged in some kind of impropriety already have cuffs on their hands. It is up to the prosecutor's office and supervising bodies to handle this issue. Today, I am pleased with the way we deal with it. The media leaked information that 10 MIG-21 aircraft, exported from Ukraine, were allegedly assembled in Croatia, and that 10 T-72 tanks or so (I do not remember the exact number) from Ukraine were also found in that same place. We conducted an emergency investigation and can positively state that no such deliveries were made through our control system. We are ready to prove that fact to everyone and everywhere, and if it fits in the contents of your interview, please mention that.

[Smetanin] What are the prospects for the Ukrainian arms market in general? How good and competitive are our arms—tanks, planes, firearms, ammunition?

[Shmarov] The world arms market is pretty tight and divided among or usurped by traditional big players, such as the United States, Russia, France, Israel, and, on a smaller scale, Great Britain. Other countries like China are making aggressive efforts to find their niche in it. Of course, it is very difficult for Ukraine to enter that market (for now, let us put aside the question of what we can offer). So, there are two options: dumping practices (but the market has its own jungle law forbidding this) or active efforts on the part of Ukrainian Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, special services, and all of us.

We are certainly conducting this kind of work, but it has brought no substantial economic profits so far, and is estimated at only a few dollars annually. It is very hard to enter this market because trade in our type of military equipment used to be monopolized by the Soviet Union, and currently by its legitimate successor, Russia represented by the "Rosvooruzheniye." It stands to reason that this organization controls the market through its offices located in many countries. But we, too, examine those issues.

Do we have commodities to trade? Of course, we have unprofitable weapons. In addition, some of the weapons are waiting to be scrapped in compliance with our international commitments. If declared, their sales are not prohibited. I think this is normal. Why should we turn into a heap of scrap metal something that could be sold and for which there is a buyer?

[Smetanin] Now a simpler question: Confronted with the military, did you feel advantages or disadvantages of being a civilian defense minister?

[Shmarov] If I were a military man, I would probably have a military mentality. I am in quite a difficult situation today. On the one hand, I was entrusted with a large ministry which should be maintained and armed. On the other hand, I represent the government and have the government's view on all this. In my opinion, if I blend into the military community, I will find it hard to perform my duties. So far, I hope, the Armed Forces have not been in any way damaged by this situation. I try to resolve mundane issues: procure fuel, prepare the transportation fleet and housing for winter... Since I can take advantage of my position in the government (in the positive meaning of this expression), I can handle those tasks better.

I think that the president and the Supreme Council made the only correct decision.

[Smetanin] Do you think that you are supported by the entire military leadership and elite? Do you feel any opposition [on their part]?

[Shmarov] This is a difficult question, because military people are special—they are accustomed to saying "yes, sir," but I cannot say what they actually think. But all of them quite explicitly express support in their words and nods. Work results of specific officials will show.

I believe that support should be expected from the middle-level officers in local units whose resources and possibilities are limited, and who are hardest hit by the present situation, and need a lot of help. This support is very realistic down there. Also, the enlisted servicemen should not be neglected. There are more of them, and one should probably work to accommodate their needs. I count on their support.

[Smetanin] In September 1995, the International Military Sport Games will be held in Italy. Our team has been

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officially invited to participate in this event. What specific support will our military sportsmen receive from you, the defense minister?

[Shmarov] You know, I am an old sportsman and am very interested in everything connected with sports. We will seek ways to help our athletes train and perform well.

[Smetanin] The chief of the Military Medical Administration was the first official that you fired. Does this mean that you will continue to pay close attention to health care?

[Shmarov] Yes, very much. A soldier feels personal attention and care first and foremost through contacts with a doctor and his supervisors. I do not want to say anything bad about the man that I fired, but I saw that he had adopted a passive and conservative position, while, in contrast, the administration's personnel was very active and reform-oriented. I thought those people should be given the opportunity to act.

[Smetanin] And the last question: In your heart, are you a military man? Did you ever want to become a serviceman?

[Shmarov] Yes, I did. I even studied at the military academy for a while, the Zhytomyr Radio Electronic Academy. But when I had a conflict with junior commanders, I decided not to yield. So, I left that institution.

## Fuel Deficit, Tariff Policy 'Exacerbate' Crisis

*WS0711112594 Kiev KHRESHCHATYK in Ukrainian 28 Oct 94 p 2*

[Article by UNIAN correspondent Ihor Karpenko: "Kilowatt-Hour as a Value Measure?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Once prosperous, Ukraine's power engineering has recently—on the eve of winter—found itself in a deep crisis. Even though we have a sufficient number of electric power plants, and they are in perfect technical condition, the fuel deficit is increasing. According to Ministry of Power and Electrification data, coal reserves at thermal power plants are standing at 4.8 million tons (instead of the planned 9 million tons), and fuel oil at 0.633 million tons (instead of the planned 1.5 million tons). Coal reserves are 2 million tons less than at the same time last year. As a result, in the opinion of our power engineering experts, the production capacities of our electric power plants have been met only by 60-70 percent.

This problem has been exacerbated due to the fact that a number of blocks at our nuclear power plants have been put out of operation because of a lack of uranium or for security reasons. According to Ministry of Power and Electrification figures, its sector has produced 9 billion kilowatt/hours less over nine months of 1994 and 6.5 billion kilowatt/hours less over the third quarter of 1994. To compensate for losses, we require some 4.5 million tonnes of coal. The government report—to be submitted for Supreme Council consideration—says that "our automatic power support system can uncontrollably disconnect entire regions of Ukraine from the central power grid." Therefore, it is not ruled out that a few regions could be left without electricity for some time in the winter.

We should also keep in mind our gas debt to Russia, which, according to data from the Ministry of Economy, has reached $1.8 billion, and I am surprised that our houses have been connected to a centralized heating system. According to the Cabinet of Ministers' Resolution No. 688, Russia—due to our unsettled debts—has again decreased gas deliveries to Ukraine and we are facing a "threat of a reduction in production or even an entire interruption and disorganization of the national economy."

In the opinion of Deputy Minister of Economy Vasyl Hureev, a flawed tariff policy and persistent nonpayments of debts by big consumers are a key reason for the bankruptcy of the power engineering sector. Electricity tariffs for Ukraine's residents are really below production costs. The state subsidizes the difference in price and pays for "budgeters." In Hureev's words, however, the state fails to do this sometimes due to the budget deficit.

Budget debts are intensified by the mutual nonpayments of enterprises that are currently staying at 6 trillion karbovanetsi [K]. Therefore, workers of the power engineering sector—who do not receive payments for their services—are forced to purchase energy resources on credit thus undermining their unstable financial situation. The Ministry of Power and Electrification debts have reached K3.5 trillion. Electric power plants have been authorized to suspend deliveries of electricity to persistent defaulters. This will hardly improve the situation.

The program for macroeconomic stabilization stipulates a three- fold increase in prices for municipal services for the population within this quarter (the people are currently paying only 5 percent of the real costs). This, however, implies that the state will continue to compensate 80 percent of the expenditures for municipal services. Therefore, power engineering is deemed to be stuck in debts. Meanwhile, according to data from the Ministry of Economy, consumption of electricity by the population—in contrast to industrial consumption—is increasing and stands at 20.7 percent. This is, according to Hureev, a natural process connected with the further electrification and gasification of residential areas.

Enterprises will likely be unable to settle the greatest portion of their debts and even the most severe sanctions will hardly force them to repay their debts. The "socialist economy" has not taught our managers to settle their debts. Therefore, the government is pinning great hopes on private companies which, in Hureev's opinion, can save the power engineering sector from final bankruptcy

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creating favorable financial conditions for themselves. The Ministry of Economy views this assistance the following way. Private entrepreneurs will purchase energy resources and transfer them to electric power plants which will process them and produce electricity which will become the property of private businessmen. Supplying the industrial and agricultural sectors with electricity, businessmen will receive their goods in return.

The government, virtually, has drafted the entire legal foundation for the implementation of this program. Even though this program seems very attractive, its implementation could encounter great difficulties. For example, I do not understand what will force a manager—refusing to pay for electricity now—to immediately begin settling his accounts with the new owners of electricity. Not to mention the fact that an enterprise has no interest in receiving expensive electricity because it can utilize free state electricity. To implement this program, enterprises should be at least disconnected from the central power grid. This, however, could destroy the equipment of steel producing plants. Therefore, although managers of electric power plants have received a formal right to disconnect their debtors from the central power grid, they will hardly take this step. So, the commercial attractiveness of a new government program is not quite convincing, therefore, it is necessary to look for other solutions.

### Umanets Speaks on Power System Merge

*MM0711153794 Moscow TRUD in Russian 5 Nov 94 p 3*

[Report by Oleg Malko: "Nuclear Power Sector Not Threatened With Closure"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev—The Ukrainian and Russian energy systems should be united as soon as possible, Mikhail Umanets, chairman of the State Committee for Atomic Energy [Goskomatom], stated at a session of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers. It is his view that Russia also has a great interest in such a process of unification.

The atomic energy department head pointed out that just a few years ago Ukraine occupied a fairly sound position in the enormous energy supply market on the territory of the USSR and the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance [CEMA]. At that time 30 billion kilowatts of electric power—both Ukrainian and Russian—"flowed" across Ukraine to this market. In the opinion of the leader of the country's nuclear power-engineering sector, in the event of agreement being reached at the political level, the technical unification of the two countries' energy systems would proceed very swiftly. This would make it easier for both countries to capture fairly promising markets. M. Umanets stated that the currency earned should be channeled into resolving the problems of the nuclear-industrial complex "which has found itself on the verge of bankruptcy and technical failure." In what is this manifested?

The financing of programs to increase safety in power units has practically stopped and assessment of their condition is not being carried out. Nuclear electric power stations [AES]' stores have been emptied. Fuel supplies have already been consumed; this year for the first time during their working lives several AES's have already been working on the basis of "using deliveries immediately upon receipt." Due to a lack of equipment and spare parts the planned replacement of worn-out units is not being carried out. All this can lead to the stations shutting down.

The reduced tariff for electric power, Umanets considers, has lead to a money shortage amounting to 10-12 trillion karbovantsi, and the systematic nonpayment by its consumers is not allowing the sector's losses to be covered. Today, Goskomatom is owed more than 1 trillion karbovantsi for the electric power it has produced.

Goskomatom intends to create its own nuclear-fuel cycle because Ukraine possesses uranium. But this is a very expensive undertaking and something like $400 million is required just in the initial period. To complete the process about $1 billion will be required. The program has been tentatively planned for a 10-year period.

But will the Chernobyl AES be closed, as the G7 countries are insisting? It was noted at the aforementioned session of the Cabinet of Ministers that this task will cost $2.5-3 billion according to the most modest estimates. Ukraine cannot afford such a sum, what is more it is also fairly onerous for the G7 countries. The position of Ukraine's Goskomatom (which both President Leonid Kuchma and Prime Minister Vitaliy Masol support) is as follows: It is possible to use Chernobyl's power units on the condition that they are modernized and the level of safety is increased. The conclusions of 170 of the very most competent experts from 12 countries has confirmed this. One of the most acceptable schemes put forward by Goskomatom is to close Chernobyl AES only after two of the new generation of power unit attached to the city of Slavutich have been constructed. In these circumstances the problem of the 30,000-strong population of the power-engineering workers' city would also be resolved. It was after all built expressly for Chernobyl AES personnel and their families soon after the "disaster of the 20th century."

### Thousands Participate in Kiev 'Mournful' March

*LD0711144094 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1330 GMT 7 Nov 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev—A mournful march in memory of the victims of the communist regime began in Sophia Square at 1000 on 7 November. It was organized by Ukraine's national-democratic forces, in particular the URP, (Ukrainian Republican Party), Rukh, Democratic Party of Ukraine, and the "Prosvita" society. Oles Shevchenko, one of the leaders of the URP, said at the rally that today the situation had changed and

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the city council had again joined the pro-communist forces and this was why the time for the action had been postponed by the national-democrats until the second part of the day.

After the rally, several hundred demonstrators made their way to Shevchenko Boulevard with the intention of entering Independence Square. However, a detachment of special purpose militia blocked the demonstrators' route at Volodymyrska Street near the building belonging to the Ukrainian Security Service. The demonstrators and their supporters made their way to Khreshchatyk [Kiev's main thoroughfare] by another route.

At 1100, a column of about 4,000 people with anticapitalist slogans calling for the renewal of the USSR and expressing discontent with the present authorities and holding red and blue flags [flag of the Ukrainian SSR] made its way from the Park of Glory to Khreshchatyk. The column halted near Independence Square where it remained for about 30 minutes. In the view of observers, the reason for this was an unwillingness to run into the national- democratic forces. The column then made its way to the Lenin monument on Bessarabska Square where flowers were placed at the foot of the statue.

Representatives of the national-democratic forces (numbering about several thousand) holding state flags and shouting anti- communist slogans accompanied the column of left-wing forces along Khreshchatyk and Bessarabska Square.

### 'Clash' Occurs During Rallies

*LD0711154894 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1410 GMT 7 Nov 94*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Viktor Demidenko and Mikhail Melnik]

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev, 7 Nov—The 77th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution was marked by a clash today between communists and socialists on the one side, and national democrats on the other.

Representatives of left-wing forces went out onto the Kreshchatik [Kiev's main street] bearing red flags and banners reflecting their aspiration to revive the socialist past.

Representatives of Rukh and other national democratic forces, however, regarding 7 November as a day of mourning for the victims of the communist regime, went down the city's main street bearing state flags and flagstaffs draped in black mourning ribbons.

Neither procession, however, started on time. The column of many thousands of national democrats headed by Vyacheslav Chornovil, Rukh leader and people's deputy was halted by OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachment] forces on the approaches to the Kreshchatik. At the same time, a no less numerous column of left-wing forces headed by Petr Symonenko, people's deputy and first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee was preparing for a demonstration on the other side of the main street.

Already heated passions boiled over. The Rukh supporters, demanding that they be allowed to proceed, started to press against the tightly-ranked OMON ranks, and a scuffle developed. One side put batons to use, the other side wielded flagstaffs. Several demonstrators, including women, were injured as a result. Rukh leader Chornovil managed to halt the brawl, and after he had talks with Simonenko it was decided that the communists and socialist should proceed first onto the Kreshchatik.

I did not want to permit bloodshed, Chornovil said in an interview to the ITAR-TASS correspondent. That is why I opted for a compromise. We put the entire blame for what happened upon the city authorities, who allowed the demonstrations to be held at the same time. We think the city council took this decision to please the communist majority in parliament.

### 'Light' Injuries Noted

*LD0711182194 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1726 GMT 7 Nov 94*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Six people received light injuries as police clashed with nationalist demonstrators in Kiev, a senior police officer said.

Most of those injured were policemen, Anatoliy Kulikov, chief of the capital's riot police force, told Interfax.

Kulikov said there had been approximately as many pro-communist as nationalist demonstrators, between 6,000 and 8,000 people on each side.

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## Belarus

### Minsk, Denmark Sign Trade, Economic Agreement

*LD0711193894 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1726 GMT 7 Nov 94*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belarus and Denmark have signed an agreement on economic, industrial and technological cooperation at the end of the first day of a visit to Minsk on Monday by Danish Foreign Minister Nilson Helvek Petersen.

In an interview with Interfax afterwards, Petersen said the deal could help substantially increase bilateral trade. The minister said that smaller states could do big business if they cooperate.

Denmark's exports to Belarus ran at $1.7 billion compared with $2.5 billion by Belarus in the nine months to October.

The two countries' foreign departments signed a protocol on cooperation with each other on the same day.

Petersen is due to end his visit on Tuesday.

## Moldova

### Tabun Outlines Iranian Oil Import Agreement

*AU0711202494 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 1930 GMT 4 Nov 94*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau BASAPRESS, 8/11/1994—During 1995-2000, Moldova will import 2.5 million tonnes of crude oil from Iran, Natalia Tabun, economist at the Foreign Economic Relations Department of the State Fuel Company, told BASA. The agreement on this transaction was signed on November 1-2 in Tehran by the Moldovan governmental organization headed by Andrei Sangheli. Tabun pointed out that the price and the delivery terms and conditions were not yet established. Previously, Nicolae Ciornai, General Director of the State Fuel Company said that the price of the crude oil imported from Iran would be 10 times as less as the world ones. The crude oil imported from Iran is to be processed at the Romanian refineries. The imported fuel will be paid in hard currency and through clearing operations. Moldova is to export to Iran pumps, carpets, canned foods, sugar, meat, vegetable oil and other products. Prime Minister Andrei Sangheli declared on his arrival from Teheran that an agreement concerning the imports of liquefied gases was also concluded, adding that Moldova can import annually 200-250,000 tonnes of these gases.

### Gen Lebed Speaks Against Smirnov Decree

*LD0711210394 Moscow NTV in Russian 1900 GMT 7 Nov 94*

[Video report by unidentified correspondent, including recording of interview with 14th Army Commander General Aleksandr Lebed]

[FBIS Translated Text] It appears that the disruption of relations between the local authorities and the 14th Army stationed in the Dniester area has come to a head. The Russian military have refused, as of Monday, to obey the new decree of Smirnov, the Dniester area leader. Lebed, commander of the 14th Army, says that this decree violates human rights. He has expressed his protest over one of the decree's provisions which allows administrative arrests of citizens for up to 30 days. Lebed maintains that the authorities are acting against their people. Moreover, he describes the Dniester area leaders as a criminal group which is profiteering from the arms trade.

[Lebed] This is one of the most lucrative businesses. There are lots of arms here, stored clandestinely and unaccounted for, and that is why they will be sold over and over again, as has happened so far—until there is basic law and order here. This is easy enough, but the unwillingness of the Dniester official authorities to enforce this law and order is the main obstacle.

[Correspondent] The command of the 14th Army believes that the Dniester area leaders, who are wary that their dealings could be exposed, are trying to intimidate the opposition by repressions. This is the main idea behind their new decrees. In General Lebed's opinion, the Dniester area's leaders are thus trying to suppress dissent and possible acts of disobedience. [video shows military hardware]

### 'Disputes' Cause Suspension of Lebed Mandate

*AU0711202594 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 1939 GMT 7 Nov 94*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau BASAPRESS, 7/11/1994—Yesterday's Dniester Supreme Soviet session suspended General Aleksandr Lebed's deputy mandate on grounds that "he has not attended the Dniester Supreme Soviet sessions for three months." In October 1993, Lebed gave up his deputy rights as a protest against Dniester authorities' dispatching of "Dniester" battalion in the rebellion against Yeltsin. Local observers say that the decision to suspend Lebed's mandate was caused by the disputes between the Dniester officials and 14th Army commander. Lebed also supported Moldovan parents' protests against the ban on the Latin script. Yesterday, employees of the Tighina (Bender) station which incurred losses as a result of the blockade addressed Mircea Snegur and the Dniester authorities to "stop using the railway as a political instrument." If their demand is not satisfied, railway employees intend to block several highways.

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## Kazakhstan

### Supreme Council Chairman Receives Iranian Envoy

*LD0811095994 Alma-Ata Kazakh Radio Network in Russian 1500 GMT 7 Nov 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] Supreme Council chairman Abish Kekilbayev has received Ali Hurani, a special envoy of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, at the latter's request. During their talk they considered issues of mutual relations between the two countries. It was pointed out that a forthcoming official visit by a Kazakh Supreme Council delegation to Iran will help in establishing direct contacts between the legislative bodies. It will certainly facilitate the further extension of cooperation in the economy, trade, transport, and communications.

Rasoul Islami, Iranian ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in Kazakhstan, took part in the meeting.

### Emigration From Kazakhstan Increasing

*LD0811095494 Almaty PANORAMA in Russian 5 Nov 94 p3*

[Unattributed report]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to a report from the state statistics committee, emigration from the republic is on the increase again. Over the first half of the year the negative migration balance was 182,800 people.

According to data given to PANORAMA by the State Committee for Statistics and Analysis, the tendency toward greater emigration from the republic resumed in the first half of 1994. During the first half of the year 9,000 (19 percent) more people left the country for abroad than during the same period of 1993 and 1,200 (2.2 percent) more than the second half of 1993. In total during the last six months of 1993 220,400 people left the republic, of which 55,400 left for the far abroad and 165,000 for the near abroad. At the same time the rate of emigration to the countries of the far abroad has fallen remarkably (from 17.1 percent to 2.2 percent), and there is a tendency towards some growth to the near abroad countries (from 25 percent to 27.5 percent).

Most of those who left the country are, as before, urban inhabitants (70.6 percent) and only one-third of them (29.4 percent) are from rural areas.

The majority of the emigrants are Russians (57.2 percent) and Germans (22 percent). Most of the people emigrating to countries of the far abroad are of German nationality, the number of which has stabilized at the level of the second half of 1993.

The migrants who departed for the near abroad can be listed as follows: to the Russian Federation 151,200 people (91.6 percent), Ukraine 4,700 (2.9 percent), Uzbekistan 3,600 (2.2 percent), Belarus 2,200 (1.3 percent), and to Kyrgyzstan 1,800 (1.1 percent). This year the stream of emigrants to the Russian Federation has grown by one-third (33.3 percent compared to the second half of 1993), by 13.5 percent to Kyrgyzstan, while the number of emigrants to Turkmenistan has fallen sharply by 36.4 percent. The number of emigrants to Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, and Belarus has fallen to 18.6 percent, 16.9 percent and 11.3 percent respectively. Among emigrants to the Russian Federation 74.7 percent were Russians, 2.4 percent Kazakhs, and 4.0 percent Germans.

An analysis of the educational level of the emigrants who left the republic aged 16 and over showed that about half of them (46 percent) have higher, incomplete higher, and secondary specialized education. It is noticeable that those who are leaving for near abroad countries have a higher educational level than those who go to the countries of the far abroad. The majority of those with higher, incomplete higher and secondary specialized education aged 16 and over as a percentage of those who left for the far abroad were 38.4 percent, for the near abroad 48.5 percent.

The worst of the population loss has been suffered by Karaganda (10.1 percent of the total number of people who have left the republic), Akmola, and Pavlodar (7.4 percent each) regions. The majority (57.2 percent) of emigrants from these regions are Russians. As a proportion of the emigrants from Mangistau region Russians made up 72.1 percent, Taldykorgan region 76.2 percent, Semipalatinsk region 68.1 percent and Leninsk region 78.5 percent. During the period January to June this year 37,600 people arrived in the republic, among them 4,400 from far abroad countries and 33,200 from the near abroad. It should be noted that the stream of immigrants into Kazakhstan is continuing to decrease. So, if immigrants into Kazakhstan decreased in the second half of 1993 by 4,300 or 7.4 percent in comparison with the first half of 1993, then in January to June this year it decreased by almost a third compared to the second half of 1993 (29.7 percent).

Immigrants, in the first half of 1994 mainly arrived from the Russian Federation (63.8 percent), Uzbekistan (13.9 percent), Kyrgyzstan (7.6 percent),and Ukraine (5.9 percent) and they amount to 91 percent of all immigrants to Kazakhstan. At the same time there is a decrease in immigration from these republics, especially Uzbekistan (by 34.9 percent compared to the second half of 1993), and the Russian Federation (by 28.8 percent). More than half of the immigrants from the Russian Federation are Russians (57.6 percent), 19.8 percent are Kazakhs and 4.9 percent are Germans; from Uzbekistan 66.7 percent of immigrants are Kazakhs, and from Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine almost half of them are Russians (45.4 percent and 49.1 percent) respectively.

An analysis of the educational level of the immigrants showed that 12,100 people aged 16 and over came to the

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republic during the last half year from the near and far abroad with higher, incomplete higher and secondary specialized education (41.4 percent out of the total number of those aged 16 and over) whilst 74,100 people left the country with the same education level (or 46 percent out of the total number of people aged 16 and over who left).

The increase in the exodus of the population from the republic from the beginning of this year helped form a negative balance of migration, which from January to June amounted to 182,800 people, that is 90,800 more people (almost double) than in the same period last year, and 52,700 (40.5 percent) people more than in the second half of 1993. There was a negative balance in all regions without exception, especially in Karaganda (19,500 people), Akmola (14,500 people), Kostanay (14,200 people),Pavlodar (13,900 people) Kokshetau (12,600 people), Dzhambyl (11,900 people), Semipalatinsk (11,600 people), Mangistau (10,600 people), and Taldykorgan (10,000 people). At the existing rate of migration one may assume that by the end of 1994 the number of those who have left the republic will be more than 400,000 people against 333,400 in 1993, and the migration loss will be more than 300,000 people against 222,100 in 1993. Economic difficulties are given as the main reason for leaving.

As a result of the negative migration process together with unfavorable demographic tendencies - the fall in the birth rate and increase in the mortality rate - as of 1st July 1994 there was a drop of 106,800 people in the number of the republic's permanent population in comparison with the number at the beginning of the current year giving a total population of 16,763,600 people.

## Tajikistan

### Rakhmonov Said To Win 60% Majority in Elections

*LD0711134894 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1318 GMT 7 Nov 94*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Galina Gridneva and Andrey Palariya]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Dusahnbe November 7 TASS—According to provisional reports, Emomali Rakhmonov, present president of Tajikistan, has received a majority of votes in the presidential elections held in Tajikistan on 6 November. Mizrob Kobirov, chief of the Central Election Commission's press center, told ITAR-TASS that 60 per cent of the electorate cast their votes in favor of Rakhmonov. Abdumalik Abdullajanov, the second candidate, who is Tajikistan's ambassador to Russia, received 35 per cent of votes from all registered voters.

As expected, the Tajik leader received the maximum support from his home constitutency of Khatlo region in the south of the Republic, where 90 per cent votes were cast in his favor. Dushanbe residents also gave an evident preference (60 per cent of total votes cast) to the present head of the republic. A similar pattern of voting was observed in a number of suburbs of the Tajik capital.

The north of Tajikistan (leninabad region) gave a majority vote (80 per cent) to their own candidate and fellow-countryman Abdumalik Abdullajanov. The electorate from the Gornobadakhshan autonomy also expressed their liking for the ambassador to Russia. Here Abdullajanov polled almost 95 per cent of the votes.

The Central Election Commission spokesman noted that so far no verified results have been received from voting held in other CIS republics, where about 10 thousand Tajik refugees are living. It has been learned that under pressure from the oppositions no voting was held in the Sherkhan port of the Kundun Province where about 2000 Tajik refugees are living. But altogether, reports from these and other regions would not seriously effect the balance of votes in favour of Emomali Rakhmonov's opponent.

According to trusted figures of Abdumalik Abdullajanov, elections were held with serious violations and under pressure tactics used by supporters of the rival candidate, especially in the southern districts of the Republic, where armed groups beyond the government control are active.

Nabidjon Kadyrkulov, spokesman of Abdumalik Abdullajanov's initiative group told ITAR-TASS that they are ready to present numerous facts of violations of the election law and cases of rigging to independent observers and journalists, which, in their opinion, are reflected in the provisional results of the elections. At the same time, the Central Election Commission said that no reports of violation of election rules and regulations were received.

Simultaneously with the presidential elections, a referendum on the new consititution was held in Tajiksitan. According to the election commission, the fundamental law has been approved by 90 per cent of Tajikistan's electorate. November 6 will be declared a national holiday in Tajikistan.

### Observers See 'No Shortcomings' in Election

*LD0711151494 Dushanbe Radio Tajikistan Network in Tajik 1100 GMT 7 Nov 94*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Today the results of the referendum on constitution and the election of the republic's president are being discussed by the residents of the Republic of Tajikistan. [passage omitted]

How were the approval of the constitution and the presidential elections conducted in the Kulyabskiy district of Khoatlon region? Our correspondent Abdusattor Gulahmad interviewed Vladimir Fedorovich Petrov, an observer of the constitutional referendum and presidential election, who is counsellor to the Russian ambassador in Tajikistan on this issue.

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Petrov told our correspondent that it was a pleasure to be taking part in this important political campaign and acting as a UN observer at polling stations in Khoatlon region's Kulyabskiy district. He said that this campaign was conducted to a high standard. One can say decisively that this political campaign was truly up to the standards of constitutional democracy in its entirety. The citizens fully observed the election procedures and legislation. There were no shortcomings observed during the voting process. The electorate participated in it in good spirits and heart, and all the polling stations had a festive look about them.

It would have been better if representatives from other international organizations such as the UN Security Council and the United Nations and representatives from the United States and other organizations could have been present at the scene of this political campaign and seen with their own eyes how it was conducted.

I must add that no domestic or foreign organization has any grounds to say anything about the vote being one-sided or biased, however much they might wish to do so, Petrov said.

### Opposition Party Leader Rejects Rakhmonov as President

*LD0711163294 Tehran IRIB Television First Program Network in Persian 1530 GMT 7 Nov 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] Our correspondent interviewed Mr. Turajonzoda, deputy chairman of the Islamic Rebirth Party of Tajikistan, who boycotted the country's elections. Mr. Turajonzoda said:

[Turajonzoda] As far as the elections are concerned, we expressed our opinion in Pakistan that we will not accept any kind of elections which take place before a total political solution. We are not going to take part in that kind of election and we are not going to accept its results. That is why Rakhmanov's election as president does not bring any changes. Of course, we are ready to continue our talks with this regime. However we do not accept him as the legitimate president of Tajikistan. We will continue our talks with him as our opponent in order to achieve a complete political solution.

### Voters Approve New Basic Law

*LD0711165094 Dushanbe Radio Tajikistan Network in Uzbek 1300 GMT 7 Nov 94*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] As we informed you earlier on, we have received the first reports on the voting in the election of the president of the Republic of Tajikistan. [passage omitted]

Thus, Emomali Sharipovich Rakhmonov has been elected president of the Republic of Tajikistan. We remind you that these are the first reports that the central election commission has received by telegraph from the regions. The full information on the elections is now being worked out. The results will be known after a few days.

The national referendum on the approval of the new constitution also took place yesterday. According to the first reports we have received, the overwhelming majority of electors approved and voted for the new basic law. Thus, the Constitution has been approved, and according to the law, from now on, 6 November is Tajikistan's Constitution Day and is to be celebrated as as a holiday every year.

A telegram from the city of Krasnoyarsk was received by the Tajik central election commission. It says that our compatriots who live in the cities of Irkutsk, Krasnoyarsk, Novosibirsk, and Barnaul cities took part in the vote. The majority of them, 185 voters, voted for Emomali Rakhmonov, while 18 voted for Abdumalik Abdullojonov. All of them voted to approve the constitution. Compatriots living in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kiev, Alma-Ata, Minsk, Bishkek, and Bonn also participated in the election of the president of the Republic of Tajikistan. [passage omitted]

### Rakhmonov: Personnel Changes Will Be Necessary

*LD0711131694 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1215 GMT 7 Nov 94*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tajikistan's first president Emomali Rakhmonov, elected to the post by preliminary returns following Sunday's elections, has told INTERFAX correspondents that his country's policy will remain unchanged.

In an exclusive interview with INTERFAX in Dushanbe Monday, he stressed: "We will promote as usual the closest ties with Russia, Uzbekistan, and other CIS countries and will build mutually advantageous relations with the entire world community along parity lines."

"The economic course will be aimed at full integration in the ruble zone, with which Tajikistan links its future," said Rakhmonov, who earlier held the post of chairman of the republic's Supreme Soviet.

In his words, the leadership will foster a peaceful political dialogue with the opposition "since there is no other alternative" to a settlement in Tajikistan.

"There will be necessary personnel changes in the administration, but it is too early to speak about concrete appointments," Rakhmonov said.

Asked whether his election opponent Abdumalik Abdullajanov will carry on as ambassador to Russia or be offered a government office, Rakhmonov explained that "this question has not been considered yet, but the opinion of Abdullajanov himself will be taken into consideration."

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Rakhmonov welcomed the heavy turnout at Sunday's poll and referendum on a new republican constitution across Tajikistan, especially in the [Gorno-]Badakhshan autonomous region (in the east of the country).

"Many politologists argued that our citizens will ignore the elections. However, their most active participation irrefutably proves that among the people of Tajikistan no one is indifferent toward his homeland's destiny, and all are disposed for peaceful and creative endeavor," Rakhmonov declared. In his words, this inspires hope that the economic crisis will be resolved and armed confrontation will be halted in the republic "to ensure not only peace in Tajikistan but stability in Central Asia, as a whole."

### Foreign Minister 'Optimistic' About Peace Settlement

*LD0711211794 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2027 GMT 7 Nov 94*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Galina Gridnyova and Andrey Palaria]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Dushanbe November 7 TASS—The intra-Tajik talks have undergone significant changes and led the sides to the realisation of their main goal—to prevent new armed confrontation for the sake of the integrity, unity and prosperity of the Tajik people who have gone through a lot of sufferings and drama of the post-war period and economic hardships, Tajik Foreign Minister Rashid Olimov said.

In an interview with ITAR-TASS on Monday [7 November], Olimov said that the essence of the Tajik settlement has been determined by the signing of an agreement in Islamabad extending the truce for another three months. The sides will resume talks in Moscow in early December to discuss a range of issues defined in the Islamabad accord.

Speaking about the prospects for intra-Tajik settlement, Olimov noted that he is optimistic and believes that only a dialogue can provide a basis for large-scale reform and presidential election in the Republic.

The minister thinks that the negotiation process should have a positive impact on political reform in Tajikistan and parliamentary elections to be held not later than February 1995.

### Update On Cotton Harvest Figures

*LD0811100294 Dushanbe Radio Tajikistan Network in Tajik 0743 GMT 8 Nov 94*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] On Sunday [6 November] the cotton growers, having voted for their candidate, rushed back to the fields of the Republic; and they were right—it would have been blasphemy to waste a warm sunny day. The cotton pickers' work was also intensive yesterday. In total more than 455,000 tons of cotton have been delivered to the state reception centers, which makes about 57 percent of the state target. [passage omitted]

## Uzbekistan

### Karimov Edict Forms Uzbekistan Railways Company

*LD0711195994 Tashkent Radio Tashkent Network in Uzbek 1300 GMT 7 Nov 94*

[Edict by the president of Uzbekistan on creating the state shareholding railway company Uzbekistan Railways; date not given—read by announcer]

[FBIS Translated Text] With the aim of satisfying the national economy's requirements for rail transport and ensuring stable and secure work on the railways:

1. A state joint-stock railway company, Uzbekistan Railways, [(Uzbekiston Temir Yollari)] is to be created on the basis of existing enterprises; branches of railway, industrial, building, trading and supply enterprises; educational institutions; health care, cultural and sports establishments; and planning, design and other organizations, enterprises and establishments within the rail transport system that are located on the territory of Uzbekistan;

2. The state joint-stock Uzbekistan Railways Company is a state body authorized to administer railway transport of the Republic of Uzbekistan and to carry out management and economic regulation of shipments via rail transport;

3. The main tasks and areas of activity for the state joint-stock company Uzbekistan Railways are to be defined as:

Introducing market relationships for rail freight and passenger transport;

defining the future development and of rail transport and assigning it a place in light of the transformation of the Uzbek economy;

guaranteeing that rail transport can compete in the transport marketplace by establishing a multifaceted service sector for consumers in rail transport enterprises;

developing and implementing a set of measures to increase the flow of train traffic on the railway network;

organizing and conducting scientific-technical and investment policy;

developing and introducing new equipment and technology for railway transport;

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carrying out tariff policy in the prescribed manner for transporting freight, passengers, mail and luggage, with a reduction in costs and an increase in customer service quality as the basic objectives;

and organizing comprehensive development of rail transport.

4. Decisions made by the state joint-stock company Uzbekistan Railways within the bounds of its powers must be implemented without fail by ministries, government departments, corporations, concerns, associations, organizations and local bodies of state administration.

5. The Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan is to adopt a resolution on organizing the work of the state joint-stock company Uzbekistan Railways and approve its structure and regulations within 10 days.

[Signed] President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov.

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## Armenia

### Yerevan To Allow Rail Transport From, To Azerbaijan

*NC0711201694 Yerevan SNARK in English 1344 GMT 7 Nov 94*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Yerevan, November 7 (SNARK)—Armenia is ready to open its railways for loads transportation from Azerbaijan to Nakhichevan, Armenian Minister for Transport Henrik Kochinian informed SNARK reporter today. "Moreover, we are agree to traffic humanitarian cargoes from Turkey, destined for Azerbaijan, via Armenia," - said he. This readiness of Armenia has been confirmed by the papers, signed recently in Brussels.

Besides, according to the minister, Armenia is expecting to meet readiness of Turkey and Azerbaijan. As it is known, Azerbaijan has been blockading Armenia more than two years, and as for Turkey it refused to allow transportation of even humanitarian aid for Armenia one and half year ago.

Henrik Kochinian informed that Iran is concerned in the lifting of the blockade of railroad, but the obstacle is the uncompromising position of Azerbaijan.

### Land, Air Communication Papers Signed With Lebanon

*NC0711201794 Yerevan SNARK in English 1213 GMT 7 Nov 94*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Yerevan, November 7 (SNARK)—Today a package of documents on land and air communication between Armenia and Lebanon has been signed in Yerevan.

A head of Lebanon delegation currently in Yerevan, a Minister for Transport 'Umar Misqawi expressed his hope that "Armenia will manage to overcome the difficulties soon and will meet a new highest stage of development."

Both Armenian and Lebanon expressed their hope that the problem with transport blockade of Armenia for the Turkish part will be settled in the nearest future.

Reporters were informed that it is nearly a year that Armenian aircrafts have been running between Yerevan and Beirut.

## Azerbaijan

### Iranian Ambassador Pays Farewell Visit to Aliyev

*NC0711155694 Baku Azerbaycan Radio Televiziyasi Television Network in Azeri 1300 GMT 7 Nov 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] Iranian Ambassador to Azerbaijan 'Ali Akbar Nahavandian met with President Geydar Aliyev today before leaving for his country after having completed his assignment. Our correspondent reports.

[Begin recording] [Sakit Ocagli] Referring to the friendly and excellent cooperation between the two neighboring fraternal countries, Ambassador 'Ali Akbar Nahavandian noted that during his diplomatic activity in Azerbaijan he always worked for the strengthening of ties in every field. The neighboring friendly Iranian people will never forget the brotherly assistance provided by the Azerbaijani people, when Azerbaijan had not yet attained its independence, to those who suffered during the natural disaster in Iran. He said that they will always be with us in difficult days for Azerbaijan.

President Geydar Aliyev particularly stressed the ambassador's contributions to developments in recent years and his significant efforts in providing assistance to the population in Nakhichevan, which is under a blockade. In referring to the assistance given to the refugees who became homeless because of Armenia's occupationist policy, the concrete work accomplished to improve the chilly ties between Iran and Azerbaijan until July 1992, Mr. Hashemi- Rafsanjani's visit to Baku, and his colleague's [Aliyev's] fruitful talks in Iran, the Azerbaijani President noted that all these were done during the ambassadorship and with the contributions of 'Ali Akbar Nahavandian.

[Aliyev] I can state now that your ambassadorial activity has come to an end in Azerbaijan and that you left a good mark here with your activities. I think that this is a deep mark that will be continued to be felt in Azerbaijan's life. In the name of Azerbaijan and myself as president, I thank you for the services you rendered to improve the friendly relations between the Iranian and Azerbaijani states and peoples and for the attention and concern you as the ambassador of Iran showed to the Azerbaijani Republic and people. I am hopeful that our present relations with you will continue and the Iranian-Azerbaijani friendly relations we created here together will further consolidate and develop. [end recording]

Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Rasul Guliyev also received 'Ali Akbar Nahavandian. The Iranian ambassador, who concluded his mission in Azerbaijan, thanked the Azerbaijani leadership for the hospitality shown to him.

### Iran, Azerbaijan 'Brotherly' Nations

*LD0711220194 Tehran IRNA in English 2013 GMT 7 Nov 94*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku, Nov. 7, IRNA—Iranian Ambassador to the Republic of Azerbaijan 'Ali Asghar Nahavandian at the end of his diplomatic mission to Baku here today met with the Azeri president Geydar Aliyev.

Calling the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Azerbaijan "two brotherly nations," Aliyev praised the efforts made by Nahavandian to expand relations between the two countries. Aliyev also referred to the mistakes made by former Azeri leaders in their conducts

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towards the Islamic Republic of Iran and emphasized on his efforts to make up for past mistakes.

Earlier in the day Nahavandian met with other high-ranking officials of the Azeri Republic to bid them farewell.

Meanwhile, the newly appointed Iranian Ambassador to Azerbaijan Mohammad Taheri began his diplomatic mission in Baku today.

## Usubov on Arms Seized, Relations With Turkey

*TA0811094994 Ankara TRT Television Network in Turkish 0800 GMT 8 Nov 94*

[Yavuz Dalogullari video report from Baku]

[FBIS Translated Text] Azerbaijani Internal Affairs Minister Ramil Usubov has stated that large quantities of weapons and provisions were both seized and voluntarily handed over by citizens during searches conducted throughout the country in the wake of the 4 October antigovernment actions. Turkish Radio and Television correspondent Yavuz Dalogullari reports from Baku:

[Begin Dalogullari recording] Usubov, who held a news conference for Turkish reporters in Baku, stated that 400 automatic rifles, 62 heavy machine guns, 20 antitank weapons, two tanks, 300 vehicles, and approximately 2 million rounds of ammunition were seized during the past month. Commenting on the estimated 5,000 weapons in the people's possession, Usubov added that this should be considered natural in a country at war, but stressed that the citizens should hand over the weapons in their possession.

On the issue of relations with Turkey, Usubov stated that close cooperation exists between the Azerbaijani and Turkish Interior Ministries. Usubov explained that Turkey, within the framework of the security and cooperation protocol signed by the respective Interior Ministries, helps Azerbaijan in areas such as the struggle against terrorism, the apprehension of offenders, and education. [end recording]

## Baku's Changing Relations With Russia Viewed

*MM0711135494 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Nov 94 p 4*

[Article by Rustam Arifdzhanov: "The Hand of Moscow...Waving Good-bye From the Quayside"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On the Baku subway, two militiamen in the new-style dark green uniform stand at the entrance to the lobby inspecting packages and bags, and, at the slightest suspicion, demanding people's documents and frisking them. Armored vehicles and men with automatic weapons stand outside buildings here and there. Once again Baku has a state of emergency, a curfew, and road blocks.

At the station that used to be called "Ploshchad Odinnadtsatoy Krasnoy Armii" ["11th Red Army Square"] in honor of the Russian soldiers who brought Soviet power to Azerbaijan in April 1920, a new black plate has been fixed to the marble of the lobby: It gives the names of the casualties in the subway explosion in spring of this year. The station itself was renamed a few years ago, as "20 January," in memory of those who were killed back in 1990 by the bullets and tanks of the very same "Red Army," sent here to defend the powers it had brought in.

### A Kiss, and Independence

The 70 years between those two dates were spent in kisses of allegiance from the chiefs of the southern land to the northern leaders, assurances of eternal love and friendship, fear of Moscow, and dependence on it. For nearly 15 years—one-fifth of the period in question—this strange one-sided love was sealed with the kisses of the man who is now president of independent Azerbaijan. He more than anyone else in the new republic (and perhaps in the entire former Union) knows the price of those developed socialist kisses. The young provincial leader outplayed the Kremlin elders. Every kiss had to be paid for. Azerbaijan used to secure decisions on building new enterprises, divert rivers of capital investment, and obtain the Central Committee and Council of Ministers resolutions that suited it.

It cannot be said that Aliyev managed to obtain more money than the others. His rival neighbors and the other brothers in the family of peoples kept a jealous eye on that. But he did do it intelligently, bringing about structural changes in the republic's economy.

During his 10 years' absence, his successors failed not only to do anything more substantial, but to do anything at all in Azerbaijan. They failed to resolve economic questions, they failed even worse in politics. They landed themselves with the Karabakh conflict, pogroms, and a bloody army march on Baku. The reign of the openly pro-Moscow President Mutalibov ended in a victory for nationalist and, moreover, pro-Turkish forces.

With the Turkish "brother," there was even more kissing and swearing of blood-brotherhood than in the old days. The naive pro-Turkish President Elchibey, who dreamed of a future universal Turkic brotherhood and might, fell into Ankara's arms tremulously and selflessly. His kisses cost nothing. Except just a few humanitarian acts: the opportunity to watch Turkish television programs and to write in the Latin alphabet, which is painfully and with difficulty replacing the Cyrillic that the majority of Azerbaijanis are used to; and repairs to two urban telephone exchanges. Turkey was not able to offer more substantial economic assistance. But everything possible was exported from Azerbaijan. The fledgling Azerbaijani bourgeoisie transferred capital to Turkey and moved there with their families. Embezzlement and corruption by the dreaming president's immediate entourage was many times in excess of what the former partyocrats used to achieve.

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**Aliyev's Return**

The rebel Colonel Guseynov, who drove Elchibey out of Baku with tanks, could not, in the view of many Azerbaijani politicians, have accomplished last year's victorious rebellion without two complementary factors. On the one hand, the tremendous dissatisfaction among the people, who had lost all hope in the fruitless war and the senseless conduct of affairs; on the other, the position of a Russia frankly far from enamored of the regime of Elchibey, who was prepared to sell both Azerbaijan and its oil, in which Moscow had a very definite interest.

Russia's position, neutral at best, was what got a mere field commander, and not a very intelligent one at that, as far as Baku. The muscular "hand of Moscow" that incited Guseynov to a coup is axiomatic for Azerbaijani public opinion, and most of all for the present opposition. Just as it is regarded as axiomatic that the commander and wool merchant was only clearing the way for another man who was a favorite of Moscow's at the time—Mutalibov.

Aliyev, summoned by Elchibey from his Nakhichevan fastness, shuffled everyone's cards. The fierce colonel who was besieging the National Assembly building was "hooked" by Aliyev's offer of the post of premier, changed sides—and lost. The nomination of a potential rival for a post that he knows the nominee cannot handle, is a tried and tested Aliyev political ploy. The same thing used to happen in the communist past, when Azerbaijanis who had made an impression in Moscow were recalled to responsible jobs in Baku and, with the passage of time, were cast into oblivion. That was what happened this time. And it could happen in future too.

Huseynov, suspecting this, managed to get his supporters appointed to many leading posts. It did not save him. The experienced Aliyev, as if teasing him, moved the young and ambitious politician further and further away from the real work. As if he was trying to provoke a conflict. More and more power became concentrated in the hands of Geydar Aliyev, who was back—to Moscow's surprise. And this in spite of the fact that he had no support in army circles, or, incidentally, in the army itself. Aliyev did not have the support of big capital in the quasi-state sphere, which was gambling on the economist Mutalibov and remembered the iron grip of the ex-first secretary. Small-scale merchant business, the wholesale suppliers of flowers and vegetables to Russia, also backed Baku's own Mutalibov, associating him with a favorable climate for expansion on the Russian market. And Russia itself was on rather cool terms with the new leader. Aliyev was certainly better to work with than Elchibey, but equally certainly more dangerous than anyone else.

He spent 18 months imposing order in the neglected economy. Some 20 percent of the republic's territory had been seized by bellicose neighbors, the greater part of it during Aliyev's own rule. The troops—flabby, untrained, undisciplined in the extreme, to the point of corruption—were unable to offer resistance. Aliyev drained the cup of defeat to the dregs. But he emerged from defeat with a more or less structured army. General Mamedov, deputy chief of the General Staff Academy, was invited from Moscow to take up the post of defense minister—a man who is not, perhaps, the greatest strategist, which is surprising for a country at war, but a dried-up, pedantic, front-line soldier who puts discipline above everything. The Defense Ministry was transformed from a noisy headquarters reminiscent of a clamorous gathering of guerrillas or militiamen, into an office, a model unit with painted borders according to "Soviet Army" tradition. Despite the burdens of war, insubordinate subunits were disbanded, field commanders were reshuffled, and laxity was resolutely stamped on. Mamedrafi Mamedov, the seventh military minister in a short space of time, achieved—he himself says—the most important thing: The army began to obey its commander in chief—Aliyev.

And now he could deal with Guseynov.

Aliyev's real return to his former self—the arbitrary and imperious master—did not come when, summoned to Baku, he became head of the transitional National Assembly, and not even when he was elected president by virtually the whole people, but only now. Or rather, a month ago, after the hapless premier's unsuccessful and, in part, deliberately engineered putsch.

Etibar Mamedov, the most powerful figure in the Azerbaijani opposition today, leader of the independence party that seceded from the People's Front, calls Aliyev's rule not pro-American, pro-Russian, pro-Turkish, or even pro-Azerbaijani, but pro-Aliyev. But both he and Mirfattakh Rakhmanov, one of the leaders of the People's Front (which does not recognize the legitimacy of Aliyev's presidency at all), believe that Aliyev is the real force that Azerbaijan needs today.

Who is behind Aliyev? Everyone and no one. At the time of his arrival in Baku, in a National Assembly packed with Suret Guseynov's "blue berets," only two people stood outside Aliyev's office—his bodyguard, and his son-in-law, also a former bodyguard, now Azerbaijani ambassador to Britain. The number of people he trusted was negligibly small. Two Azerbaijani politicians who were shot by terrorists in September—an old KGB colleague who was soon appointed chief of the presidential apparatus Special Section, and a fellow Nakhichevaner, deputy chairman of the National Assembly, for whom the president felt almost paternal feelings, were the people closest to him apart from his son-in-law and his son, the vice president of the Azerbaijan Oil Company. Those who ordered the killing knew where to hit him.

The escape of four high-ranking prisoners. "The audacious seizure of the republican prosecutor's office building by a special detachment of police." The Russian Foreign Ministry note disputing the legality of the oil

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contract.... Finally, the rebellion of Guseynov's closest associates in Ganja, carried out not without the prime minister's blessing. This whole line of destabilizing events made the republic start talking confidently of the "hand of Moscow" again.

Aliyev was left all alone with the people. He alone made the decision to break out of the ever tighter circle by summoning the people to the square by night. A rally style, a street style, not in the least characteristic of this office strategist. And when a crowd of more than 100,000 gathered outside the presidential palace, his nerve never wavered for a moment. The cautious Aliyev stated openly that the threads of the conspiracy lead to Moscow. But then, getting a grip on himself, he explained—to Mutalibov, who has entrenched himself in the Russian capital. Other republican leaders were even more cautious.

'Ali Akbar Nahavandian, Iranian ambassador to Azerbaijan, speedily dissociated his state from involvement in the events. Russian Ambassador Valter Shoniya, in conversation with me, called the search for a Russian connection absurd. But it was Ramiz Rizayev, head of the Azerbaijani mission to Russia, who was more specific: "There can be no question of any involvement by official Moscow in the attempted coup in Azerbaijan. The insignificance of the figure of Mutalibov is clear to many Russian politicians, although Russia has many faces. However, most likely it was not Russia that was trying to use the adventurist Guseynov to change the situation in Azerbaijan, but Guseynov himself, playing the Russian card. It is quite possible that the plan was carefully planned, and planned outside Azerbaijan. But most likely this was done by specialists paid by Guseynov and his associates. It was necessary to create a fog over the 'hand of Moscow' in order to give some significance to the attempted rebellion. The story that Russian aircraft or helicopters from the Gabalinskaya Radar Station helped Guseynov to flee Azerbaijan comes from the same stable. We make a clear distinction between official Russia and those who are ready for any kind of provocation for big money."

**...But the Ship Has Sailed**

Nonetheless, artificial structures in the form of a constant Russian threat are now being set up by many people. After all, the necessary "building" material is at hand. Railroad traffic on the North Caucasus Railroad has been suspended since early September because of the situation in Chechnya. Azerbaijan's losses from this have already amounted to some 4.5 billion rubles. Buses lined up at the railroad station with destination boards saying "Moscow" or "Mineralnyye Vody" naturally cannot salvage the situation. Lines have formed outside the bread stores. The Ministry of Grain Products was quick to state that the main reason is the stoppage of traffic along the Chechen sector of the railroad, although state subsidies on bread total nearly 80 billion rubles and its prime cost is three times higher than the sale price.

According to First Deputy Communications Minister Omar Guseynov, "Azerbaijan was forced this year to reduce by half the number of channels to Russia and the CIS countries. The reason was the republic's debt, formed as a consequence of the excess of outgoing calls over incoming calls, which last year totaled $360,000 and this year has increased to $2 million." Air time for "Ostankino" and the Russian Television channel has just been reduced considerably. The reason this time was our own [Russian] state companies' debts to Azerbaijan.

Hinting at machinations by your neighbor, in this case Russia, is always the best way to disclaim your own blunders. At the same time, foreign experts who are watching Azerbaijan closely have classified the state as being among those countries with high inflation, a closed national currency, and an unreformed economy.

The total volume of production has been steadily declining for more than four years now. And although Aliyev has managed to slow down the decline and even to overcome the hyperinflation that gripped the republic at the end of last year, reducing the inflation rate from 53 percent to 20 percent or below, the threat of economic disaster has not passed. Nearly all industrial production in the industrial sector goes on military needs. In terms of the number of refugees per head of population, Azerbaijan has the highest indicator.

Consumer goods production has fallen by 17.6 percent in a year. Of this, food products accounted for nearly one-fourth [sentence as published]. The production of nonfood goods has fallen by 12 percent.

Because of the lack of the necessary manufacturing equipment for processing raw cotton, only some 20 percent of this raw material is processed in Azerbaijan today.

Gas extraction is falling: by virtually 1 billion cubic meters a year. Azerbaijan extracts just over half of what it needs itself, whereas 10 years ago it even used to export gas.

Oil extraction is also falling: by 8.5 percent compared with last year. Oil fields on land constitute an ecological and natural disaster. Oil extraction in the coastal waters is not very different.

**The Main Trump Card**

It is Caspian oil that is Azerbaijan's main political and economic trump card. It is oil that fills the holds of the ship—battered by war and internecine strife, touched by the rust of an unreformed economy—that Aliyev is gradually steering toward free voyaging, drawing further and further away from the fairway mapped out over the decades in the northern headquarters.

People in Azerbaijan believe that Aliyev has already done more for Russia than he might have done. Elchibey did not see the northern neighbor on the list of participants in the oil contract at all. Out of Azerbaijan's

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30-percent share in the contract signed in Baku for the exploitation of three marine oil fields, 10 percent is allocated to the Russian company "Lukoil" today. The greater part of the oil will go to an international concern involving Britain's "British Petroleum" and America's "AMOCO." It is proposed to extract 500 million tons of oil over 30 years. More than $7 billion in investments will be needed ("Can Russia supply that?"—people in Azerbaijan asked me maliciously), and according to various estimates the Azerbaijanis will eventually receive profits of between 35 and 80 billion dollars.

But the contract's effect on the economy here will, it is believed, be immediate and significant. The signing of the contract will be followed by the arrival of supply and servicing companies in Baku and a large influx of domestic capital investments. The country's infrastructure, especially telecommunications, needs considerable improvement, and the development of the network of hotels and offices will also be a priority. A $150-million plan is already being discussed for converting the old sports complex on Primorskiy Boulevard in Baku into a "five-star" hotel and office complex. The construction contract is expected to go to the British company "Morrison Construction," while the EBRD [European Bank for Reconstruction and Development] will invest a 35-percent share in this enterprise and provide finance. The World Bank has also recently signed its first loan agreement with Azerbaijan. This credit of $40 million will be used to modernize and repair Baku's water supply network. According to Mete Durdag [name as transliterated], IMF representative in Baku: "Azerbaijan, which has ignored IMF recommendations for many years, is becoming a model member." Foreign trade has been liberalized and restrictions on currency exchange rates lifted. Bread and fuel prices are being released. A privatization program has been drawn up.

But the ship is sailing, and completing its repairs as it goes along. From the Russian shore, we can wave the departing sailors good-bye with a white handkerchief or see them off with polite diplomatic faces. We can shout threats after them, or even catch up with the fugitives. There are many methods. Send torpedo boats after them, organize a mutiny on the ship, refuse to allow them to refuel at the nearest port. But we lack the resources for the first; the mutineers are self-centered and untalented; and apart from our own northern quays, there are others, in other seas.

The Azerbaijanis have little faith in the hand of Moscow waving good-bye, but they also see Kozyrev's note as more like an attempt by the Russians to resolve their own political problems—say, to neutralize the imperialistically inclined patriotic opposition with the semblance of a diplomatic demarche. It is asserted that the government, in the person of Chernomyrdin, correctly understands Azerbaijan's problems.

Aliyev is quite a pragmatic man (and it is most likely him we will be dealing with for a very long time to come), and if he is now steering the ship toward the hands that hold rustling U.S. bank notes, that certainly does not mean that he will deny himself the pleasure of calling at a Russian port too, should the occasion arise. To refuel. Or even to shake a hand that is giving or—most important—not taking anything away.

That is what friendship will mean now. And clearly, no kisses.

## Georgia

### Shevardnadze Weekly Interview

*LD0711161194 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 0622 GMT 7 Nov 94*

[Interview with head of state Eduard Shevardnadze by correspondent Nato Oniani; date not given—live or recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Oniani] We present to you a radio interview with the chairman of the Georgian parliament and head of state, Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze.

Mr. Shevardnadze, you started your interview last week by discussing economic problems and reviewing the results of the previous week. Last week was also interesting in this respect, so I would like to ask you to start today with this subject.

And another question. Mr. Valavi, who is probably the most popular representative of the International Monetary Fund in Georgia, discussed at a meeting with the parliamentary majority [faction] Saturday the progress of economic reforms and, especially, the need for a structural reorganization of the Cabinet of Ministers. It is very important today that the executive structures should be staffed with people who will not block reforms and who are not, simply, conservative. Therefore, structural reorganization in the Cabinet of Ministers should not have a random nature.

[Shevardnadze] Thank you and good morning. I think that our attempt to do a brief review of the economic situation is justified.

I would like to speak very briefly about the results of the [first] nine months. Industrial output in this period was worth 109 trillion coupons. But output is not the main factor here. What is important is the trend. There is not a lot in this trend to cheer about, but there is some positive tendency: the decline in output has slowed slightly. It is down by 13 or 14 percent. I believe that if we manage to supply the country with a minimum amount of energy, then the results of November's and December's work will be more promising as far as the use of industrial potential is concerned.

At the same time, I would like to say for certain people's attention that, in my opinion, there were no serious reasons, for example, for a fall of 34 percent in rolled metal production, 58 percent in steel, 31 percent in

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electricity, 68 percent in machine tool, 77 percent in cement production and so on. I have named the fields which had the opportunity to work in relatively normal conditions. [passage omitted]

No measures have been taken so far to ensure that the flat tax on bread and gas sales is paid into the budget. This is a very serious question because there will be no budget unless this question is addressed. We will be unable to solve any problems if such basic issues remain unsolved. Between 17 September and today the Bread Products and Poultry Corporation contributed [to the budget] only 2.7 trillion coupons instead of 5.5 trillion. We cannot go on living like that. [passage omitted]

As for the situation on the domestic currency market, the positive tendency here is becoming stable. This is the most remarkable result of our reforms. It may not be a very significant achievement but it is an achievement anyway. It can be said that the strengthening of the coupon is becoming a permanent process. It is becoming rather strong, giving us the opportunity to consider the introduction of a real national currency in the first or second quarter of next year.

For example, on the last day of trading on the Tbilisi Interbank Currency Exchange, which was on 4 November, commercial banks offered $304,000 for sale. But there was no demand, which is a very important factor, and the National Bank took another step to stabilize the coupon and bought all the foreign currency on sale. It has increased its own reserves and set the rate for the U.S. dollar at 1.98 million coupons. At the end of the previous day of trading a week ago, the dollar closed at 2.3 million coupons. There are serious changes here as well. As for the Russian ruble, it remains at 625 coupons. So, the situation is stable. [passage omitted]

As for Mr. Valavi's meeting with members of our parliament, his views are no different from ours. The issue of structural improvement has been on the agenda for quite a while, and this process is in fact under way. There are two areas which require work. The main thing is structural reorganization in the economy itself, not only in the superstructure [zednasheni]. Or, in other words, reforms are needed. The second area is concerned with improving the management structures. The former process is proceeding ahead of schedule, and that is how, I think, it should proceed. Meanwhile, the latter one, which is the structural reorganization, improvement, or perhaps streamlining of the superstructure, the Cabinet of Ministers, is being prepared and will be implemented. Both these processes should develop at the same time and they are a prerequisite for overall success [words indistinct].

This issue has another aspect. No structural transformation in management will help unless there are appropriate people who will lead new reorganized structures. Everything will depend on people and on our ability to find the right people. I do not want to overtake events—things should happen in their own time and that is when we should learn about them—but let me say that there will be both structural and personnel changes. However, these changes will only take place when we are ready for them, when there are laws to implement them. Otherwise, the idea of structural changes may be counterproductive.

You mentioned conservatives—I am not talking about people with a conservative mentality—I tell you that such people, conservatives in the good sense of the word, are also necessary at a time of reform. Someone should take issue with you, someone should argue with you to ensure that the truth will out in a dispute. For example, when there is a discussion of reforms I take into consideration, to a certain extent, the opinion of thinking conservatives in the good sense of this word.

[Oniani] Excuse me for interrupting you but there is one problem in Georgia which the current reforms have exposed. There are people who are very experienced administrators of industry. Now it has suddenly become clear that their experience is not quite suitable for the present economic conditions in the country. Fresh personnel are needed, but fresh personnel have no experience of industry administration. [passage omitted]

[Shevardnadze] You will have noticed our attitude to the privatization process, especially the fact that we have not expressed no confidence in collectives and managers who are active today. Whether we like it or not, they are the most qualified people. How they are adapting to market economy changes is a different question. I believe that we should rely on what we have and help these people bring their mentality in line with present requirements.

[Oniani] One of the most important events of last week was UN Secretary-General Butrus Butrus-Ghali's visit to Tbilisi. [passage omitted] In connection with the UN secretary-general's visit, it can be said that the introduction of Russian peacekeeping forces to Georgia became necessary after we saw that the United Nations was unable to act decisively.

[Shevardnadze] The secretary-general's visit to Georgia was without doubt an important event. I said that, in a certain sense, this first visit was a historic event. For a new UN member this is a sign of appreciation and recognition of its prominent position in the international community.

As for the results [of the visit], it is probably a little too early to speak about them now. It would be more appropriate to discuss the results after he [Butrus-Ghali] returns to New York. Let us see in what form he chooses to express his views. This may be a resolution, a report to the Security Council containing his proposals, or some recommendations. We will learn about it later.

The Security Council and Russia, as one of its members, have, of course, the ability to give a powerful impetus to

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the conflict settlement. This, in a certain way, should be supported with the secretary-general's impressions after his visit. [passage omitted]

I am sure that Georgia will have a say in turning the United Nations into a real guarantor of peace and stability on our planet, which, unfortunately, the UN has still not become after 50 years of existence.

We are now discussing our relatively minor problems here [in Georgia] such as reforms, structural improvements, and so on. But the United Nations also needs these reforms. If it wants to be a guarantor of stability and peace, there should be appropriate mechanisms and structures in place as well as appropriate funds. I said at our meeting [with Butrus-Ghali] that the modern world could afford to release 10 billion, 15 billion, or 20 billion—considering that trillions were saved after the end of the cold war—in order to set up appropriate structures, including its own private armed forces, to establish peace in hot spots and to avert cataclysms. It seems that we are moving in this direction and will achieve this ultimately.

[Oniani] Jaba Ioseliani [chief Georgian negotiator at the peace talks on Abkhazia] said in connection with the Abkhaz conflict that if the process of settlement drags on, Georgia should demand the withdrawal of the peacekeeping forces and refuse to allow the setting up of Russian military bases. When asked in the secretary-general's presence to comment on this, you said: I admit that Jaba Ioseliani is not the only one who thinks so. The next meeting will be held in Geneva [on 14 November]. Will Georgian representatives take part in it?

[Shevardnadze] If the Abkhaz conflict settlement is delayed indefinitely, negative processes will develop spontaneously. This is what Batoni Jaba was talking about, and I said he was not alone in thinking so.

Unfortunately, this threat has not been recognized appropriately either by the Abkhaz leaders—I want them to consider this—or by the mediators and our friends who are helping us. If events lose their dynamism, it will then be impossible to look for peaceful ways. We should all understand this well. I think that this is well understood [words indistinct] in Russia, its armed forces. Politicians and diplomats are also aware how important it is for the entire process to become dynamic and be speeded up. [words indistinct]

As for [the talks in] Geneva, we should by all means take part in this meeting. I do not think that the time for protest has come yet. [words indistinct]

[Oniani] At an expanded meeting at the Defense Ministry last week, you discussed problems facing the Georgian army. You also said that we should publish documents concerning specific incidents involving undisciplined behavior and often antistate activity by certain individuals during the Abkhaz conflict. You said that many people who have made billions in this war are today trying to assume an air of dignity.

The head of the Security Service [Igor Giorgadze] said at the meeting that certain political forces are trying in vain to find a power base in the armed forces.

Meanwhile, there are widespread rumors in Tbilisi of meetings near Lake Tbilisi and possible armed attacks. If this is true, do you not think that parliament's meeting tomorrow can be considered as part of the preparation for these events?

[Shevardnadze] I told the Defense Ministry Collegium something in this connection, something that had to be said. This meeting also discussed specific tasks relating to the construction of the armed forces. [words indistinct]

The session of parliament tomorrow is an attempt to raise tension artificially [words indistinct]. Therefore, it is understandable that there is public anxiety over rumors that they are recruiting volunteers, assembling weapons, preparing for the Abkhaz campaign,and so on. I do not think that this is related to Abkhazia. Nor do I believe that these forces represent any threat. I still believe that there are no forces in the country capable of plunging the people and the authorities into chaos and anarchy. Realistically speaking, there are no such forces. If someone attempts to embark on adventures - there are such people, there are adventurists - I do not think that they have a future. The only danger is that this may result in casualties. I think that they have enough brains and intelligence not to misjudge the situation. People will not support them, people will not take to the streets. Events which have cost Georgia so dear in the past [word indistinct] years will not repeat themselves. They will not be able to do it, but they are trying.

In this connection, I would like to tell you that there were grounds for the statement made by the head of our security service, Mr. Giorgadze. Last night was not exactly a peaceful one, although the population did not hear anything. The police did their job, and there was peace and order in the city—apart from the fact that snow fell quite unexpectedly. [passage omitted containing Oniani interruption recalling the abortive anti-Shevardnadze coup in June 1992]

On the one hand, they have no support among the population. However, as Igor said—I mean the head of the Security Service, Mr. Giorgadze—this [threat of armed attacks] was real indeed. Unfortunately, not all our military units are properly maintained today. Wages are symbolic, the quality of catering is poor. The winter is coming, and not everybody has proper clothes and caps to wear. However, most of our units are loyal and will do their job. We discussed all of these issues, and we will create the proper conditions for them; we will either perish or create an army in which there will be relatively normal conditions. They [the plotters] are looking for support there [in the army]. They are looking for people

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who are upset. You know that we have disbanded many formations. Those formations had to be disbanded. Naturally, there are people who are upset, although the great majority met this with understanding. They are looking for such people. They are still looking for weapons. However, all of this is doomed to failure [word indistinct]. No category of people will support them. They are bankrupt, politically bankrupt. I do not want to use the words political corpse and so on, but these people are not far from that.

Those who are calling for bloodshed and urging people to take to the streets are indeed enemies of their own people, regardless of whether they understand what they are doing or not, (?there is no difference). [passage omitted]

### Shevardnadze Appoints New Deputy Interior Minister

*LD0711143394 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 1300 GMT 7 Nov 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] We present a decree by the Georgian head of state.

By decree of the Georgian head of state, Emzar Sabanidze will be appointed Georgian deputy interior minister.

### Further Interior Ministry Appointments

*LD0711162794 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 1500 GMT 7 Nov 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] The Georgian interior minister has issued an order on the appointment of Colonel Arvelodi Zhvania as head of the Chief Directorate of Investigation and Colonel Levan Kenchadze as head of the Chief Directorate of Highway Police of the Georgian Interior Ministry.

### National-Democrats on Establishment of Russian Bases

*LD0711175694 Tbilisi IBERIA in Georgian 1500 GMT 7 Nov 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] Tbilisi, 7 November—The press center of the Georgian National-Democratic Party has provided an IBERIA correspondent with a statement that says:

"We have learned from media reports that at a 5 November meeting with the Georgian head of state, representatives of the Georgian Defense Ministry requested that the handling of the issue of establishing Russian military bases in Georgia be expedited.

"The press center of the Georgian National-Democratic Party is authorized to state that bringing up the subject of establishing Russian military bases in Georgia particularly by the representatives of the Defense Ministry, is, mildly speaking, an approach to the issue that does not meet needs of the state [arasakhelmtsipoebrivi] especially today when the Abkhazian problem is far from being settled and there seems to be no prospects of settling it.

"We are stating that the issue can be put on the agenda only after Russia has done a favor and has met commitments it has made in regard to the Abkhazian problem."

### 'Saboteurs' Kill 2 Abkhaz Policemen

*LD0711193194 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1726 GMT 7 Nov 94*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Two policemen have been killed following an attack by Georgian saboteurs outside Nabakeva village in Abkhazia's Gal region on Monday afternoon, Abkhaz Interior Minister Givi Agrba told Interfax. He said the attack on a police patrol took place in a security zone controlled by Russian peacekeepers.

The minister said the militants took the dead body of one of the policemen to Georgia. He accused Russian peacekeepers of failing to intervene again.

### People Protect Social-Democratic Propaganda Group

*LD0711202494 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 1300 GMT 7 Nov 94*

["Statement by the Georgian Social-Democratic Party"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A propaganda brigade of the political council of the Georgian Social-Democratic Party led by Professor Guram Muchaidze, chairman of the party and member of parliament, held meetings with people of the towns of Kareli, Khashuri, Surami, Zestaponi, Kutaisi, Samtredia, Tkibuli, Chiatura, Sachkhere, and Terjola from 2 to 6 November. The meetings focused on the provision of social security for the working people.

The active intervention and support on the part of the population helped to prevent some armed individuals from arresting members of the brigade in Zrstaponi and Kutaisi. They also drove away vehicles equipped with machineguns sent to disperse the people gathered in Samtredia.

The full support of the working people has once again demonstrated the righteousness of the stance held by the Georgian Social-Democratic Party.

The information has been provided by the press center of the Georgian Social-Democratic Party.

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## Estonia

### Luik Speaks on Return of KGB Archive Files

*LD0711203394 Tallinn Estonian Television Network in Estonian 1900 GMT 7 Nov 94*

[Report on address by Foreign Minister Juri Luik in the Riigikogu in Tallinn on 7 November; passages in quotation marks are recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The majority of the KGB files that were taken out of Estonia are being kept in Ulyanovsk at the Russian State KGB central archives, according to Foreign Minister Juri Luik in an address to Riigikogu members today.

[Luik] "There exists a decree dated autumn 1992, from Russian President Boris Yeltsin, under which these security documents should be handed over to the Russian central state archives. This decree, however, is not adhered to properly, and the Russian state security, having judged the strategic value of these documents, has constantly kept its paw on them."

According to Juri Luik, it is expected, however, that quite soon Estonia and Russia will sign agreements which ensure that the KGB materials are brought back to Estonia. He noted that so far Russia has not responded to Estonian demands, with offers being made only to Lithuania.

[Luik] "Two options have been offered to Lithuania. KGB materials that are in Moscow are either to be destroyed, as decided, so to speak, by a joint Lithuanian-Russian commission, or they will be sealed completely for 30 years, and after 30 years they will be returned to the Republic of Lithuania. Well, neither option of course satisfied my Lithuanian colleagues."

In addition to the Estonian-Russian working group for talks, the Estonian Archives Department has also been involved in calls for the return of the archive materials. They are also studying the circumstances under which the files were taken out of Estonia. Juri Luik could not name the person to the parliament who is responsible for the loss of the files. He only noted that Hardo Aasmae, the then mayor of Tallinn, had been dealing with the archives. As one would recall, Edgar Savisaar's government was in office at the time. [passage omitted]

### Russian Federation on 'Complicated' Documentation

*WS0811113894 Tallinn BNS in English 1625 GMT 7 Nov 94*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tallinn, Nov 07, BNS—The Russian Federation is unable to issue all of its citizens with new passports and thus fails to ensure the freedom of movement for all people who have been granted Russian citizenship.

The Russian Embassy in Tallinn released data according to which 54,247 Russian citizens live at present in Estonia, but most of them have the registration stamp proving their citizenship entered in the domestic passport of a nonexistent state, the former Soviet Union, Director-General of the Citizenship and Migration Department Mart Piiskop told BNS.

The situation of Russian citizens living in Estonia is complicated also because the Citizenship and Migration Department is forced to enter in those passports the residence and work permits, which in accordance with the aliens law can be entered only in internationally recognized travel documents. Those people, if they want to travel abroad, are at the same time forced to obtain the temporary travel document issued by Estonian authorities.

The situation may become even more complicated after Feb. 6, 1995, when Russians living abroad can no longer apply for the citizenship of the Russian Federation under a simplified procedure.

The number of applicants is steadily growing. The Russian consulate in the northeast Estonian town of Narva informs they receive an average of 80 applications a day. The consul general said 17,000 residents of the East Virumaa and West Virumaa counties have also filed their citizenship applications in Narva.

The aliens law stipulates that all aliens residing in Estonia must either choose the citizenship of one or another country or opt for the status of stateless person and apply for residence and work permits by July 12, 1995, at the latest.

### Russian-Speaking Party Holds Founding Meeting

*LD0711135194 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 2000 GMT 5 Nov 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] A founding meeting of a third Russian- speaking party in Estonia—the Estonian Russian Popular Party—took place in Tallinn today. Nearly 70 representatives from Tallinn, Narva, Tartu, Parnu, and other Estonian towns attended the meeting. The meeting adopted a statute and program of the party and elected a six-member board.

With regard to internal policy, the party intends to seek equality for all permanent residents of the republic while a society based on law is built, and equality in choice of citizenship in accordance with the agreement concluded between the Republic of Estonia and the Russian Federation on 12 January 1992.

Aleksey Zybin, who was one of the initiators of the party and a member of its board, and a former leader of the Intermovement [Interdvizheniye], told BNS [Baltic News Service] that the party was not intending to be just an ethnic one. Zybin said that ideologically the party was somewhat left of center.

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### New Party Gives Farm Development High Priority

*LD0711131394 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 2000 GMT 5 Nov 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] The Estonian Farmers' Party was set up in Tartu today. The party defines itself as uniting citizens of the Republic of Estonia whose aim is the survival of the Estonian nation.

The party statute aims to gain legal backing for giving priority to developing the farming economy, a speedy return of land to its owners, low interest loans for developing farms and, protection of the Estonian agricultural market against dumping.

Ants Aaman, one of the initiators of the party, deemed the party's links with the Estonian Farmers' Central Union to be very important. With regard to the forthcoming parliamentary elections, Aaman said that they are looking for union with the majority of the right-wing parties with a rural connection.

## Lithuania

### Official Cites Bridge Explosion as 'Terrorism'

*WS0711160594 Tallinn BNS in English 1302 GMT 7 Nov 94*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vilnius, Nov 07, BNS—A powerful explosion shattered a railroad bridge not far from Vilnius Sunday in the first major act of terrorism in Lithuania.

The blast occurred at 7 a.m. [0500 GMT] on a two-track bridge across a small river on the line between Vilnius and the second biggest town of Kaunas, only 15 minutes before a passenger train was supposed to pass through.

People living close to the site of the explosion managed to warn the engine driver about the danger and the train was stopped about 500 meters from the damaged bridge. There were no injuries.

Lithuanian railroad authorities announced several hours later that some Vilnius-Kaunas trains would be taken off through "technical reasons." The dry "technical" announcement did not attract much attention until Monday.

Experts said the bomb had to be very powerful because the explosion wave ripped off a huge concrete prop and bent the rails. The blast damaged about 80 meters of one track. Debris fell on houses about 200 meters from the bridge.

The second track remained suitable for train-traffic, but speed had to be reduced to 5 kilometers per hour on that section of the line.

There has been no claim of responsibility. Officials said it is too early to say who might have set the blast or why. The explosion is investigated by all competent law enforcement agencies. The site of the bombing was visited by Interior Minister Romasis Vaitekunas.

### Police Investigate 'Possible Motives'

*WS0711160794 Tallinn BNS in English 1302 GMT 7 Nov 94*

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Vilnius, Nov 07, BNS—Lithuanian special services are investigating four possible motives of a bomb blast that seriously damaged a railroad bridge not far from Vilnius.

A powerful explosion Sunday morning ruined a considerable part of a two-track bridge on the railroad line between Vilnius and the second biggest Lithuanian town of Kaunas. The Prosecutor's Office set up a special group to investigate this most daring act of terrorism in Lithuania ever. The group includes high-ranking Security Department, Interior and Defense ministry officials.

Sources in the group told BNS that the bridge may have been blown up by former members of the Vilnius OMON, Soviet shock police, to mark the 77th anniversary of the Bolshevik coup in Russia.

The Vilnius OMON was especially active during 1990-1991, when Lithuania was struggling for its independence from the former Soviet Union. OMON leaders ran off to Russia after the failed Soviet coup attempt in Moscow in the August of 1991, but former OMON members still live in Lithuania and some were brought to trial for anti- state activities.

According to another theory, explosives may have been planted by local rightist radical forces, which seek to break off talks on Russian military transit through Lithuania. The first round of military transit talks between Lithuania and Russia is scheduled for this week.

Investigators also suppose that the bridge may have been blown up by Russian special services with an aim to prove that military transit through Lithuania is unsafe and thus to receive Western loans for ferry-communication between St. Petersburg and the Kaliningrad region.

The fourth possibility is that the explosion is related to the trial of four alleged mafiosi accused of murdering Lithuanian journalist Vitas Lingys. The sentence is likely to be announced this week.

According to expert conclusions, the 25-meter bridge was blown up by professionals because the explosion only blocked train-traffic to Vilnius, while Russian transit trains are still able to pass. [passage omitted]

### Government Condemns Act

*LD0711161294 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1400 GMT 7 Nov 94*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Lithuanian Government made a statement today, which reads inter alia:

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On 6 November an act of diversion unheard of in the Republic of Lithuania was carried out. An attempt was made to blow up a railroad bridge over which several trains were due to pass at that time.

It is difficult to understand the aims of those who had committed this crime. One thing is clear—they do not like the stability in our country and the gradual return to normal life. The bomb was placed under the bridge by those who want to present Lithuania as unsafe to her people and her neighbors. [passage omitted]

### 'Key Institutions' on Alert

*WS0811114094 Tallinn BNS in English 1625 GMT 7 Nov 94*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vilnius, Nov 07, BNS—All key institutions and enterprises in Lithuania have been instructed to tighten security after an act of terrorism on the Vilnius-Kaunas railroad line, Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius said on national radio Monday noon. The government will soon make a special statement, he said.

Part of a two-track railroad bridge was ruined Sunday morning by a powerful explosion 35 kilometers west of the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius. Slezevicius said the bombing "causes worry" from both the internal and the international point of view. The prime minister indicated that the crime has to be disclosed "as precisely and efficiently" as possible.

The circumstances of Sunday's explosion were discussed Monday at the Interior Ministry and at a special meeting called by President Algirdas Brazauskas, with participation of the prime minister and other senior government officials.

Slezevicius said it is still too early to speak about any investigation results.

The premier thanked people who live near the site of the explosion for "special self-control" and help in avoiding a major train accident. "Obviously, a collision of two trains was planned and the consequences would have been fatal," Slezevicius said.

A passenger train approaching the damaged bridge was stopped by efforts of local people who warned the engine driver of the danger ahead.

### Repairs To Take 'Three Weeks'

*WS0811113694 Tallinn BNS in English 1843 GMT 7 Nov 94*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vilnius, Nov 07, BNS—It will take around three weeks and 5.6 million lits to repair the railroad bridge damaged by Sunday's bomb explosion and to cover all other losses, Lithuanian Transportation Minister Jonas Birziskis said in a radio interview Monday.

The minister said he is certain that the bridge was blown up by "forces hostile to Lithuanian independence, seeking to destabilize the situation in our democratic state and to intimidate its people."

Birziskis supposes that the explosion is not accidental. "Repeated breakage of railroad installations, anonymous threats and finally a bridge explosion are all links in a single chain of crimes," the minister said.

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